



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963
Volume X
Cuba, 1961-1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

Cuba, 1961-1962

1. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 3, 1961, 1 a.m.

//Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Cuba. Official Use Only; Niact.

2674. Reference: Embassy telegram 2667./1/ Note received from Ministry of Foreign Relations at 1:20 a.m. January 3 reading in translation as follows:

/1/In telegram 2667 from Havana, January 2, Charge Daniel M. Braddock reported that Castro had just announced that his government had decided that the United States would not be allowed to have a greater number of diplomatic personnel in Cuba than Cuba maintained in the United States. Castro indicated that if all the U.S. officials remaining in Cuba decided to leave that would be "perfectly all right with us." He added that "90 percent of functionaries are spies anyway." (Ibid.)

Havana, January 2, 1961, Year of Education

Mr. Charge d'Affaires:

I have the honor to inform you that the Revolutionary Government has decided that under present circumstances the personnel of the Embassy and Consulate of Cuba in the City of Washington, whether diplomatic, consular, or of other character, whatever their nationality, should not exceed eleven persons. Likewise it has decided that the personnel of the Embassy and Consulate of the United States in the city of Habana, whether diplomatic, consular or of other character, whatever their nationality, should likewise be limited to eleven persons.

For the purpose of facilitating the departure of the persons who for this reason must abandon the national territory, a period of 48 hours has been fixed from the time of receipt of this note.

I take the opportunity, Mr. Charge d'Affaires, to reiterate to you the assurance of my reciprocity of your considerations./2/

/2/Braddock assessed the Cuban note and its impact in telegram 2675 from Havana, January 3. His conclusion was that it would be impossible to maintain a useful operation at the level authorized by the Cuban Government. Braddock recommended that the United States respond by breaking relations immediately. (Ibid.) The note is also printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, January 23, 1961, p. 104.

Signed Carlos Olivares.

Braddock

2. Editorial Note

On January 3, 1961, at 9 a.m., a meeting was held at the White House to consider a response to the note from the Cuban Foreign Ministry which was transmitted in telegram 2674 from Havana. (Document 1) According to notes on the meeting taken by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, the participants included President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Christian Herter, Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Gordon Gray, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, CIA Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell, Bissell's Assistant C. Tracy Barnes, and several officials from the Department of State, including Under Secretary Livingston Merchant and Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Mann.

Herter summarized the Cuban note and read Charge Braddock's message recommending an immediate break in relations. (See footnote 2, Document 1) Mann noted that, in the event of a break in relations, the Swiss Embassy in Havana could be expected to look after U.S. interests in Cuba. The President asked how the United States would know what was happening in Cuba if relations were broken and was told that, outside of Cuban exile sources, the United States would have only limited sources of information in Cuba after relations were broken. After some discussion, it was concluded that a break in relations would not affect the treaty guaranteeing the United States the use of Guantanamo naval base. Gates and Merchant questioned the need to respond immediately to the Cuban note, but Eisenhower decided to make a clean break and directed Herter to take the steps necessary to effect the break as quickly as possible.

Lemnitzer's notes conclude with the action assigned to the Joint Chiefs: "Look into ways and means of training Cuban refugees & expand the program." The program he referred to was the program developing under CIA direction to launch an invasion of Cuba with a force of Cuban exiles. (National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, Notes, Miscellaneous Meetings, 1961) Notes on the meeting were also taken by Barnes, who recorded that it was agreed that the number of Cuban exiles being trained for the invasion should be increased, possibly up to 1,500, and additional training sites would have to be developed. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 2, Vol. III, Part IV) For another record of the meeting, see Document 3.

3. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, January 3, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Nov 1960-Jan 20, 1961. Secret. Prepared by Barnes. According to a chronology prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency on May 24, 1961, entitled "Special Group Consideration of the Strike Force Concept," those attending the meeting included Secretary of State Herter, Secretary of Defense Gates, Secretary of the Treasury Anderson, Director of Central Intelligence Dulles, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Gray, Under Secretary of Defense James H. Douglas, Under Secretary of State Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State Mann, CIA Deputy Director for Plans Bissell, his assistant Tracy Barnes, and Brigadier General Andrew J. Goodpaster. The location of the meeting is not given. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Gen Maxwell Taylor, Green Study Group, Vol. II) The chronology covers the period November 1960 through January 1961 and is included in the Supplement.

SUBJECT

Outline of 3 January 1961 Meeting

Points covered were:

1. A discussion of whether or not to break relations which it was quickly decided should be done. It was stated that it might be more difficult [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. The importance of commo obviously is to know on a current basis what the situation is and what sort of treatment is being accorded to American nationals. The tone of the meeting was clearly in support of overt introduction of U.S. forces if any steps were taken by the Cubans either to harm American citizens or to attack or damage official U.S. property (e.g. Guantanamo).

2. A fairly detailed discussion followed as to when the break should be announced. The upshot of this was to favor slightly an immediate break, i.e. even prior to the expected Cuban attack in the UN on 4 January but subject to discussions by the Department with Messrs. Braddock and Wadsworth in order to obtain their views. The Department will make the final decision.

3. There was considerable discussion of the situation in Cuba with general agreement on its seriousness and on the need for action. It again was made clear that action would be taken immediately should the Cubans provoke it in any aggressive way. Even without such provocation, it was clear that the meeting felt that pretty rigorous action should be taken and obviously could successfully be taken--the danger, however, being that if it went too far it might rupture the structure of the OAS which, of course, is undesirable.

4. As to present preparations, there was some discussion about the use of U.S. soil for training. The consensus of the meeting was against this although it was agreed that efforts should be made to try and increase the number of trainees, possibly up to 1500, which if done would require additional training sites. In this connection it was felt that perhaps some additional trainees might be spread around in relatively small groups and given some training. The cover story could be that enlistment in these small cadres was the best way to keep them together, cover the language problems, provide them with some sustenance and keep them occupied. Another possibility suggested was some military training in refugee camps, some of which have already been created. The conclusion, however, was clear that preparations should proceed and that to the extent possible the size of the force should be increased.

5. There was some discussion about talking with other Latin American countries on a bi-lateral basis with a view to having them consider providing support against Cuba at an appropriate moment. This would involve breaking of relations at the proper time and possible active support such as recognition of an opposition government and the provision of material, men and conceivably a little money. In this connection it was made clear that action against Trujillo should be seriously pushed. It was urged that in all future propaganda Trujillo's name be paired with that of Castro in order to increase in people's minds the similarity between them as dictators and help overcome distinctions such as one being right and the other being left. It was suggested that possibly Venezuela would be willing to attack the DR if it could be assured of some U.S. support. This plan was thought to be worth examination particularly if it could be worked out so as to occur at the same time as an effort against Cuba.

6. There was some discussion as to when it might be advisable to recognize a provisional Cuban government. Although there was some argument that it might be well to do so fairly soon, the sense of the meeting was that it would be preferable to wait until the individuals involved were located on Cuban soil.

7. It was clearly the sense of the meeting that all possible reasonable efforts should be made now and through the immediate future to provide materiel support to opposition elements inside Cuba and to step up propaganda including leaflet missions.

8. (See below)

C. Tracy Barnes/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

8. In addition to the above points, there was a brief discussion about briefing members of the new administration. The State Department made it clear that it considered such a briefing important, particularly for Mr. Rusk. No definite schedule was agreed upon but the consensus of the meeting was that appropriate briefings should be considered for the near future./2/

/2/Presumably paragraph 8 was added at a later time.

4. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Herter and Dean Rusk

Washington, January 3, 1961, 12:30 p.m.

//Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, 1957-61. Secret. Drafted by Herter. Dean Rusk was Secretary of State-designate.

I discussed with Dean Rusk the following three matters:

1. The Cuban situation resulting from the note/1/ sent through the Embassy in Havana to the effect that our personnel had to be reduced within 48 hours to a total of eleven, including locals. I explained that our Charge d'Affaires in Havana had recommended that the best course for us would be to break off diplomatic relations completely since it would be impossible to carry on in anything like a dignified or effective way with such small staff. I further told him that we had checked with Wadsworth/2/ in New York, who had felt that such a break would not interfere with the debate on the charges brought by Cuba against us to begin tomorrow, and I, likewise, checked with Braddock in Havana, who reiterated his recommendation for a clean break and felt that such a break would not jeopardize the situation with respect to the remaining U.S. citizens in Cuba.

/1/Document 1.

/2/James J. Wadsworth, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

I then told Dean Rusk that I thought a decision would be reached this afternoon with respect to breaking diplomatic relations, and that my expectation was that this would be done. He asked if he could have until 3.00 p.m. to report reactions, and that his own impression was that there would be no reaction unless there was a very violent feeling on the part of the President-elect./3/

/3/Rusk telephoned Herter later the same afternoon to indicate that he had passed along the information concerning the possibility of breaking relations with Cuba, and that Kennedy did not want to comment on the merits "either way." (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)

[Here follows a summary of discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Christian A. Herter/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

5. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Herter and President Eisenhower

Washington, January 3, 1961, 7:30 p.m.

//Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking.

The President telephoned that if the Cubans attack Guantanamo, they would be kicked out with force. The

Secretary said our Legal Adviser/1/ was doing what he was supposed to do in looking into it. He said we would move right along on this. The President said they were waiting for the other paper/2/ and the Secretary said it was on its way.

/1/Eric Hager.

/2/Not further identified.

6. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, January 5, 1961.

//Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Cuba. No classification marking. Drafted by Goodpaster.

On the evening of January third, Secretary Herter called me to say that he was sending a recommendation to the President as to timing of breaking relations with Cuba (the meeting with the President in the morning/1/ had resulted in the President's approval to break relations, with a request to State Department to give him their view on timing). Mr. Herter said the matter was entirely clear-cut, except that, contrary to his statement in the morning, it did seem that there is some basis for a possible charge that breach of relations would vitiate our treaty rights in Guantanamo. He said he would call me back shortly to elaborate on this point.

/1/See Documents 2 and 3.

He called back within an hour and said the point was essentially this--that the agreement reached in 1903/2/ involved a payment of rental on the part of the United States, and an undertaking to return fugitives. These provisions were confirmed in 1934 when the treaty was extended to state that it could not be altered or abrogated without agreement of both parties./3/ He said the problem is that it might be argued we would not be in position to carry out the provision about return of fugitives. I asked Mr. Herter whether the weight of legal opinion would support this charge, would support us against the charge, or would be rather evenly divided. He said he could not say, but had the legal advisor, Mr. Hager, come on the phone and talk to me about this./4/ Mr. Hager said this is a very gray area of international law. He added that a very good argument could be made by us, and a lot of non-Soviet nations would see some weight in our position, which would be a respectable one. However, the argument would be a very good one against us as well. He added that one key point is that he cannot think of a forum in which this charge could be effectively brought to bear, since the question would be held to be a political rather than a legal one.

/2/For text of the agreement between the United States and the Republic of Cuba for the lease of lands in Cuba for coaling and naval stations, which was signed by the President of Cuba on February 1, 1903, and by the President of the United States on February 23, 1903, see *Foreign Relations*, 1903, pp. 350-351. The terms of the lease, signed at Havana on July 2, 1903, established an annual rent of \$2,000 in gold coin for naval or coaling stations in Guantanamo and Bahia Honda, Cuba. (Ibid., pp. 351-353)

/3/For text of the agreement signed by the United States and Cuba on May 29, 1934, which extended the provisions of the 1903 treaty concerning the lease of the Guantanamo naval base, see *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1933-1937*, pp. 4054-4055.

/4/A fuller record of this conversation and several others on January 3 involving Herter and the question of breaking relations with Cuba are in the Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations.

I asked Mr. Herter, who had heard all of this, whether in light of all these considerations he would still recommend that the President go forward with the proposed action. He said he would.

I then met with the President in the Mansion and he approved the proposed action and statements./5/ On my suggestion he talked by telephone to Mr. Herter in the foregoing sense.

/5/See Document 8.

A.J. Goodpaster/6/

Brigadier General, USA

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, January 3, 1961, 9:05 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1-361. Unclassified; Niact; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Hurwitch and approved by Vallon. The text of the note is also printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, January 23, 1961, pp. 103-104.

1347. Following is text of note delivered 8:30 p.m. January 3 to Cuban Charge:

"Sir:

I have the honor to refer to a note dated January 2, 1961/1/ from the Government of Cuba to the Charge d'Affaires of the United States Embassy in Habana stating that the Government of Cuba has decided that personnel of the Embassy and Consulate of the United States in the City of Habana, regardless of nationality, shall not exceed eleven persons.

/1/See Document 1.

This unwarranted action by the Government of Cuba places crippling limitations on the ability of the United States Mission to carry on its normal diplomatic and consular functions. It would consequently appear that it is designed to achieve an effective termination of diplomatic and consular relations between the Government of Cuba and the Government of the United States. Accordingly, the Government of the United States hereby formally notifies the Government of Cuba of the termination of such relations.

The Government of the United States intends to comply with the requirement of the Government of Cuba concerning the withdrawal of all but eleven persons within the period of 48 hours from 1:20 a.m. on January 3, the time of the delivery of the note under reference. In addition, the Government of the United States will withdraw its remaining diplomatic and consular personnel in Cuba as soon as possible thereafter.

The Government of Cuba is requested to withdraw from the United States as soon as possible all Cuban nationals employed in the Cuban Embassy in Washington and in all Cuban Consular establishments in the United States.

The Government of the United States is requesting the Government of Switzerland to assume diplomatic and consular representation in Cuba on behalf of the Government of the United States./2/

/2/A copy of the note addressed to the Swiss Government of January 4, requesting Switzerland to assume diplomatic and consular representation in Cuba on behalf of the United States, is in the Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Cuba.

I take this opportunity to reiterate to you the assurances of my reciprocity of your considerations."/3/

Herter

/3/The Cuban Government acknowledged the "rupture" of relations in a note addressed to the U.S. Embassy in Havana on January 4. The note indicated that the Government of Czechoslovakia had been requested to assume responsibility for the diplomatic and consular interests of Cuba in the United States. (Despatch 1506 from Havana, January 4; Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1-461)

8. Editorial Note

In conjunction with the delivery on January 3, 1961, of the note notifying the Cuban Embassy of the U.S. decision to terminate relations between the two countries (see Document 7), the White House released a statement by President Eisenhower. Eisenhower made reference to the note received earlier in the day from the Cuban Government, which he stated "can have no other purpose than to render impossible the conduct of normal diplomatic relations with that Government." It was, he added, a "calculated action on the part of the Castro government" and "the latest of a long series of harassments, baseless accusations, and vilification." Accordingly, he had instructed Secretary Herter to return a note stating that the United States "is hereby formally terminating diplomatic and consular relations with the Government of Cuba." He stressed that this move did not affect U.S. friendship and concern for the people of Cuba who were, he said, "suffering under the yoke of a dictator." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61*, page 891)

On January 4 White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty issued a supplementary statement concerning the Guantanamo naval base: "The termination of our diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba has no effect on the status of our naval station at Guantanamo. The treaty rights under which we maintain the naval station may not be abrogated without the consent of the United States." (Department of State *Bulletin*, January 23, 1961, page 104)

9. Memorandum From the Chief of WH/4/PM, Central Intelligence Agency (Hawkins) to the Chief of WH/4 of the Directorate for Plans (Esterline)

Washington, January 4, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret. Branch 4 of the Western Hemisphere Division was an internal task force created within the CIA in January 1960 to direct the Cuban project. J.D. Esterline became task force director on January 18, 1960. Esterline reported on the project to the Deputy Director for Plans, Richard M. Bissell, although Bissell's principal aide, Tracy Barnes, who acted for Bissell about 50 percent of the time. Branch 4 began with a staff of 20 and grew by April 1961 to a staff of more than 500 with its own communications, propaganda, and military sections. Marine Corps Colonel Jack Hawkins was assigned to Branch 4 in September 1960, with direct responsibility for military training operations. (Minutes of the Paramilitary Study Group, May 22, 1961, Envelope 6; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

SUBJECT

Policy Decisions Required for Conduct of Strike Operations Against Government of Cuba

1. Purpose:

The purpose of this memorandum is to outline the current status of our preparations for the conduct of amphibious/airborne and tactical air operations against the Government of Cuba and to set forth certain

requirements for policy decisions which must be reached and implemented if these operations are to be carried out.

2. Concept:

As a basis for the policy requirements to be presented below, it would appear appropriate to review briefly the concept of the strike operations contemplated and outline the objectives which these operations are designed to accomplish.

The concept envisages the seizure of a small lodgement on Cuban soil by an all-Cuban amphibious/airborne force of about 750 men. The landings in Cuba will be preceded by a tactical air preparation, beginning at dawn of D-1 Day. The primary purpose of the air preparation will be to destroy or neutralize all Cuban military aircraft and naval vessels constituting a threat to the invasion force. When this task is accomplished, attacks will then be directed against other military targets, including artillery parks, tank parks, military vehicles, supply dumps, etc. Close air support will be provided to the invasion force on D-Day and thereafter as long as the force is engaged in combat. The primary targets during this time will be opposing military formations in the field. Particular efforts will be made to interdict opposing troop movements against the lodgement.

The initial mission of the invasion force will be to seize and defend a small area, which under ideal conditions will include an airfield and access to the sea for logistic support. Plans must provide, however, for the eventuality that the force will be driven into a tight defensive formation which will preclude supply by sea or control of an airfield. Under such circumstances supply would have to be provided entirely by air drop. The primary objective of the force will be to survive and maintain its integrity on Cuban soil. There will be no early attempt to break out of the lodgement for further offensive operations unless and until there is a general uprising against the Castro regime or overt military intervention by United States forces has taken place.

It is expected that these operations will precipitate a general uprising throughout Cuba and cause the revolt of large segments of the Cuban Army and Militia. The lodgement, it is hoped, will serve as a rallying point for the thousands who are ready for overt resistance to Castro but who hesitate to act until they can feel some assurance of success. A general revolt in Cuba, if one is successfully triggered by our operations, may serve to topple the Castro regime within a period of weeks.

If matters do not eventuate as predicted above, the lodgement established by our force can be used as the site for establishment of a provisional government which can be recognized by the United States, and hopefully by other American states, and given overt military assistance. The way will then be paved for United States military intervention aimed at pacification of Cuba, and this will result in the prompt overthrow of the Castro Government.

While this paper is directed to the subject of strike operations, it should not be presumed that other paramilitary programs will be suspended or abandoned. These are being intensified and accelerated. They include the supply by air and sea of guerrilla elements in Cuba, the conduct of sabotage operations, the introduction of specially trained paramilitary teams, and the expansion of our agent networks throughout the island.

3. Status of Forces:

a. Air. The Project tactical air force includes ten B-28 aircraft currently based in Guatemala and at Eglin Air Force Base. However, there are only five Cuban B-26 pilots available at this time who are considered to be of highly technical competence. Six additional Cuban pilots are available, but their proficiency is questionable.

It is planned that seven C-54 and four C-46 transports will be available for strike operations. Here again, the number of qualified Cuban crews is insufficient. There is one qualified C-54 crew on hand at this time, and three C-46 crews.

Aviation ordnance for conduct of strike operations is yet to be positioned at the strike base in Nicaragua. Necessary construction and repairs at this base are now scheduled to commence, and there appears to be no obstacle to placing this facility in a state of readiness in time for operations as planned.

Conclusions:

- (1) The number of qualified Cuban B-26 crews available is inadequate for conduct of strike operations.
- (2) The number of qualified Cuban transport crews is grossly inadequate for supply operations which will be required in support of the invasion forces and other friendly forces which are expected to join or operate in conjunction with it in many parts of Cuba. It is anticipated that multiple sorties will be required on a daily basis.

b. Maritime. Amphibious craft for the operation, including three LOU's and four LCVP's are now at Viaques, Puerto Rico, where Cuban crew training is progressing satisfactorily. These craft with their crews will soon be ready for operations.

The Barbara J (LCI), now enroute to the United States from Puerto Rico, requires repairs which may take up to two weeks for completion. The sister ship, the Blagar, is outfitting in Miami, and its crew is being assembled. It is expected that both vessels will be fully operational by mid-January at the latest.

In view of the difficulty and delay encountered in purchasing, outfitting and readying for sea the two LCI's, the decision has been reached to purchase no more major vessels, but to charter them instead. The motor ship, *Rio Escondido* (converted LCT) will be chartered this week and one additional steam ship, somewhat larger, will be chartered early in February. Both ships belong to a Panamanian Corporation controlled by the Garcia family of Cuba, who are actively cooperating with this Project. These two ships will provide sufficient lift for troops and supplies in the invasion operation.

Conclusion:

Maritime assets required will be available in ample time for strike operations in late February.

a. Ground. There are approximately 500 Cuban personnel now in training in Guatemala. Results being achieved in the FRD recruiting drive now underway in Miami indicate that extraordinary measures may be required if the ranks of the Assault Brigade are to be filled to its planned strength of 750 by mid-January. Special recruiting teams comprised of members of the Assault Brigade are being brought to Miami to assist in recruiting efforts in that city and possibly in other countries, *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*. All recruits should be available by mid-January to allow at least four to six weeks of training prior to commitment.

The Assault Brigade has been formed into its basic organization (a quadrangular infantry battalion, including four rifle companies, and a weapons company). Training is proceeding to the extent possible with the limited number of military instructors available. This force cannot be adequately trained for combat unless additional military trainers are provided.

Conclusion:

- (1) It is probable that the Assault Brigade can reach its planned strength of 750 prior to commitment, but it is possible that upwards of 100 of these men will be recruited too late for adequate training.
- (2) Unless U.S. Army Special Forces training teams as requested are sent promptly to Guatemala, the Assault Brigade cannot be readied for combat by late February as planned and desired.

(3) The Assault Brigade should not be committed to action until it has received at least four and preferably six weeks of training under supervision of the U.S. Army team. This means that the latter half of February is the earliest satisfactory time for the strike operation.

4. Major Policy Questions Requiring Resolution:

In order that planning and preparation for the strike operation may proceed in an orderly manner and correct positioning of hundreds of tons of supplies and equipment can be effected, a number of firm decisions concerning major questions or policy are required. These are discussed below.

a. The Concept Itself.

Discussion. The question of whether the incoming administration of President-Elect Kennedy will concur in the conduct of the strike operations outlined above needs to be resolved at the earliest possible time. If these operations are not to be conducted, then preparations for them should cease forthwith in order to avoid the needless waste of great human effort and many millions of dollars. Recruitment of additional Cuban personnel should be stopped, for every new recruit who is not employed in operations as intended presents an additional problem of eventual disposition.

Recommendation. That the Director of Central Intelligence attempt to determine the position of the President-Elect and his Secretary of State-Designate in regard to this question as soon as possible.

b. Timing of the Operation.

If Army Special Forces training teams are made available and dispatched to Guatemala by mid-January, the Assault Brigade can achieve acceptable readiness for combat during the latter half of February, 1961. All other required preparations can be made by that same time. The operation should be launched during this period. Any delay beyond 1 March, 1961, would be inadvisable for the following reasons:

(1) It is doubtful that Cuban forces can be maintained at our Guatemalan training base beyond 1 March, 1961. Pressures upon the Government of Guatemala may become unmanageable if Cuban ground troops are not removed by that date.

(2) Cuban trainees cannot be held in training for much longer. Many have been in the camp for months under most austere and restrictive conditions. They are becoming restive and if not committed to action soon there will probably be a general lowering of morale. Large-scale desertions could occur with attendant possibilities of surfacing the entire program.

(3) While the support of the Castro Government by the Cuban populace is deteriorating rapidly and time is working in our favor in that sense, it is working to our disadvantage in a military sense. Cuban jet pilots are being trained in Czechoslovakia and the appearance of modern radar throughout Cuba indicates a strong possibility that Castro may soon have an all-weather jet intercept capability. His ground forces have received vast quantities of military equipment from the Bloc countries, including medium and heavy tanks, field artillery, heavy mortars and anti-aircraft artillery. Bloc technicians are training his forces in the use of this formidable equipment. Undoubtedly, within the near future Castro's hard core of loyal armed forces will achieve technical proficiency in the use of available modern weapons.

(4) Castro is making rapid progress in establishing a Communist-style police state which will be difficult to unseat by any means short of overt intervention by U.S. military forces.

Recommendation. That the strike operation be conducted in the latter half of February, and not later than 1 March, 1961.

c. Air Strike.

The question has been raised in some quarters as to whether amphibious/airborne operation could not be mounted without tactical air preparation or support or with minimal air support. It is axiomatic in amphibious operations that control of air and sea in the objective area is absolutely required. The Cuban Air Force and naval vessels capable of opposing our landing must be knocked out or neutralized before our amphibious shipping makes its final run into the beach. If this is not done, we will be courting disaster. Also, since our invasion force is very small in comparison to forces which may be thrown against it, we must compensate for numerical inferiority by effective tactical air support not only during the landing but thereafter as long as the force remains in combat. It is essential that opposing military targets such as artillery parks, tank parks, supply dumps, military convoys and troops in the field be brought under effective and continuing air attack. Psychological considerations also make such attacks essential. The spectacular aspects of air operations will go far toward producing the uprising in Cuba that we seek.

Recommendations.

- (1) That the air preparation commence not later than dawn of D minus 1 day.
- (2) That any move to curtail the number of aircraft to be employed from those available be firmly resisted.
- (3) That the operation be abandoned if policy does not provide for use of adequate tactical air support.

d. Use of American Contract Pilots.

The paragraph above outlines the requirement for precise and effective air strikes, while an earlier paragraph points up the shortage of qualified Cuban pilots. It is very questionable that the limited number of Cuban B-26 pilots available to us can produce the desired results unless augmented by highly skillful American contract pilots to serve as section and flight leaders in attacks against the more critical targets. The Cuban pilots are inexperienced in war and of limited technical competence in navigation and gunnery. There is reason also to suspect that they may lack the motivation to take the stern measures required against targets in their own country. It is considered that the success of the operation will be jeopardized unless a few American contract B-26 pilots are employed.

With regard to logistical air operations, the shortage of Cuban crews has already been mentioned. There is no prospect of producing sufficient Cuban C-54 crews to run the seven C-54 aircraft to be used in the operation. Our experience to date with the Cuban transport crews has left much to be desired. It is concluded that the only satisfactory solution to the problem of air logistical support of the strike force and other forces joining it will be to employ a number of American contract crews.

Recommendation:

That policy approval be obtained for use of American contract crews for tactical and transport aircraft in augmentation of the inadequate number of Cuban crews available.

e. Use of Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua.

The airfield at Puerto Cabezas is essential for conduct of the air strike operation unless a base is made available in the United States. Our air lease [base?] in Guatemala is 800 miles from central Cuba--too distant for B-26 operations and for air supply operations of the magnitude required, using the C-46 and C-54 aircraft. Puerto Cabezas is only 500 miles from central Cuba--acceptable, although too distant to be completely desirable, for B-26 and transport operations.

Puerto Cabezas will also serve as the staging area for loading assault troops into transports much more satisfactorily than Puerto Barrios, Guatemala which is exposed to hostile observation and lacks security. It is planned that troops will be flown in from Guatemala to Puerto Cabezas, placed in covered trucks, loaded over the docks at night into amphibious shipping, which will then immediately retire to sea.

Conclusion.

The strike operation cannot be conducted unless the Puerto Cabezas air facility is available for our use, or unless an air base in the United States is made available.

Recommendation. That firm policy be obtained for use of Puerto Cabezas as an air strike base and staging area.

f. Use of U.S. Air Base for Logistical Flights.

An air base in southern Florida would be roughly twice as close to central Cuba as Puerto Cabezas. This means that the logistical capability of our limited number of transport aircraft would be almost doubled if operated from Florida rather than Puerto Cabezas. Logistical support of the strike force in the target would be much more certain and efficient if flown from Florida.

There is also a possibility that once the strike operations commence, conditions would develop which would force us out of the Nicaraguan air base. Without some flexibility of air base with pre-positioned supplies in the United States, we could conceivably be confronted with a situation wherein the Assault Brigade would be left entirely without logistical air support. Supply by sea cannot be relied upon, for the Brigade may be driven by superior forces from the beach area. Such a situation could lead to complete defeat of the Brigade and failure of the mission.

It seems obvious that the only real estate which the United States can, without question, continue to employ once the operation commences is its own soil. Therefore, an air base for logistical support should be provided in the United States. This will offer the possibility of continued, flexible operations, if one or both of our bases in Guatemala and/or Nicaragua are lost to our use.

Recommendation.

That policy be established to permit use of an air base in southern Florida (preferably Opa Locka which is now available to us and has storage facilities for supplies) for logistical support flights to Cuba.

J. Hawkins/1/

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

10. Editorial Note

On January 4, 1961, the U.N. Security Council met in response to a request on December 31, 1960, from the Foreign Minister of Cuba to adopt the measures necessary to prevent the armed forces of the United States from violating the sovereignty of Cuba. (U.N. doc. S/4605) James J. Wadsworth, U.S. Representative in the Security Council, dismissed Cuban allegations of a "sinister plan," which he stated were based on "the kind of second-hand rumor which Dr. Roa uses instead of evidence." Wadsworth added that it was "natural and readily understandable" that some of the Cuban exiles who had found refuge in the United States would want to attempt to overturn the government which had caused them and their homeland so much hardship. But he stated that "the

United States Government has been in no way associated with such activities." (U.N. doc. S/PV.921)

At the afternoon meeting of the Security Council on January 4, the Representatives of Chile and Ecuador introduced a draft resolution calling upon the Governments of the United States and Cuba to resolve their differences. (U.N. doc. S/4612) Debate on the Cuban complaint carried over to January 5, and the Council dropped the complaint for want of sufficient grounds for taking action. The Representatives of Chile and Ecuador did not press for a vote on their draft resolution. (U.N. doc. S/PV.923)

11. Editorial Note

In briefing the National Security Council on January 5, 1961, on significant world developments affecting U.S. security, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles offered the following assessment of developments relating to Cuba:

"Mr. Dulles reported that Castro had reacted violently and defiantly to the rupture in U.S.-Cuban diplomatic relations. The controlled Cuban press had hurled a great deal of invective at the U.S. On the eve of the rupture in diplomatic relations, Khrushchev had said at a Cuban reception in Moscow that the U.S. was pursuing a dangerous policy in attempting to suppress the Cuban revolution; while reiterating Soviet support for Cuba, he had remained vague as to the character of that support. Peru was pleased at our action in breaking off diplomatic relations; Chile had indicated it would not follow our example; Venezuela, Honduras and other countries were considering a rupture but will take no immediate action. Newspapers in Brazil are calling the present situation a crisis and suggesting that Latin American countries do not follow the U.S. lead. The President said this was a typical South American reaction. Continuing, Mr. Dulles said Panama seemed on the verge of declaring the Cuban Ambassador persona non grata while Mexico had remarked that it would now be difficult to influence Cuba and get rid of Castro. Secretary Herter said the reaction from Mexico had been much more moderate than anticipated.

"Mr. Dulles said that all Latin American Communists and Communist front groups were urging support for Castro. Apparently, Canada will continue to maintain relations with Cuba. Mr. Dulles said the 50,000 applicants for U.S. visas in Cuba were very distressed at the severance of diplomatic relations. He added that *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* the Soviet, Czechoslovakian, Polish, and Chinese Communist embassies in Cuba now contained about 100 persons and that 200 additional Bloc nationals not directly attached to the embassies were in Cuba. Five more Bloc countries--Hungary, Roumania, Albania, North Vietnam, and Mongolia--had been recognized by Cuba. Military equipment from the Bloc continues to arrive in Cuba.

"Secretary Anderson pointed out that economic controls had not been applied against Cuba. He thought such controls would have little effect now although they might have had some effect if applied a year ago. The Treasury Department was prepared to apply these controls if a political decision were made to do so. Secretary Herter said the application of these controls would involve invoking the Trading-with-the Enemy Act. Secretary Gates asked why it would not be desirable to apply such controls. He thought this would mean a desirable psychological move even though there was not much U.S.-Cuban trade at present. The President said that the Secretary of Commerce should be consulted with respect to our trade with Cuba. The Vice President noted that many people in Florida objected very strenuously to such trade as we still carried on with Cuba. Mr. Dulles said the businessmen he talked to believed that the elimination of our lard exports to Cuba would have a desirable effect because the Cuban people would blame Castro for the lack of lard.

"The President asked whether economic controls could be applied to Cuba without a public order. Secretary Herter said an Executive Order would be required. Secretary Anderson said the application of such controls would not have much economic effect now, so that the decision for such application should rest on a political judgment. The Vice President felt that economic controls should be applied to Cuba now that diplomatic relations with that country had been severed. In response to a question from the President, Mr. Randall said that while he had been opposed to the early invocation of the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act, he now favored using all

the instruments at hand against Cuba and would, therefore, favor economic controls. The President asked Secretary Herter, consulting as necessary with Secretaries Anderson and Mueller, to let him have recommendations on the imposition of economic controls against Cuba." (Memorandum of discussion at the 473d meeting of the National Security Council, prepared on January 5 by Deputy Executive Secretary Marion W. Boggs; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) The Trading with the Enemy Act was enacted on October 6, 1917. For text, and revisions, see 40 Stat. 411, as amended.

12. Memorandum From Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower

Washington, January 5, 1961.

//Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series. Secret. Initialed as seen by President Eisenhower. A handwritten note on the source text by Goodpaster, dated January 6, reads: "Told State President has approved."

SUBJECT

Invocation of Trading with the Enemy Act Against Cuba

From an economic point of view the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act would have a limited effect. The assets of the Cuban Government in the United States are believed to be very small. We have already embargoed exports from the United States to Cuba under the Export Control Act except for certain foods and medical supplies which continue to go forward on humanitarian grounds. On the import side you have already exercised your authority to eliminate imports of Cuban sugar, which constitute approximately 70% of Cuba's exports to the United States. The principal economic effect of the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act would therefore be to limit the remaining 30% of Cuba's exports to the United States, consisting principally of tobacco, molasses, fruits and vegetables. Cuba obtains about \$100 million a year for these items, but not all of this trade would be lost since Cuba could presumably market most of these items in other countries.

From a political standpoint the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act would create certain problems. In freezing Cuban assets in the United States it would be necessary to exempt the funds of some Cuban nationals in order to avoid creating hardships on anti-Castro elements. This would lead to difficult problems of selection in individual instances.

But more importantly, there would be the problem of our taking unilateral action in an area where it has hitherto been our policy to act multilaterally through the Organization of American States and under the Rio Treaty.^{/1/} Whether or not a new proclamation were issued under the Trading with the Enemy Act, it would be necessary to make some public statement regarding the reasons for invoking the Act. Such a statement would of necessity base such invocation on a threat to the peace and security of the Hemisphere caused by the Communist and interventionist character of the Cuban regime. This is an area which the Rio Treaty contemplates would be treated with in a multilateral way. Failure to act under the Treaty would expose us to charges in Latin America that we failed to avail ourselves of the inter-American machinery for the maintenance of security in the Hemisphere.

^{/1/}For text of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed at Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, pp. 789-796.

Nevertheless, I believe that the time is fast approaching when it should be possible to ascertain whether there is any reasonable prospect for prompt action in this direction on a multilateral basis. If this multilateral action is not taken in the near future, I believe we should then proceed unilaterally. I think it would be appropriate for me to say to Mr. Rusk that had it not been for the time factor this Administration would have applied the Trading with the Enemy Act and to recommend to him that he give this matter his urgent attention.

On balance, it is my recommendation that, given the extent to which this step would commit the new Administration, this decision be left to them.

Christian A. Herter

13. Memorandum From the Assistant to the Deputy Director (Plans) for Covert Operations (Barnes) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles

Washington, January 5, 1961.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 2, Vol. III, Part IV. Secret.

SUBJECT

Material for the 5 January Special Group Meeting/1/

/1/See Document 14.

Essentially what we should try to obtain from this meeting is some specific understandings on certain important problems, all of which have been discussed but no precise resolutions reached. We should also report on certain of our plans to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding.

A. Points on which we should report:

1. The 3 January meeting spoke of increasing the strike force./2/ We all agree that this would be useful but we should make it absolutely clear that we are only able to handle the 750 maximum planned. Assuming we get the Special Force trainers, we can be ready by the end of February with, we believe, 750 although it is likely that a number of these will only have been in training by then a very short time. In this connection, a definite understanding should be reached as to:

/2/See Documents 2 and 3.

a. Where will the additional men (i.e. over 750) be sought? Who will do the recruiting? Where will they be maintained? Who has the responsibility for preparing the site or sites? Who will undertake whatever training is necessary?

b. In the remaining time, how realistic is it to assume any additional individuals can be obtained? Moreover, since this would become substantially overt and since the U.S. has now broken relations, wouldn't it be better to concentrate on some acceptable method of providing military back up with U.S. forces joined perhaps overtly by a few Latin American countries?

2. We have started to prepare the Puerto Cabezas strike base since it is absolutely essential that we have a strike base and since the Nicaraguan base is the only available one if we cannot use some U.S. base.

3. We are presently contemplating resupply (after the strike landing) from Puerto Cabezas and from Guatemala. We should have, however, a U.S. base for this purpose. Authority to do so is needed immediately in order to get ready but if this is impossible at least authority to settle on which base could be used if later approved.

4. We are planning to move to Puerto Cabezas substantial amounts of material starting around the 15th or 20th of January including aviation ordnance, resupply ammo and weapons for ground forces, aviation gas, diesel fuel, and possibly some extra one-man packs. Should we delay longer, there is a danger that we might not be able to

get the needed inventories in place in time. It should be recognized, however, that in making those moves, we are risking a possible loss of the inventories since Somoza will unquestionably take them over if they are not used as planned. Consequently, if there is any likelihood that ultimately U.S. bases may be authorized, these preparations would result in a substantial increase in our costs as the inventories will roughly have an estimated value of about \$1,500,000.

B. Issues which we should clarify with the State Department:

1. There has been a lot of talk about bi-lateral arrangements with selected Latin American countries in order to get them on our side. Work on this should start immediately particularly now that there has been a break in relations. We are prepared to help on this. With whom should we work, what countries will be involved and what will the approaches to these countries consist of and when will they be made?

2. For sometime now it has been agreed that a post-Castro regime should receive economic aid from the U.S. Definitive decisions as to how much and what kind should be reached very soon and plans made as to how it may best be announced since an announcement will clearly give a strong political boost to any provisional government.

3. A number of issues regarding the provisional government must immediately be decided.

a. It has been stated that such a government will be recognized but it has not definitively been indicated that there are no legal objections.

b. When will it be recognized? We still believe that it should not be recognized until it is in place or about to be put in place on some Cuban real estate.

c. Who should be in the provisional government and how should they be selected? In this connection, we believe that the U.S. should retain control of designating the individuals, at least the two or three leaders of the original junta, leaving the expansion to these individuals and such selection process as the times may produce.

d. Precisely what benefits will recognition of a provisional government provide, i.e., presumably it will mean support both in equipment and men to defend any Cuban real estate held by the provisional government (on an analogy to the recent U.S. action in support of Nicaragua and Guatemala).

e. Will it mean overt U.S. support to enable the provisional government to extend its control over the rest of Cuba by overcoming Castro's forces?

3. Who has the responsibility for doing something about Trujillo and what will be done? Again, the time is very short. We had a program approved last week but it is not one that can move rapidly enough to meet the kind of time schedules discussed on 3 January. Figueres has been invited to come to Washington as soon as possible.

C. Issues which we should clarify with the Defense Department:

1. The top levels of Defense should make it clear in appropriate places that we should obtain full and rapid cooperation from the services on matters requested through General Erskine's office. We are happy to work with Erskine's office but the actual support must come from the services and the channels have been very unclear and consequently slow in a number of cases. This could be clarified if the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of Defense could call in an appropriate representative of each of the services together with a representative of Erskine's office and direct them to take the responsibility to see that appropriate requests are rapidly supported. The case of the Special Force trainers is a ghastly example of how things can go badly.

2. Is there any need for us to work with appropriate Defense elements with respect to post-strike support which

may be needed?

C. Tracy Barnes/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

14. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, January 5, 1961.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Special Group Mtgs-Cuba. Secret; Eyes Only. No drafting information is given.

SPECIAL GROUP MEETINGS--CUBA

5 January 1961

1. Mr. Douglas felt that Defense (Col. Prouty) was now in a position to iron out all the difficulties in connection with the Special Forces personnel for Guatemala. It was agreed that State concurrence in the arrangements should be obtained, but Mr. Douglas said Defense would not slow down its activities awaiting this.

2. Mr. Douglas then read from a paper/1/ left with him by Gen. Lemnitzer. This indicated a schedule of training time, if training were conducted under Army auspices, which would approximate 24 weeks or--on a sketchier basis--12-16 weeks. The memo also referred to numerous difficulties which might arise, such as medical care, pay, etc., as well as problems of cover, political orientation and the like. All agreed that a training schedule of this kind is totally impractical in current circumstances. The members appeared to agree that this constituted a good argument for a re-examination of basic concepts, particularly as to the need for overt intervention and early recognition of an exile government.

/1/Not found.

3. Mr. Barnes pointed out that due to the different political colorations of the emigres, if for no other reason, it would be difficult to name a government before members of it are physically on Cuban soil.

4. It was agreed that in any case a decision as to ultimate overt intervention is required, but that it will probably not be practicable to obtain this in the next fifteen days. Mr. Gray undertook to pass on the word that the Army plans, as outlined in the paper read by Mr. Douglas, were not responsive to the need. Mr. Bissell said that one alternative action that can be taken is to obtain Cubans who have already had military experience and to train them in the U.S. He recognized that this would constitute essentially an overt act.

5. Mr. Barnes pointed out the desirability, in the course of bilateral discussions with other Latin American countries, of attempting to obtain commitments for limited personnel support at an appropriate time. In answer to a question, Mr. Merchant said that he did not foresee the necessity for a temporary evacuation of the Guatemala base.

15. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant) to Secretary of State Herter

Washington, January 10, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56314/1-1061. Secret. Drafted by Merchant.

The meeting with the President this afternoon on the *New York Times* Guatemala base story/¹/ was attended by Messrs. Gates, Douglas, Dulles, Gray, Willauer, Mann, J.C. King, General Goodpaster, and myself.

¹/*The New York Times* on January 10 ran a front-page article under the headline "U.S. Helps Train an Anti-Castro Force at Secret Guatemalan Air-Ground Base."

After considerable discussion the President decided that we should make no statement to the press today on the matter and continue to refuse to comment.²/ The question of a statement, however, can be re-examined if news interest persists and grows.

²/In response to questions concerning *The New York Times* story, Department of State spokesman Lincoln White denied any knowledge of a base to train Cuban exiles in Guatemala. (The New York Times, January 11, 1961)

The statement which we had agreed upon in advance and showed to the President/³/ was modified during the course of the discussion by inserting after the words in the first sentence "--to train a small number of men" the additional words "including some Cuban refugees,--". The President also struck out the opening clause in the second sentence "in the face of this threat."

³/Not found.

Two questions were raised indicating weaknesses in the statement, the first being the reference to the purpose of training as being purely defensive and designed to cope with infiltration and subversion. Mr. Gates in particular felt that this was misleading and could cause us later trouble.

The second point discussed and criticized was the implication in the second sentence that the special training was merely an extension of the conventional training program whereas actually it was carried out in a different area under different trainers of a different character.

Concerning the meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow, after considerable discussion (during the course of which the President indicated that he felt we allowed ourselves to be pushed around to an unwarranted extent by Congressional committees) the President ruled that Mr. Dulles should testify but that he should insist on no record being kept and no one else being present other than members of the committee and the Chief Clerk. The billed purpose for the committee meeting would be a general intelligence round-up by Mr. Dulles similar to those given in past years.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

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16. Editorial Note

According to a chronology of JCS participation in planning for operations against Cuba, maintained in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, working level officers on the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were informed on January 11, 1961, for the first time of the plan being developed in the CIA for an invasion of Cuba by a Cuban exile force:

"Mr. Willauer and a CIA representative briefed Gen Bonesteel and Gen Gray on the general concept, in Gen Bonesteel's office. This was the first time the JCS at the working level had knowledge of this project. At this meeting, Gen Gray pointed out the necessity for the establishment of a special interdepartmental working group and suggested this matter be brought before the 5412 Group at their next meeting the following day."

(Chronology of JCS Participation in Bumpy Road; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

The chronology indicates that the 5412 Group reviewed the planning on January 12, and arranged for the establishment of a State-Defense-CIA-JCS working group to evaluate the additional measures that might be required; see Document 17. On January 13 the Interdepartmental Working Group held its first meeting at the Department of State; see Document 18. Brigadier General David W. Gray, the JCS representative at the meeting, was given the mission of preparing an evaluation of the possible military courses of action necessary to overthrow the Castro government in the event the currently planned political and paramilitary operations were determined to be inadequate. The evaluation prepared in the Department of Defense for General Gray is printed as Document 19.

17. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, January 12, 1961.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Special Group Mtgs-Cuba. Secret; Eyes Only. No drafting information is given.

SPECIAL GROUP MEETINGS--CUBA

12 January 1961

1. Mr. Dulles reported the information received from General Goodpaster to the effect that a large delegation from the above-mentioned group (Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front) reportedly will visit Washington on Saturday.

2. Mr. Willauer outlined a proposal to establish a task force consisting of representatives of State, CIA, Defense

and the Joint Staff to draw up contingency plans covering the possible eventual use of overt U.S. forces.

3. All members agreed that such planning is an essential step. Mr. Gray asked that a preliminary report of the task force be available for the meeting of January 19th.

4. In answer to a question, Mr. Barnes gave details of the Cuban government's capture of materiel from two airdrops plus one cache.

5. Mr. Parrott outlined the status of the answer to a request from the Department of Justice to the Department of State for an opinion on whether such action would run counter to U.S. foreign policy interests. He said that all members of the Group had concurred, with the exception of Mr. Douglas. Particularly for the benefit of Mr. Irwin, who had not been exposed to this subject, Mr. Parrott outlined various reasons why State and CIA feel strongly that something must be done to stop Masferrer./1/ Mr. Irwin deferred to the judgment of those two agencies.

/1/Rolando Masferrer, a former pro-Batista Cuban senator.

6. The Group then approved the suggested exchange of correspondence,/2/ with some editing designed to give as much flexibility as possible. It was also agreed that every attempt should be made to avoid undue publicity in connection with whatever action is taken.

/2/Not further identified.

18. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 13, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Nov 1960-Jan 20, 1961. Top Secret. Drafted in M by E. Glion Curtis.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Whiting Willauer, Assistant Secretary of Defense John Irwin, General Gray, JCS, Captain Spore, OSO, Mr. Tracy Barnes, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], Mr. Joseph W. Scott, Mr. Glion Curtis, Mr. Wym Coerr, and Mr. Frank Devine/1/

/1/Willauer, Scott, Curtis, Coerr, and Devine represented the Department of State. Irwin and Spore represented the Department of Defense. Gray represented the JCS. Barnes, [*text not declassified*] represented the CIA. This was the interdepartmental working group described in Document 16.

The meeting opened at 10:05 a.m. with Ambassador Willauer in the chair. There were some introductory remarks emphasizing the special security restrictions on any matters discussed--Secretary Irwin noted that in the Defense Department only Secretary Erskine, Secretary Douglas, Secretary Gates and Secretary-designate McNamara will be informed. There was some preliminary discussion as to the nature of the job to be done which is brought out more fully in the remarks noted later on. Ambassador Willauer indicated that the reason for the existence of the working group was to provide a third prong to the two-pronged approach. The two-pronged approach is the overt program for Cuba on the one hand, and the accompanying covert program contained in the document dated December 6 and December 20./2/

/2/The December 6 version of this document, which does not include the second part dealing with the covert program, is in the Supplement. The December 20 version of the document has not been found.

Ambassador Willauer then proceeded to read through the document, stopping at various points to comment or to respond to questions. This record will not attempt to reproduce the content of the document, but merely to identify the place where the reading ceased and discussion took place.

Ambassador Willauer read Part I. Basic Assumptions through the sentence on economic dislocations (line 5, first paragraph). At this point he noted that he felt, and he quoted Jose Figueres as concurring in this viewpoint, that there was a high probability that the Soviet Union would pump in enough economic assistance to make a show case of Cuba. He noted that dissatisfaction arising from economic factors is not overlooked. He indicated that for all practical purposes, he felt, the notion had been abandoned that there was any hope of overthrowing the Castro regime with economic warfare measures alone, even if they include an effective blockade.

He then read through the rest of the Basic Assumptions section.

He then read Part II. Suggested Solution through the first paragraph. Comment: Ambassador Willauer indicated that events had overtaken the provisions of this paragraph. He said that at this time no one foresees any Foreign Ministers Meeting by February 1, nor do they foresee any effective collective sanctions decision. Ambassador Willauer then went on to note that an obscure item which appears in the *New York Times* of January 12 indicated an inclination on the part of President Betancourt of Venezuela to call an OAS Foreign Ministers meeting for the purpose of acting against dictators both of the right and of the left. Mr. Coerr noted that the type of reaction which had occurred yesterday in Uruguay against the Communist and Castro activities could build up to an OAS meeting. Ambassador Willauer commented that we had not given up all hope, but we cannot count on such a meeting taking place. Ambassador Willauer then read the second paragraph. He then noted that again events have overtaken the provisions of the paper in that the United States has already broken relations with Cuba. He noted that Peru had broken relations unilaterally and perhaps Uruguay is about to do so. The other Latin American countries, however, are reviewing their political situation and appear to be receding from their somewhat stronger attitude toward breaking relations which existed prior to the United States action. He specifically cited the Chilean elections and the Argentine evidence of softening of its position.

Ambassador Willauer then read the third paragraph of this section. He noted that this type of action is all overt, nevertheless, assistance to a government in exile, particularly in terms of personnel training and military materiel support, brings in the Defense Department immediately. Secretary Irwin directed attention to the provision of assistance "after" recognition and raised the question particularly with reference to training, as to whether it shouldn't be done ahead of time and be ready for use at the time of recognition. Ambassador Willauer quoted General Gray as having said that the force of 750 men could perhaps hold a perimeter of only 1,000 yards across. He noted that the actual amount of real estate controlled by the government is not important and even expressed the possibility that one could be recognized without any real estate at all. In response to General Gray's question, Mr. Scott noted that although the phrase used in the paper is government-in-exile, what is really meant is a provisional government. Ambassador Willauer then noted the fact that the Agency is smuggling into Cuba two Cuban leaders. These persons might constitute a rallying point for the formation of a government within Cuba.

Mr. Barnes asked whether it is realistic to speak of recognizing a government in exile while the Castro Government is still in existence and asked whether this was really possible. Mr. Coerr replied, "yes" with the proviso that it would, of course, not be done if the situation were so flimsy as to be ludicrous. In response to Mr. Barnes' question whether real estate is essential or not, Mr. Scott replied that the present legal opinion is that real estate is essential. Secretary Irwin indicated he had the same concern as Mr. Barnes. As he described it, his problem is that it is not sufficient to establish control over a piece of territory but in addition there must be an ability to maintain that control. His question is whether 750 men really will be able to do that. Ambassador Willauer made the point that perhaps there is already sufficient real estate of one sort or another available in the Escambray in dissident hands to warrant recognition of a government which controlled that territory.

Secretary Irwin commented that the real question was not one of recognition, but rather whether or not we are prepared to do enough with sufficient speed to enable the provisional government to establish its control over all

of Cuba. He noted that he is currently very concerned with such a problem in Laos, where volunteers were encouraged but no decision had been taken yet as to how far we would go.

Mr. Scott observed that this was one of the reasons for this current meeting. How do we make recognition effective? How much do you need to provide for the purpose? In this picture the abilities and limitations of the Defense Department constitute the third prong in the program.

Ambassador Willauer raised the question of training volunteers such as Argentines or Cubans. Tracy Barnes estimated that there are now 70,000 Cubans in and around the Miami area, of whom perhaps 10,000 could be of military age. Ambassador Willauer then continued with "Suppose we figured on the basis of 10,000 Cubans and perhaps 5,000 other Latin American volunteers for training, then questions might be: Where could they be trained? What would be required for the purpose? and, How long would it take? Tracy Barnes noted that there may be a question of what types of people would be acceptable. For example, he said that a military background of some sort may be necessary. Ambassador Willauer suggested that this was a Department of Defense judgment. Mr. Coerr observed that the size of the force may be dependent upon the kind of victory which is considered to be necessary. In amplification he said one sized force might be sufficient to knock Castro off, but to eliminate his government quickly and thoroughly might require more people. Captain Spore asked whether the first step isn't really to surface a new leader before recognition of the government. Ambassador Willauer commented that it would never be possible to pull all the Cubans together. Captain Spore inquired about the need for some massive program within Cuba.

At this point Secretary Irwin left the meeting.

General Gray, responding to Captain Spore's last question, indicated that the document/3/ will answer that question. Ambassador Willauer then noted that it will be necessary to make several assumptions. One is that whatever government is recognized must be assumed to be satisfactory for our purposes. A second is that Castro is in power in Cuba and has certain military equipment and capabilities. One of our questions is, in the light of these assumptions, what is required from the outside to assure success of the provisional government?

/3/Reference is to the staff study prepared in the Department of Defense on January 16; see Document 19.

At this point Mr. Devine made three comments. He noted that with reference to our recruitment of volunteers, Castro is also busy recruiting Latin American volunteers for his own purposes. Secondly, he noted that the principal point implicit in the element of establishing a safe haven perimeter within Cuba was the expectation that this would encourage and in fact produce large-scale adherence from defectors within Cuba. Thirdly, he wished to be sure that the fact that two Cuban anti-Castro leaders are being infiltrated into Cuba at this time does not represent a decision already taken that these are the chosen instruments. Mr. Devine was reassured on this latter point.

There was then an exchange between Ambassador Willauer and General Gray. General Gray indicated that his directive from General Bonesteel was that this working group was to write an overall plan with all three elements; that subordinate to this general plan was to be a family of plans for detailed operations in support. Ambassador Willauer indicated this is correct.

The reading of the document continued from the third section "Measures to implement Proposed Solutions." There was no further comment or discussion down through paragraph d of the section "Recognition of a Cuban Government-in-exile," however, Ambassador Willauer did note in passing that unilateral action by the United States has already been taken and that the collective action section has been overtaken by events. He also noted that the language calling for recognition of government-in-exile immediately upon breaking relations has been overtaken by events.

Secretary Irwin returned to the meeting at this point.

Mr. Barnes then noted that there is a group of 400 to 1,000 Cubans who expect to make some calls on President Eisenhower and elsewhere during the course of today and tomorrow. Ambassador Willauer then continued the reading through the end of Part I.

Ambassador Willauer read Part II--Covert Action, Section 1--Objectives. He commented that the Agency is doing a tremendous amount of work--Tracy Barnes indicated that there are 180 different groups of Cubans. Mr. Barnes also said that two representatives of opposition groups are about to go inside Cuba. One is a member of the FRD, the second is not. He continued by saying that perhaps Arellano Sanchez Arango might also go in. Sanchez Arango claims to have a lot of support, but so far has not identified any of it. Ambassador Willauer then read Section 2--Present Status, and noted that the support spring boards are located in Guatemala, Nicaragua and the Canal Zone.

The Ambassador then continued reading sections 3 and 4 and then invited comment by Mr. Barnes on the geographic score, the main thrust and the broadcast activity in the political action and propaganda fields. Mr. Barnes reported in considerable detail about activities of Swan Island, the three newspapers, and the magazine, as well as trips through Latin America by the jurists, labor groups, representatives of Cuban women, and students organizations. He noted the political stand taken last May by Tony Varona in Mexico City and Caracas, the development and announcement of a political platform, which he characterized as being somewhat negative. He indicated in some detail the reasons why it was felt that a more positive approach to the platform provisions was not desirable at the stage reached when the platform was released. He then indicated that Radio Swan is commencing to discuss various approaches to such important questions as land reform, elections and other elements of a platform. General Gray asked who was the leading candidate. Mr. Barnes indicated that he has lists from many sources with detailed information about the individuals. He said that he is ready to sit down and consider the candidates and reach a decision as to who are most appropriate. He noted that at this stage we should not go so far as to select one individual who might be shot, and that the selection of a single candidate should follow some demonstration that he can survive in Cuba and does in fact have a substantial political following.

Ambassador Willauer noted that there is one military contingency plan which will have to be ready for use if Castro should start slaughtering Americans. This would be a purely military plan and would include military occupation. General Gray noted that such a plan already exists and is being revived. Ambassador Willauer noted that the hardest political problem was that the Cubans would not work together. Mr. Barnes then noted that the tabs to the paper give full details about the individuals, names, background, etc.

Secretary Irwin at this point left the meeting.

Ambassador Willauer then read the paramilitary section, number 5. Mr. Barnes commented on the communication teams in Cuba. He first noted, however, that so far the activities have not developed any cracks and crevices in the Castro structure. There is still hope that these might become visible during the next sixty days with increased propaganda, support, and other activities. He indicated that at one time there were ten communications teams active. For various reasons these have now been reduced to six. There is no indication yet of Cuban DF capability. In contrast the Agency with Navy help feels that it knows every movement of any Cuban ship and has good information about the ground forces and secret police, and does not have much information about air activity.

Ambassador Willauer then continued reading in the paramilitary section through the sentence ending "and carry out sabotage." At this point [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] was asked to comment, since he just recently came from Havana. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] indicated that the various elements of the opposition are cooperating with each other in sabotage activities. Recently, there has been a decrease of such activity because of the Fidel-inspired invasion scare, the militia activity, and the introduction of death penalties. Some of the sabotage teams have been picked up but some are still in existence, willing and able to act;

however, more material is necessary. Ambassador Willauer noted the need for labor to cut the cane. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] continued by noting that the sabotage units can be coordinated with any landing. Some details of the supply drops were reported. Mr. Barnes indicated that of the six missions flown within the past ten days (out of a total to date of ten supply drops)--five were supply missions. Of these, two were fully successful, one was partially successful, one was mechanically successful but the material was lost subsequent to its receipt by the people to whom it was destined, and the fifth was not good. Mr. Barnes indicated that better results will be possible in the future, now that there are on-site communications units in action. Ambassador Willauer noted in passing that with a collapse of the Castro regime after successful efforts, it may be necessary to provide certain facilities, such as electric power or communications, particularly in a place such as Havana, if the sabotage efforts are as successful as is hoped. Thus it might be wise to earmark early some Naval ship with this thought in mind.

The final paragraph of the paramilitary section was read. Ambassador Willauer noted the Paul Kennedy article in the New York Times,^{/4/} which he indicated as giving pretty accurate information about the training and asked whether anyone required additional information. Ambassador Willauer indicated that it still may be possible to have U.S. strike bases; that this matter has not yet been finally decided. He also mentioned the question of contract pilots. He said that the idea of air strikes beginning three days before D-day has been killed, and that a strike beginning the day before D-day has now been accepted. He noted that it is possible that Cuba may have a jet air force based on the pilots being trained in Czechoslovakia. As yet there is no evidence that there are any jet airplanes in Cuba. However, Ambassador Willauer raised the problem that, if Castro has a jet air force, how would it be possible to explain the use by the FRD of a jet capability. He suggested the possibility of a volunteer group, to acquire and provide the jet pilots and planes. Ambassador Willauer indicated that he hoped the Defense Department would include in its estimates some indication of what might be required to counteract a Cuban jet air force, and some estimate as to how soon Cuba could have effective jet capability after delivery of such planes in Cuba. Following Mr. Barnes comment that there is no magic to any specific number of days before D-day for a pre strike, and that sufficient facts are not now on hand to reach a decision, Ambassador Willauer commented that with the present Cuban air force one day before D-day is sufficient. Mr. Devine noted that one of the problems of activity prior to D-day is what will be happening during that period in the U.N. and the O.A.S.

^{/4/}See footnote 1, Document 15.

Ambassador Willauer then finished the reading of the paper with the miscellaneous section.

Captain Spore then commented at length on the sea lift problem. He gave a run down of what vessels the Agency now has indicating that it would not be sufficient for the number of troops involved. He said that the Navy is quite concerned about the problem of selecting a beach. He also said that heretofore calculations had been based on an unopposed landing. If an opposed landing is a possibility, there will be a requirement for naval support and the vessels in hand have no armament. He also expressed Navy concern over the actual landing and transportation without Castro's prior knowledge from port of embarkation. Ambassador Willauer noted the possibility of a pre-dawn strike.

Ambassador Willauer then explained about the timing problem, indicating that the next meeting of the Group is early Thursday^{/5/} morning, and that this working group has been instructed to obtain the third prong document from Defense before that meeting. He suggested that the next working group meeting be Monday^{/6/} when some type of progress report might be helpful. General Gray raised some general questions. He then specifically asked if the plan just read is valid. He noted that there are so many contingencies raised, the plan does not seem to have yet been determined. Ambassador Willauer indicated that the Special Group could not go beyond the point which the Ambassador has described in stating what the United States policy will be. This will be something that has to be determined and set by the new administration. In the meantime the Group does require from Defense a statement regarding the questions he, the Ambassador, has raised.

^{/5/}January 20.

/6/January 16.

General Gray and Ambassador Willauer then discussed the nature of the job to be done by Defense and what is required.

General Gray then attempted to sum up what he understood was needed. He said (1) The Group seems to want an estimate of the time to organize and train a Cuban indigenous army, including an estimate of its chances; (2) What U.S. support would be required for the 750 men in terms of air and naval power; (3) What U.S. ground forces will be required to support the action. A separate paper, he said, would deal with U.S. unilateral intervention to protect U.S. lives and property, involving ground, air and naval forces. He would contemplate this situation arising so quickly that there would be no possibility to inter mix it with the plan. And (4) the use of U.S. and indigenous forces on a planned basis.

There was considerable discussion by Captain Spore, Ambassador Willauer, General Gray, and Mr. Barnes on the need to work on the assumption that the 750 men may not be able to do the job unassisted. At one point, *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* estimated, on the basis of observation of visa applicants, that in the group of 70,000, there would be less than 1,000 able-bodied men available for training for military duties. Ambassador Willauer suggested that General Gray note, as a problem in connection with training Cubans, the question of who pays the trainees, who pays their dependents, and who would pay indemnity in case of their death.

Mr. Barnes noted that the study would not be complete without consideration of the timing factor. Nor without consideration of two further points, namely, coordination with action vs. Trujillo, and an estimate of why an embargo, including activity which amounts to acts of war, will not work. Ambassador Willauer noted that there is perhaps insufficient time to do all this in the final report, however, he suggested that the desirability of also dealing with Trujillo should be noted, and that the Agency might include an evaluation of the effects of a complete economic embargo. It was also considered that at some point the Agency will have to prepare and put up for the reaction of the Special Group, its assessment of the possibility of success by the 750 unaided. There would also be required an assessment of the political feeling in the country which it is hoped might be developed between now and the end of February.

The next meeting is on the calendar for Monday at 1600 hrs.

19. Staff Study Prepared in the Department of Defense

Washington, January 16, 1961.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 1, Source Documents-DCI-8, Vol. I, Part III. Top Secret. The source text has a handwritten date of January 16 on a cover sheet. A handwritten note on the cover sheet, in an unknown hand, confirms that the evaluation was discussed on January 16 by the Interdepartmental Working Group on Cuba; see Document 20.

EVALUATION OF POSSIBLE MILITARY COURSES OF ACTION IN CUBA (S)/1/

/1/According to a chronology prepared in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, General Gray received informal approval of the evaluation on January 19 from General Lemnitzer and Joint Staff Director General Earle Wheeler. (Chronology of JCS Participation in Bumpy Road; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials) On January 22 General Lemnitzer used the evaluation in a briefing on the Cuba project at the Department of State for several members of the new Kennedy administration. (Memorandum No. 1 from the Cuban Study Group to the President, June 13; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

The Problem

1. To evaluate possible military courses of action to overthrow the Castro Government in Cuba in the event currently planned political and paramilitary operations are determined to be inadequate.

Facts Bearing on the Problem

2. The basis of the problem was a request by the Department of State for an evaluation of the following possible military courses of action in Cuba.

a. U.S. unilateral action with U.S. Air, Naval, and Army forces.

b. Invasion by a U.S. trained and supported volunteer Army composed of Cubans and other anti-Castro Latin Americans.

c. Invasion by a combination of a and b above.

3. The estimated strength and capabilities of Cuban Armed Forces are as follows:

a. Ground

(1) Revolutionary Army--32,000; capability low, except for guerrilla type operations.

(2) Revolutionary National Police--9,000; capable of security only.

(3) Militia--200,000 to 300,000; capability low except for guerrilla type operations.

b. Naval

(1) Strength, 4 to 5,000 personnel; 3 PF, 2 PCE and 43 smaller craft; capabilities very low.

c. Air Force

The Revolutionary Air Force, from which almost all the rated pilots were purged by Castro, has almost no combat capabilities at this time. However, reports indicate that as many as 100 pilots are undergoing flight training in Czechoslovakia. Also, the Air Force has received several Czech trainees and 6-10 helicopters recently.

4. In the military field, the Soviets have delivered to Cuba in the past five months, at least 20,000 tons of arms and equipment, including small arms, armored vehicles, personnel carriers, helicopters, trainer aircraft, a variety of artillery, and large quantities of ammunition. So far, the U.S. has no evidence of the Soviets providing Cuba with sophisticated weapons such as missiles or nuclear devices, or MIG jet fighter aircraft.

5. There are fifteen airfields in Cuba which are capable of handling jet aircraft.

6. The U.S. has available on the East Coast of the U.S. the following combat forces.

a. U.S. Atlantic Fleet, including at least two attack carriers, a Marine Division, and a Marine Air Wing.

b. The Strategic Army Command.

c. Elements of the U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command.

7. Mr. Tracy Voorhees, Special Advisor to the President on Cuba, has reported that approximately 40,000 anti-Castro refugees have entered the U.S. in 1960.
8. From 1950 through 1959, approximately 70,000 Cubans entered the U.S., 10,000 of whom have been naturalized.
9. The CIA estimates that there has been a total of 65,000 anti-Castro Cuban exiles of all classes of which 3,000 are Cuban males capable of performing military service. Of these 3,000, CIA estimates that 750 are willing to perform military service in a Volunteer Army.
10. That an adequate number of troop age (18-65) physically able male Cuban exiles are available in the U.S. to form a Volunteer Army of sufficient strength to have the capability of establishing and holding a lodgement on the Island of Cuba.
11. That it is impossible to train covertly, in the Free World, a force adequate to assure a successful permanent lodgement in Cuba.
12. Massive internal popular support by the Cuban people of action to overthrow the Castro Government cannot be assured.
13. That the Soviet Bloc will continue its assistance to Cuba, but will not openly intervene on behalf of the Castro Government.

Discussion

14. U.S. Unilateral Action:

a. The Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command, has a contingency plan^{2/} prepared and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which provides for the employment of Army, Naval and Air Forces for the overthrow of the Castro Government in Cuba. This contingency plan is currently undergoing revision in view of increased capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces and militia. This revision generally reflects only an increase in U.S. Military Forces to be employed.

^{2/}Not found.

b. If U.S. unilateral action were directed the forces assigned for commitment to this operation are considered adequate and on an emergency basis could begin commitment within a matter of hours. If circumstances prove this force to be inadequate the proximity of Cuba to the U.S. simplifies the problem of rapid reinforcement of the Task Force from other U.S. based forces. This reinforcement would be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as required.

c. Unilateral action in Cuba by the U.S. would have a tremendous impact on U.S. prestige in the Caribbean and Latin America (as well as the rest of the free world) unless it had strong support of Latin American public opinion and, preferably, token Latin American participation. It would therefore be desirable that, prior to the implementation of this course of action, a concerted effort be made either through the OAS or through selected Latin American countries, to obtain condemnation of the Castro regime and open Latin American support for action to eliminate that regime.

d. This course of action could also be justified if Castro attacked Guantanamo Bay or if such an attack were "staged". With prior propaganda effort by the U.S., Free World opinion could be sufficiently swayed, or the facts sufficiently "muddled", that U.S. unilateral action in response to such an attack, actual or "staged" would have

less impact on U.S. prestige in the Free World.

15. A second possible course of action would be invasion by an overtly U.S. trained and supported Volunteer Army, adequate in size and capability to assure a successful lodgement in Cuba.

a. This force would be trained in both guerrilla and battalion type tactics. It would not be organized above the level of reinforced battle group combat teams.

b. The training would be conducted at bases presently on a caretaker status, in Southeastern United States or Puerto Rico, and which could be made available.

c. It is believed this force could be trained to minimum standards in seven months with time phases as follows: 8 weeks for the initial planning, assembly of equipment, instructors and trainees; 8 weeks basic; 6 weeks advanced individual training and small unit training; and 6 weeks unit training. During the 2 months basic training phase potential leaders and technicians would be identified. Their training, to a minimum acceptable level, would be conducted during the five months remaining in the basic training period outlined above.

d. Refresher and/or advanced flying training, to minimum acceptable standards, can be provided former Cuban pilots on bases in Southeast United States during the seven month training period envisioned above.

e. Dependent upon the size of this force, and the degree of direct U.S. participation, provision of adequate amphibious lift would be a problem. Crews necessary to operate these craft can be trained during the seven month training period at bases in Southeastern United States or on Islands in the Caribbean.

f. A force adequate in size to assure a lodgement in Cuba would require a sustained source of supply in such quantity, and by such means, that it would obviously be beyond the capabilities of Cuban exiles and beyond U.S. capability to provide covertly. Consequently, logistic support would have to be provided overtly by the United States unilaterally, or in conjunction with one or more Latin American countries. In either event, adequate logistic support would be assured.

g. In training and committing a Volunteer Army certain problems arise which are beyond the present resources and purview of the Department of Defense. For example: (1) The pay of the Volunteer Cuban Army; (2) The costs of the training, equipment, and logistic support; (3) Care for the dependents of these forces; (4) Hospitalization facilities and costs, and (5) Indemnities for casualties. These problems are not insurmountable but must have early consideration in planning.

h. The problem of maintaining the lodgement and assuring supply would be complicated somewhat if the Castro regime obtains jet aircraft prior to the invasion by the Volunteer Army. Once jet aircraft are seen in Cuba, a jet capability must be assumed. However, this problem could be reduced to manageable proportions if prior to the invasion a limited number of B-26 aircraft made a surprise attack on the fifteen Cuban airfields capable of handling jet aircraft. It is believed such an attack would destroy all, or nearly all, of their aircraft, and render their airstrips inoperable. On the basis that such a surprise attack did not destroy Castro's jet capability, it would be desirable to have the immediate participation of jet aircraft from Latin American countries as part of the OAS contribution. If used these aircraft would have to operate from U.S. bases.

i. The capabilities of this Volunteer Army to take and hold a lodgement in Cuba would be dependent on opposition to Castro within Cuba, and the popular attraction of the leaders of the Volunteer Army, and of the provisional government. Both of these factors will be subject to change before and after the envisaged invasion. Unless extensive internal popular support is received, a force based upon the personnel availability estimate in paragraph 9 could hold a lodgement for only a very brief time. To hold a lodgement for any appreciable period without massive popular support would require a minimum force of 5,000.

16. Invasion by a combination of possible courses of action a and b.

a. The possible third course of action would involve the employment of a U.S. trained Volunteer Army and U.S. Army, Naval and Air Forces for invasion. Such a course of action would have as its objective the overthrow of the Castro Government and control of the Island of Cuba. This U.S. participation could range in scope from the provision of Army, Naval and Air Force combat units to logistical support only.

b. This course of action from the viewpoint of operational planning would involve only a downward revision of forces allocated to CINCLANT's contingency plan comparable to the strength and capability of the Volunteer Army.

c. As in the case of unilateral U.S. action this course of action would accomplish its objective; for, if circumstances indicate a requirement for additional forces, the proximity of U.S. military bases to Cuba and the availability of additional U.S. based forces simplify the problem of rapid reinforcement of the Task Force. Such reinforcement, as required, would be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. The problems facing the employment of this course of action are a combination of those for courses of action a and b.

Conclusions

17. Courses of action a and c are the only courses of action which assure success.

18. Course of action b will require, as a minimum, U.S. logistic support and will not necessarily accomplish the mission of overthrowing the Castro Government.

19. Course of action c will be subject to the same objections as course of action a, however would have a better chance of obtaining Cuban popular support.

20. Since courses of action b and c could not be accomplished covertly and would take at a minimum 7 months to prepare, the U.S. would have to face a long period of world condemnation, as compared to course of action a which could be accomplished expeditiously without prior world knowledge of U.S. intentions.

Recommendations

21. It is recommended that the above conclusions be considered by the Group in any further evaluation of plans for action aimed at the overthrow of the Castro Government.

20. Memorandum for the Files

Washington, January 16, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Nov 1960-Jan 20, 1961. Secret. Drafted by Curtis.

SUBJECT

Meeting 4:10 p.m., January 16, 1961

PERSONS PRESENT

Ambassador Willauer, General Gray, Messrs. Barnes, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], Captain

Spore, Messrs. Scott, Devine, and Curtis

General Gray presented his draft of the Defense Department paper./1/ He read through the document and noted several language changes on his copy for incorporation in the final document.

/1/Document 19.

The salient features are incorporated in the following paragraphs.

The problem was stated to be to evaluate the possible military courses of action in event of a determination of inadequacy of the present political and paramilitary program to remove Castro.

There was a three fold approach to the problem. The first (a) is unilateral action by the U.S.; the second (b) is with a volunteer "Cuban" army; and the third (c) is a combination of the first two.

Intelligence estimates of Cuban strength were reported and included some present jet capability. There is an estimate of the availability of only 750 able-bodied Cubans willing to fight out of the estimated 65,000 Cubans in the Miami area. Under approach (b) it is estimated that a minimum of 5,000 men, preferably 10,000, will have to be overtly trained and that 7 months is the minimum time period required. Mr. Scott noted that the basis for estimating a force of 5,000 will have materially changed in 7 months with present trends in Cuba and the probable degree of USSR support to Castro. It was noted that with a requirement of 5,000 and only 750 Cubans available substantial numbers of other Latin volunteers are required.

The final conclusion is that course (a) is the only realistic one with a certainty of the outcome. There was discussion of a further contingency to provide support for a spontaneous indigenous uprising. There was discussion of format and procedures. Ambassador Willauer presented his draft of a covering statement/2/ to Mr. Barnes and Mr. Scott for study.

/2/Not found

General Gray did not expect that another meeting will be required and plans delivering the final draft of his paper on Wednesday/3/ morning to Mr. Scott.

/3/January 18.

21. Memorandum From the Assistant to the Deputy Director (Plans) for Covert Operations (Barnes) to the Chief of WH/4 of the Directorate for Plans (Esterline), Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, January 18, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Nov 1960-Jan 20, 1961. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent through the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division.

SUBJECT

Meeting with General Gray--18 January 1961

1. I saw General David Gray (JCS Staff assigned to the Willauer Planning Group by General Bonesteel) on 18 January in order to have a general discussion with him of the Cuban planning problems. I found him not only extremely cooperative and understanding but amazingly in agreement with our views. He pointed out that any operation of this type must be thought of in terms of a series of possible approaches on a graduated scale, each step requiring more effort and more commitment by the U.S. His scale ran from the mere use of pressure to open

unilateral U.S. intervention. The intermediate steps generally were support of an internal uprising, a small invasion force bringing about an uprising, a trained guerrilla force, a volunteer army, and a volunteer army in connection with a U.S. effort. He felt that our planning in effect carried through the first three steps and what we now need is some planning that will prepare the U.S. for any possible contingency. In effect, the planning now needed should carry us from where our plans end through the various phases in the scale, including the final step of overt U.S. military action. He stated that a paper/1/ is being prepared by Defense to explain this planning cycle and he said, as of the present, he believes that probably the most likely action would be the use of our element followed by substantially overt U.S. support, presumably after the recognition of some provisional government. He said that his worry is that a decision might be made to land the FRD force without having first decided upon and prepared the supporting U.S. effort. His position was that it would be too late to try to do this after the FRD force was on its way. I told him that all of us agreed thoroughly with him and we were all equally anxious to obtain firm plans and decisions that would permit the use of such force as the situation may require.

/1/Reference is to the staff study dated January 16, Document 19.

2. General Gray thought that it would be better not to undertake any planning on the overt support post an FRD strike force landing until the Defense paper has been completed, which he feels should be ready next week. General Gray did feel that we could start immediately to plan for possible support needs in case an internal uprising should occur before any FRD force landing. Such planning, he said, should begin with him although it would involve discussions with logistics officers. I told him that we were prepared to give some estimates on the logistics side as to what we felt might be involved in such support. I plan to get in touch with General Gray to make an appointment early next week for Jake Esterline, Jack Hawkins, a WH-4 logistics officer and myself.

3. General Gray, in my opinion, presently believes that the potential Cuban opposition is probably too great for any force of only 750 men. He admits that internal support could change this but says that he cannot help feeling that 200,000 militia each with a sub-machine gun is, in itself, a pretty strong force if they do nothing more than stand and pull the triggers. He agreed, however, that the next few weeks should be very revealing as to the future of internal opposition and further agreed that from the planning point of view these issues are not involved since one must assume the worst situation in order to be properly prepared. Such preparation does not necessarily mean that it will all have to be used.

4. General Gray said that he was quite aware of the difficulties of holding a group of alert young men in a readiness condition for too long. He said, however, that if the present deadlines, for whatever reasons (i.e. political or otherwise) are delayed, the military might be able to be helpful in providing exercises to stimulate actual conditions that might have to be faced. Such training could be useful, he said, and would keep the men busy for at least some additional period. It should be noted that General Gray did not say that the extension of time was unavoidable but was only talking on the basis that it might occur.

5. A point on which I think we must be realistic is that if the FRD force does go into action and then is provided with U.S. military aid, the command of the operation will at the moment the aid begins to be provided shift to CINCLANT. Personally, this does not bother me because it seems to me that at that point CINCLANT is the proper C-in-C.

C. Tracy Barnes/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

22. Editorial Note

On January 19, 1961, President Eisenhower and President-elect Kennedy met at the White House, together with their principal advisers, to discuss various foreign policy concerns. According to a memorandum prepared by Clark Clifford, who was helping to organize the transition for Kennedy, Eisenhower brought up the issue of

Cuba briefly, in a discussion devoted to the problem of Laos:

"President Eisenhower said with reference to guerrilla forces which are opposed to Castro that it was the policy of this government to help such forces to the utmost. At the present time, we are helping train anti-Castro forces in Guatemala. It was his recommendation that this effort be continued and accelerated." (Memorandum by Clifford, January 24; Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, White House Correspondence, 1/61-11/63)

Robert McNamara also prepared a memorandum for the President-elect in which he summarized the discussion at the meeting. His summary of the discussion on Cuba reads as follows:

"President Eisenhower stated in the long run the United States cannot allow the Castro Government to continue to exist in Cuba." (Memorandum from McNamara to Kennedy, January 24; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, 381 Cuba, 18 Jan. 61)

23. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, January 19, 1961.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Special Group Mtgs-Cuba. Secret; Eyes Only. No drafting information is given.

SPECIAL GROUP MEETINGS--CUBA

19 January 1961

1. Mr. Willauer presented the highlights of a paper/^{1/} which he had prepared following meetings of the special contingency planning group. He concluded that several major aspects of the overall plan require clarification or further decision, citing the following: (a) the use of U.S. air bases for strikes before and after D-Day, (b) staging of the invasion force, possibly from the U.S., (c) specific action, including timing, to get support of other Latin American countries, (d) how and when to recognize a provisional government, (e) the possibility of having to provide considerably more overt support than originally planned.

/1/Reference is to a memorandum from Ambassador Willauer to Under Secretary of State Merchant dated January 18. For text, see the Supplement.

2. Mr. Dulles noted that the next ten-day period poses a number of problems from the standpoint of policy approval. In answer to a question, Mr. Barnes said we are not planning specific overflights in the immediate future but urged that we be in a position to service requests as quickly as possible. The Group agreed that dispatches by sea can be continued without further approval at this time. It was also agreed that a high level meeting, to include the new Secretaries of State and of Defense should be arranged as soon as possible to reaffirm basic concepts.

3. Mr. Merchant said that the Department of Justice is not now prepared to take any action against Masferrer. The Group agreed this seemed reasonable under the circumstances.

4. Mr. Merchant reported the opinion of Assistant Secretary Mann that President Ydigoras/^{2/} may be overthrown in the next few days, perhaps by leftists in the Army or Air Force. Mann had urged that it be agreed that no Cuban trainees be placed at the disposal of Ydigoras and that plans for evacuation on very short notice be firmed up. It was noted that Mr. Mann and Col. King are in close touch on this matter.

/2/General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, President of Guatemala.

24. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 22, 1961, 10 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Jan 21, 1961. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted on January 23; no other drafting information is given on the source text. For another record of the meeting, see Document 25.

SUBJECT

Meeting on Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The Attorney General

The Under Secretary of State-designate

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Mr. Allen W. Dulles

Mr. Paul Nitze

General Bonesteel

Ambassador Hugh S. Cumming

Mr. Thomas Mann

Ambassador Whiting Willauer

Mr. Richard Bissell

Mr. Tracy Barnes

General David Gray

Colonel Cecil Shuler

Mr. Joseph W. Scott

The Secretary called on Mr. Mann to give a resume of activities regarding Cuba in the diplomatic field over the last several months. Mr. Mann said that several months ago he had talked with members of the Latin American diplomatic corps and had indicated to them that the United States wanted to know whether the OAS system

could prevent Castro's exportation of communism elsewhere in the hemisphere. The reaction of most members of the corps was that they wanted to know first where the Kennedy administration and the Quadros administration would stand. A short time ago, the Colombian Ambassador suggested to Mr. Mann that he go to Colombia and talk with President Lleras, who had once been Secretary General of OAS and who could be expected to be eager to see the OAS used in an effort to stop Castro. Mr. Mann then presented at some length a procedure for lining up support in the OAS for sanctions against Castro. He mentioned that a complicating factor was the problem posed by the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic. He then listed the possible lineup in the OAS which might favor effective action against Castro if properly approached. In summary Mr. Mann felt that the basic choice was whether we go it alone or multilaterally. (After the meeting, Mr. Mann made clear to some of the participants that the multilateral approach he had in mind should proceed simultaneously with the development of action plans in other fields and should in any case provide us with a realistic estimate of multilateral possibilities within about a month from the time soundings were begun.)

At this point, Mr. Merchant noted that two distinctions should be made regarding possible Latin American support for action against Castro. First a distinction should be drawn between the attitudes of governments and the attitudes of peoples within Latin American countries. A second distinction should be made with regard to the difference between what governments would be willing to support publicly and what they would be willing to support only privately.

Ambassador Willauer said that one of the matters that had captured his attention from his position in the field was how the fear engendered by Castro had dried up private capital activities in all of Latin America. Not only American firms, but also local sources of capital were seeking to escape.

With reference to the distinction between governmental and public attitudes, the Secretary asked Mr. Mann whether we might be in some rather tight situations in a number of countries of the hemisphere if Moscow pushed the button, i.e., with respect to pro-Castro movements in a number of countries. Mr. Mann said this would definitely be the case and mentioned Venezuela and Colombia as examples. As a further example of this [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] mentioned that he had a private meeting with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] had been brutally frank. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] mentioned he would send the Secretary a memorandum on his talk [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

The Secretary asked whether a systematic review had been made of possible actions under the Monroe Doctrine. He thought we ought to know what would be the legal situation under the Doctrine with regard to differing levels of action. Mr. Mann replied that a lot of thought had been given to this but as far as he was aware no systematic study had been made of it. He mentioned that Mr. Arthur Dean had recommended a young lawyer to study this problem. Mr. Mann felt that we should have outside legal advice on it.

The Secretary next asked at what point did we begin to consider that Castro had gone beyond the watershed in Cuba, adding that it seemed clear there was little hope now. Mr. Mann indicated it was difficult to name a specific point. There were a number of things that Castro had done that led to the conclusion that he had crossed the watershed. One early action on his part was his initiative in seeking ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc, which he had undertaken before we had acted on sugar quotas. Mr. Mann then listed other actions on Castro's part such as expropriation of land, setting up the militia, etc. He summarized by saying that history may indicate that Cuba had been one of the most rapidly communized states--faster even than those in Eastern Europe. He pointed out that Castro has complete control, something totally different from the situation in the traditional dictatorships in Latin America.

Mr. Bowles asked whether we had an estimate on the economic needs of Cuba and how far the Sino-Soviet bloc would likely go to meet them. Mr. Mann indicated there was such an estimate which needed, however, to be updated.

The Secretary then called on General Lemnitzer to review the military situation in Cuba. After having

emphasized the extreme sensitivity of some of the information he was about to give, General Lemnitzer estimated that the Revolutionary Army had 32,000, the Revolutionary National Police 9,000, the Militia over 200,000. He said that Cuba was an armed camp. They had received more than 30,000 tons of arms and equipment over the past five or six months. This buildup had made a decided change in the U.S. contingency plans to deal with it. He said there was no evidence of jet aircraft, missiles, or nuclear weapons; on the other hand, about 100 Cuban pilots were being trained in jet aircraft in Czechoslovakia. Their return to Cuba would add a new dimension to the problem.

With respect to Guantanamo, the General identified the critical problem for us as being the water supply. In response to a question from the Secretary he said there was no evidence of a buildup of Cuban forces around Guantanamo. He also indicated that very precise rules of engagement had been worked out for our aircraft in the area of Cuba. These included hot pursuit into Cuban airspace. The Secretary wanted to know whether the Cubans knew about this. The General said that they did not. The Secretary then asked whether the Cubans had any air-strike capability against Miami. The General replied they didn't have much now but when the pilots now training in Czechoslovakia return and if jet aircraft became available for them this would change the picture.

The Secretary then called on Mr. Dulles to outline the program for which he has been responsible with regard to Cuba. Mr. Dulles said that last March 17th the President had approved a covert action program to eliminate Castro. There had been three major lines of development under this program. The first was the political front, the second the psychological front, and the third was training Cubans for paramilitary activities. With regard to the political front he indicated that a vehicle had been created, the FRD, to enable the Agency to pull together as many of the disparate anti-Castro groups as possible. At one time there had been 184 anti-Castro refugee groups. He thought that on the whole the FRD was a reasonable representation of the anti-Castro political spectrum now inside Cuba. It covered the range from a little to the right to a little to the left of center. There were no Batista-ites or Communists in the FRD. The essentials of its program were the restoration of the Cuban constitution of 1940 and the original reforms announced by Castro, which had been subsequently laid aside. He then mentioned that under the mechanism of the FRD they had proceeded with psychological and paramilitary activities. Under the former he mentioned Swan Island, WRUL and certain radio stations in the Miami area, publications such as *Avance*, *El Mundo*, *Diario de la Marina* and *Bohemia*.

Mr. Dulles next described the paramilitary training activities going on at Retalhuleu in Guatemala. Under cover of the FRD, he said, we now have about five to six hundred highly trained Cuban foot soldiers. These have been trained by three Special Forces teams from Fort Bragg. The head trainer considered them the best-trained men in Latin America. In addition, we had sixteen B-26's, four or five C-46's and seven C-54's. At the present time, we had six active communications teams in Cuba and were planning to put in small paramilitary teams of six to eight men whose mission would be to try to line up resistance in Cuba.

The Secretary asked what was the estimated strength of resistance in Cuba at the present time and Mr. Dulles said he thought we could count on about 1,000, who were somewhat scattered. The Secretary then asked whether we have a capability to establish a going resistance movement without use of U.S. forces. Mr. Dulles said this would necessarily depend on how many came over to the dissident side. He said that our present Cuban force in training would reach 700 to 800. He then went on to mention the difficult problem of keeping them in Guatemala. At the best, we had six weeks to two months left before something would have to be done about them.

Mr. Dulles then said that in the normal course of events the Agency would continue drops--the next ones were scheduled for January 25-26--but that policy guidance was now needed from the new administration. He mentioned that the 5412 Group had met weekly and it had heretofore been possible for him to get his guidance from that Group. He said that at the moment what he needed was policy guidance on the following matters: (1) continuance of training, (2) introduction of small teams into Cuba with sabotage and communications capability, and (3) drops of food and supplies to dissidents now in Cuba. Mr. Barnes added that guidance was also needed on infiltrating political leaders into Cuba. He mentioned Artime and Manuel Ray.

Secretary McNamara asked what size Cuban force was considered necessary to buildup enough strength to overthrow Castro. Mr. Dulles said he thought that our presently planned Cuban force could probably hold a beachhead long enough for us to recognize a provisional government and aid that government openly. Secretary McNamara then asked whether the estimate was that time was strengthening or weakening us. Mr. Dulles replied that it now was weakening us. This could change if people in Cuba got hungry, but this might be a long time off. Food was still being sent to Cuba from the United States. General Lemnitzer interjected to say that Castro's popularity might be going down but his grip was getting tighter daily.

Mr. Bowles asked whether we knew of any cliques in the Castro hierarchy. Mr. Dulles said we didn't think there were any; that it now seemed to be down to the hard core. Mr. Bowles recalled the division between Trotsky and Stalin. Mr. Dulles replied that they didn't see any such division in the Cuban picture. He said he believed that the Castro regime had plans to export Castro's communism; that they already have power among the people in the Caribbean countries and elsewhere, particularly in Venezuela and Colombia.

The Attorney General said that about five days ago he had been approached by a former attorney of Castro's who was till close to Raul Castro, who had indicated that Raul might be going over into counter-Revolutionary efforts, principally against Che Guevara. The attorney had asked him what were the prospects for cutting off petroleum shipments to Cuba in the event of Raul's defection. He expected the attorney, who is now in Cuba, to return shortly with more on this.

Turning to the possibility of recognizing a provisional government, the Secretary indicated that seizing the Isle of Pines would have a number of advantages. Mr. Dulles said it had indeed a number of advantages but one major problem was how could dissidents in Cuba join up with a force landed there. General Lemnitzer said the Isle of Pines was heavily defended. Ambassador Willauer said that his first reaction had been very much in favor of trying to seize Pine Island. The head of the Special Forces team training the unit in Guatemala, however, had informed him that they would expect to lose roughly 50% of an invading force. He also brought up the possibility of a counter-attack by Castro forces from Cuba itself. The Secretary then said he was thinking about a two-step operation; first the establishment of a beachhead on the Isle of Pines and then moving on to Cuba itself. In this connection he asked whether we had a Puerto Rican ranger battalion and General Lemnitzer said we did not.

The Secretary next asked whether we anticipated any problem about restaffing Cuban personnel at the Guantanamo base. General Lemnitzer said there was no problem about this at the moment. About 1,000 Cubans lived on the base. The rest lived outside. The Secretary asked what about the possibility of putting the force now in Guatemala on the base at Guantanamo. General Lemnitzer replied that there might be some problem of concealment and an action of that sort might justify an attack against the base. The Secretary then asked in terms of contingency planning how many U.S. divisions were being thought of. General Lemnitzer in reply said two plus or maybe three.

The Secretary then commented on the enormous implications of putting U.S. forces ashore in Cuba and said we should consider everything short of this, including rough stuff, before doing so. He said he felt we might be confronted by serious uprisings all over Latin America if U.S. forces were to go in, not to mention the temptation that the commitment of such forces in Cuba would provide elsewhere in the world. In this connection he again mentioned the possibility of a physical base on the Isle of Pines for a provisional government which we could recognize. This he thought would be a powerful step forward. What we needed was a "fig leaf." A Cuban provisional government on the Isle of Pines, for example, could sink Soviet ships carrying supplies to Castro with less danger than would be the case with direct involvement of U.S. forces.

The Secretary then asked Mr. Dulles if he could say offhand how much money the Cuban operation had cost to date. Mr. Dulles said that it had cost about \$6 million last year and \$28 million was earmarked for the first six months of 1961. The Secretary asked him whether he could use a quarter of a billion dollars. Was there a possibility, for example, of suborning a unit on the Isle of Pines. This in the long run would be much cheaper than

using U.S. forces directly. The Secretary also mentioned that we should inquire into the possible usefulness of a pacific blockade with a carefully and publicly defined mission. In elaboration he mentioned the possibility of "making some international law." Should we, for example, announce that the introduction of jet aircraft into this hemisphere by the Bloc would be regarded as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. It would then be the Bloc's responsibility if they chose to "escalate" in the face of such an announcement.

General Lemnitzer then asked permission for General Bonesteel to show a chart of several possible courses of action in ascending scale which had been drawn up for contingency planning purposes. General Bonesteel summarized the chart and said that in his view we needed an overall national plan. The Secretary agreed and said it was clear a task force was needed to devote itself to the development of such a plan. He thought that the task force should be composed of representatives of State, Defense, and CIA. Mr. Dulles said that perhaps also representatives of Treasury and Justice should be included as needed.

Mr. Merchant commented that the inadequacies of the original March 17th plan only began to become apparent in November and mentioned that the intelligence community had brought out an estimate in the first part of December/1/ concluding that time was running against us in Cuba. He then mentioned that we were now working against some important deadlines. Among these were the shakiness of the Ydigoras regime, and the so-called "shelf-life" of the Cuban unit in Guatemala. The possibility of bringing the Cuban forces to the United States raised the question of how overtly the United States was prepared to show its hand. These problems were of an immediate nature, and another reason why policy guidance was needed as soon as possible.

/1/Reference is to SNIE 85-3-60, dated December 8, 1960. For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1958-1960, vol. VI, pp. 1168-1174.

Mr. Dulles said he hoped that the 5412 Group would be continued and could resume its meetings as soon as possible. The Secretary concluded by saying he would try to work out some arrangement about this tomorrow or the next day.

(At the end of the meeting, Ambassador Willauer gave the Secretary a memorandum he had written for Mr. Merchant on January 18/2/ which outlined a number of major issues on which policy guidance is needed. The memorandum was a reflection of views developed at the first meetings of a tripartite (State, DOD, and CIA) task force on the Cuban problem which had been chaired by Ambassador Willauer. A copy is attached to the original of this memorandum.)

/2/For text, see the Supplement.

25. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, January 22, 1961.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 3, Vol. IV (6). Secret. Drafted by Tracy Barnes on January 23.

SUBJECT

Conclusions of Dean Rusk's 22 January Meeting on Cuba/1/

/1/For another record of this meeting, see Document 24.

PRESENT

See attached list/2/

/2/Not printed. For the list of meeting participants, see Document 24.

The meeting was long and covered the entire problem in considerable detail. It is the purpose of this memorandum mainly to record the points of significance to CIA. It might be said, however, that in general no definite conclusions were reached other than to say that within a day or two the DCI will be advised by Secretary Rusk as to the views of the present administration on how to proceed and the status of the Special Group with particular reference to the grant of authority for actions in connection with Cuba.

The actions to be taken by CIA are:

1. To continue planning with the State Department with respect to the political side of the proposed provisional government or junta, i.e. who should be selected and when, how and where should they be selected. This is already underway and will be continued.
 2. To plan with the Pentagon with regard to specific support which might be provided by the Pentagon in the event that conditions make support necessary. Such planning with respect to the possibility of support for a pre-FRD strike landing is already underway. Other contingencies are also under consideration.
 3. An estimate should be made of the effects of overt U.S. action in Cuba on the rest of the world with particular reference to the rest of Latin America, the OAS, close NATO allies and possible Soviet and ChiCom moves in other parts of the world, e.g., Berlin, Laos, Korea, and possibly the Congo. Sherman Kent has been alerted to this and proposes to do a memo to the Director/3/ which can be coordinated if the Director so desires.
- /3/On February 11 the Board of National Estimates sent CIA Director Dulles a memorandum prepared in the Office of National Estimates, entitled "Probable International Reactions to Certain Possible US Courses of Action Against the Castro Regime." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI (McCone) General Maxwell Taylor Committee on Cuba, 28 Jan-21 May 1961) The text of this memorandum, which was forwarded to the U.S. Intelligence Board on the same day, is in the Supplement.
4. To prepare a briefing for the DD/P, possibly the DCI, regarding what is being done in connection with sabotage within Cuba and what might be done to increase same.
 5. To prepare a briefing regarding the theory underlying the selection of a landing site for the FRD strike force and some of the possible areas which would fit this theory.
 6. To prepare a short paper/4/ identifying individuals either connected with the project or supporting the project who had FBI experience in Latin America during the war; also stating the present working relationships with the FBI in connection with the project. (There is nothing peculiar about this. It was asked for by the DCI in order to be ready in case Secretary Rusk again raises a question along these lines based on his own personal recollections of wartime actions.)

/4/Not found.

Nos. 4, 5 and 6 are being taken care of by WH/4.

C. Tracy Barnes/5/

A/DDP/A

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

26. Memorandum of Conference With President Kennedy

Washington, January 25, 1961, 10:15 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Chester V. Clifton Series, JCS Conferences with the President, Vol. I. Top Secret. Drafted on January 27 by Goodpaster.

OTHERS PRESENT

General Lemnitzer

General Decker

Admiral Burke

General White

General Shoup

General Clifton

General Goodpaster

The President first told the group that General Clifton would be taking over from me the Defense Liaison functions. He expressed appreciation for the help I have been enabled to give him by staying on for a short while. He said he would hope to make use of General Clifton in order to stay in very close touch with the Chiefs. General Lemnitzer confirmed that it has been valuable to have someone here with whom the Chiefs could take up specific items, and whom they could get to take up questions with the President for them. The President said he is extremely anxious to keep in close contact with the Chiefs. He recognized that he would be seeing General Lemnitzer frequently when he comes to NSC meetings, attends meetings with the Secretary of State, etc.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

The President asked what the Chiefs think should be done regarding Cuba. General Lemnitzer replied, recalling that the initial plans were for clandestine operations. However, with the shipment in of heavy new military equipment from Czechoslovakia--30,000 tons or more--the clandestine forces are not strong enough. We must increase the size of this force and this creates very difficult problems. What is required is a basic expansion of plans. He noted that time is working against us--although living conditions in Cuba are deteriorating, Castro is tightening police state controls within the area. He is also sending agents and arms into other countries of Latin America. General Lemnitzer thought that the hope is to get a government in exile, then put some troops ashore, and have guerrilla groups start their activities. At that point we would come in and support them. He noted that plans are ready for such action. General Decker added that this action should be taken under a recognized Cuban leader, and, unfortunately, we do not have one at present. General Lemnitzer confirmed that there are a multitude of splinter groups. The President commented that Castro has been able to develop a great and striking personality throughout Latin America and this gives him a great advantage. Admiral Burke agreed that there is lack of a leader to rally around, and that we need somebody to fill this role.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

27. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, January 26, 1961.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 5, Area Activity-Cuba. Top Secret. Drafted by Bissell for a Presidential briefing. The briefing apparently was that provided by Dulles to President Kennedy and other members of the new administration on January 28. For records of that meeting, see Documents 30 and 31.

CUBA

A. Concept of the Operation:

1. We believe the present plan can establish a beachhead on Cuban soil and maintain it for a period of two weeks, possibly as long as thirty days. It will be of sufficient size to enable a provisional government to be introduced and exist without being under small arms fire. It will contain an air strip and will permit access by sea.
2. There is reasonable chance that the success of the above plan would set in motion forces which would cause the downfall of the regime.
3. There is a greater than even likelihood, however, that, although the consolidation of the beachhead would elicit wide-spread rebellious activities and great disorganization, it would not by itself and with such other support as could be rendered by Agency resources cause the downfall of the regime. Nevertheless, supplemented by the infiltration of other PM teams in other parts of Cuba and by harassing air activity, it could produce a set of affairs describable as continuing civil war.
4. Under these conditions and assuming that the provisional government had been recognized by the United States, there would appear to be a basis for an overt, open U.S. initiative to institute a military occupation of the island by a composite OAS force in order to put a stop to the civil war. This would almost certainly have to be accompanied by a commitment on the part of the OAS to hold supervised free elections reasonably promptly.
5. The provisional government would indicate its readiness to cooperate with such an OAS force whereas the Castro regime would almost certainly refuse to permit a period of OAS pacification followed by an OAS supervised election. Thus the initiative referred to above would in fact lead to overt military intervention against the Castro regime.

B. Immediate Decisions Required:

1. Activities now in progress include (a) political preparations to form an acceptable junta representing all groups; (b) propaganda; (c) the final recruitment and training of PM forces; and (d) active softening up operations in Cuba, including infiltration of teams, maritime resupply, sabotage, extension of agent communication nets, and air resupply and leaflet missions.
2. The softening up activities listed under paragraph 1. (d) preceding are essential not only as preparation for the final effort to overthrow the regime but also to test the temper of the Cuban people, to enable operational assessment of the actual and potential strength of the resistance and furnish other hard intelligence. If these activities are continued for another two to three weeks, it should be possible to form a far better judgment than at present of the chances for the success of the operation outlined in part A. above. Both the continued evidence to the world of active resistance in the island and the intelligence thus obtained will be of equal value as preparation for the operation outlined above, or for overt U.S. or OAS military action or as continuing pressure in the event that paramilitary or military action is substantially delayed.
3. It is recommended:
 - a. That the activities currently in progress set forth in paragraph B.1. above be continued for three weeks pending

a reassessment of the chances of success of the operation as planned.

b. That the detailed military planning be reviewed by not more than one or two senior officers on behalf of the JCS with a view to confirming or modifying the military estimate contained in paragraph A.1. above.

28. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara

JCSM-44-61

Washington, January 27, 1961.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, China-Cuba, 1961. Top Secret.

SUBJECT

U.S. Plan of Action in Cuba

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are becoming increasingly concerned with the situation presented by steadily increasing military strength of the Castro Government and the tight grasp of the Communists over the means of counter-revolution, including the military, the police and governmental financial resources as well as the organs of propaganda. Unless the United States takes immediate and forceful action, there is a great and present danger that Cuba will become permanently established as a part of the Communist Bloc, with disastrous consequences to the security of the Western Hemisphere. Cuba provides a Communist base of operations for export of similar revolutions to an already unstable and potentially explosive Latin America.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the primary objective of the United States in Cuba should be the speedy overthrow of the Castro Government, followed by the establishment of a pro-U.S. Government which, with U.S. support, will accomplish the desired objectives for the Cuban people. Great emphasis is placed on the urgent necessity for the United States to locate, train and support such Cuban nationals as will be capable of establishing a new non-Communist government once Castro is overthrown.

3. The current Political-Para-Military Plan/1/ does not assure the accomplishment of the above objective nor has there been detailed follow-up planning to exploit that plan if it succeeds or for any direct action that might be required if the plan is found to be inadequate.

/1/A summary of this plan, referred to as the Trinidad Plan, is in the Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Papers Furnished the Green Committee. See the Supplement.

4. As you recall, at the conference between the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 January 1961/2/ this problem was addressed. At the time the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pre-sented a Joint Staff concept of an ascending scale of U.S. supported or directed actions to accomplish the overthrow of the Castro Government. This concept, which is appended hereto, was intended to demonstrate the key elements in the development of an over-all U.S. Plan of Action for the overthrow of the Castro Government. That conference informally agreed that an Inter-Departmental Planning Group should be established to develop a detailed over-all U.S. Plan of Action along the general lines indicated in the Appendix.

/2/See Documents 24 and 25.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, recommend that:

a. An over-all U.S. Plan of Action for the overthrow of the Castro Government be developed by an Inter-Departmental Planning Group.

b. Such an over-all U.S. Plan of Action for the overthrow of the Castro Government include, but not be limited to the following:

(1) Mission

(2) Each feasible course of action (as set forth in the Appendix hereto, or as revised by the planners), with sub-elements as follows:

(a) The concept of operations for the course of action.

(b) Specific Tasks required of Executive Agencies concerned to accomplish the course of action.

(3) Coordinating Instructions

(a) Designation of Agency or individual responsible for inter-departmental coordination and arrangement for reviewing and approval of the Plan.

(4) Requirements for supporting plans.

(5) Special provisions for continuous evaluation of the situation as a basis for determining U.S. course of action.

(6) Command relationships for implementation of each course of action.

c. The resultant over-all U.S. Plan of Action, after review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other appropriate agencies and approval by the President, be supported by detailed plans by the cognizant Executive Agencies for the implementation of tasks set forth in the over-all U.S. Plan of Action.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are prepared to assign personnel to participate in this Inter-Departmental Planning for the Department of Defense.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staffs

Appendix

CONCEPT OF ACTIONS

(1) Pressure

Concept: Economic break dip relations O.A.S. acn. Propaganda & info; Naval/Aerial surveillance; Embargo; Show of force; Comm & trans.; Isolation

Mil. Req.: Naval/Aerial surveillance; Embargo; Show of force

Status of Mil. Req.: Current naval maneuvers

(2) Internal uprising

Concept: Foster thru propaganda & pressure a general internal uprising by the Cuban people

Mil. Req.: Log. supt.

Status of Mil. Req.: No plan; (Plan being initiated)

(3) Volunteer invasion force w/covert support

Concept: Train and equip small vol. force Cuban exiles to invade, establish a center of resistance for antiCastro Cubans to rally to establish pro U.S. Govt.

Mil. Req.: Logistic support

Status of Mil. Req.: Support provided as required

(4) Guerilla force with covert support

Concept: Train antiCastro Cuban exiles in U.W., insert into Cuba to est. U.W. units, initiate guerilla warfare w U.S. covert support

Mil. Req.: Logistic support

Status of Mil. Req.: No action

(5) Volunteer invasion force with overt action

Concept: Same as (3) plus planned overt follow up by U.S. forces; Naval blockade

Mil. Req.: Army, Naval & A.F. combat units; Logistic units; Supplies; Naval blockade

Status of Mil. Req.: No action; (Plan required)

(6) Overt U.S. action supported by L.A. volunteers

Concept: Invasion by U.S. military forces in conjunction w L.A. volunteers; Naval blockade

Mil. Req.: Same as (5); Naval blockade

Status of Mil. Req.: Modification of current cont. plan required est program of L.A. vol. req

(7) Unilateral overt U.S. action

Concept: Invasion by U.S. military forces only; Naval blockade

Mil. Req.: Same as (5); Naval blockade

Status of Mil. Req.: CINCLANT contingency plan (Being modified)

29. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara

JCSM-45-61

Washington, January 27, 1961.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Cuba 1961 000.1--092. Secret.

SUBJECT

Increased Tempo of the U.S. Information Offensive Toward Cuba (C)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that it would serve the National interest to intensify the information offensive of informing the Cuban citizens of the dangers inherent in the Castro government's alignment with the Sino-Soviets and their isolation from the Inter-American System. Such increased activity would definitely tend to offset the distorted view of U.S. objectives and policy that the Cuban populace now receive from their government and would contribute to the internal problems of the Castro regime.

2. One means of accelerating the information offensive could be through the greater employment of the Voice of America and Radio Swan, using increased power, and the long wave band so as to reach the largest possible segment of the Cuban populace. Consideration should be given to the employment of continental U.S. stations which would transmit regular commercial news and selected television programs using increased power for these broadcasts. It may be feasible to employ commercial stations in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, as well as leading dissident Cubans now residing in these areas to assist in this offensive.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Secretary of Defense forward the memorandum in the Appendix/1/ to the Secretary of State.

/1/Not printed.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer/2/

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.

30. Memorandum of Discussion

Washington, January 28, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/61-4/61. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Bundy and initialed by Kennedy. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. Another set of notes of this meeting, prepared by Lemnitzer, is in National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, Notes, Miscellaneous Meetings, 1961. Tracy Barnes also prepared a record of this meeting; see Document 31.

MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION ON CUBA

PRESENT

The President, The Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant Secretary Mann, Assistant Secretary Nitze, Mr. Tracy Barnes, Mr. McGeorge Bundy

The meeting began with a description of the present situation in Cuba by the Director of Central Intelligence. The judgment expressed without dissent was that Cuba is now for practical purposes a Communist-controlled state. The two basic elements in the present situation are a rapid and continuing build-up of Castro's military power, and a great increase also in popular opposition to his regime.

The United States has undertaken a number of covert measures against Castro, including propaganda, sabotage, political action, and direct assistance to anti-Castro Cubans in military training. A particularly urgent question is the use to be made of a group of such Cubans now in training in Guatemala, who cannot remain indefinitely where they are.

The present estimate of the Department of Defense is that no course of action currently authorized by the United States Government will be effective in reaching the agreed national goal of overthrowing the Castro regime. Meanwhile, the Department of State sees grave political dangers to our position throughout the Western hemisphere in any overt military action not authorized and supported by the Organization of American States.

After considerable discussion,^{/1/} the following proceedings were authorized by the President:

^{/1/}According to a "Review of record of proceedings related to Cuban Situation," prepared by Naval Intelligence for the Director of Naval Operations on May 5, Lemnitzer's debriefing following the White House meeting on January 28 outlined the discussion as follows:

"The President wanted to know how the JCS felt about the prospects for success of a landing in Cuba by the forces being trained in Guatemala. It was indicated that they wanted a JCS study and evaluation of CIA's plan and the JCS opinion of its chances for success. The Chairman offered a personal opinion that in view of the strong forces Castro now had that the Cubans would have very little chance of success. As opposed to this, CIA took a very optimistic view of the force's ability to land and hold a beach head. The Chairman also pointed out that whereas they might be able to take a small beach head that after a relatively short time Castro would be able to mount heavy forces against them. The problem would then be one of who would come to their assistance." (Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)^{/1/}

1. A continuation and accentuation of current activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, including increased propaganda, increased political action and increased sabotage. Continued overflights for these purposes were specifically authorized.
2. The Defense Department, with CIA, will review proposals for the active deployment of anti-Castro Cuban forces on Cuban territory, and the results of this analysis will be promptly reported to the President.
3. The Department of State will prepare a concrete proposal for action with other Latin American countries to isolate the Castro regime and to bring against it the judgment of the Organization of American States. It is expected that this proposal may involve a commitment of the President's personal authority behind a special mission or missions to such Latin American leaders as Lleras, Betancourt and Quadros.

Finally, it was agreed that the United States must make entirely clear that its position with respect to the Cuban Government is currently governed by its firm opposition to Communist penetration of the American Republics, and not by any hostility to democratic social revolution and economic reform. The President intends to deal with this matter himself in the State of the Union Address.^{/2/}

/2/In his State of the Union message on January 30, President Kennedy drew a distinction between opposition to Communist penetration and control in Cuba and Latin America and support for social and economic reform. See *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961*, p. 15.

The President particularly desires that no hint of these discussions reach any personnel beyond those most immediately concerned within the Executive Branch.

McGeorge Bundy



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963
Volume X
Cuba, 1961-1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

Cuba, 1961-1962

31. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, January 28, 1961.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C. T. Barnes Chrono, Jan-Jul 1961. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Barnes on January 30.

SUBJECT

Cuban Meeting on 28 January 1961/1/

/1/For another record of the meeting, see Document 30.

The decisions reached at the meeting were:

1. To continue all present project activities including propaganda, political action, sabotage, exfiltration and infiltration and overflights both leaflet and supply.
2. To present, as soon as possible, the project tactical PM plan to a limited number of senior officers designated by General Lemnitzer. These officers should, as soon as possible, report their views of the plan in order that a DOD position may be formulated.
3. In addition, it was the sense of the meeting that the 5412 Group should probably be reconstituted and should probably take cognizance of the Cuban problem as well as other covert projects as it has in the past. With respect to Cuba, it was also the sense of the meeting that a task force, constituted generally along the same lines as that previously set up under the Special Group, should be reconstituted for purposes of coordinating the U.S. effort and keeping the senior levels of the interested Departments advised as to the status of planning and actions taken, as well as notifying appropriate individuals whenever any important aspect of the plan is in arrears or needs special attention.

There was some discussion, initiated in connection with consideration of Laos, regarding the need for machinery in the government for centralizing governmental control and decisions. The problem in addition to Laos was thought to exist as well with respect to the Congo and to a lesser extent Cuba. Mr. Nitze was asked to work with Mr. Merchant on this problem and to make recommendations at the next NSC meeting as to what might be done.

4. The Department of Defense clearly has the view that, due to the military build-up which has occurred in Cuba in the last four or five months, a fairly substantial effort will be necessary to overcome the resistance. General Lemnitzer indicated that he is quite prepared to have our tactical plan examined, but his present feeling obviously

is that no force of 600 to 800 men is adequate for success. He anticipates, therefore, that final planning will have to include agreed plans for providing additional support for the Cuban force--presumably such support to be U.S.

5. The State Department agrees with General Lemnitzer's views mentioned in the above paragraph. Moreover, State is anxious that no decision be made in favor of any strike force landing until it is quite clear that all other possible steps have been fully pursued. In general, the State Department would advocate taking action to isolate Cuba within the hemisphere. Discussions with Lleras Camargo, Betancourt and Quadros might be initiated for this purpose on the theory that if their support could be obtained, it would go a long way toward lining up other Latin American countries and possibly provide a basis for OAS action. In addition, State would like to examine the possibilities of harassment of Cubans employing action similar to these used against the Nazi penetrations during World War II. Finally, State would favor actions of a covert nature in Cuba itself, including a continuation of all the activities now under way.

6. Should a strike force effort be made against Cuba, State clearly would want such an effort to obtain a fairly sizable piece of Cuban real estate with an ability to hold it in order to enable a provisional government to be identified and recognized and in order to provide territory from which such provisional government could operate against the Castro regime. The Isle of Pines is an obvious possibility along these lines and it was agreed that it should be so examined. On the other hand, it was recognized that this has been recently further fortified and, in addition, is difficult to get at for hydrographic reasons. Nevertheless, it provides good evidence of the way State is thinking.

7. There was some discussion of the possibility of using the Cuban strike force as a guerrilla force. Such use would be an alternative to a strike force landing and would assume the use of a greater number of teams and a much longer term approach to the problem.

C. Tracy Barnes/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

32. Editorial Note

At 2:30 p.m. on January 28, 1961, following the meeting at the White House concerning the proposed plan of action against Cuba, the Joint Chiefs of Staff met at the Pentagon with McNamara, Dulles, Rusk, Gilpatric, Bowles, and Nitze to consider the implications of the meeting with the President and the nature of the proposed operation: "Mr. McNamara expressed his concern about the Cuba operation and pointed out the necessity for determining whether the CIA plan was satisfactory or not. He was informed that the Joint Staff had been told to appraise and evaluate the Cuban plan. Mr. McNamara, in effect, questioned whether such a small force could really achieve a worthwhile objective. Admiral Burke pointed out that a big question was the matter of support for the force. He also mentioned that the Cubans could get on the beach but it was a matter of how long they could stay there. SecDef pointed out that at the next meeting CIA should be told that their plan is not considered to be a good one and therefore the necessity for development of an alternate plan. The Chairman agreed with him." ("Review of record of proceedings related to Cuban Situation," prepared by Naval Intelligence for the Director of Naval Operations, May 5; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

33. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, January 31, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1961. Confidential. The source text indicates that the memorandum was dictated by the President.

It seems to me important that our efforts to organize support along the lines discussed last week should proceed

as quickly as possible. I have suggested to Bundy that he get in touch with Mann and ask him for a report before the end of the week on the ways and means by which these negotiations might be conducted more quickly. At last Saturday's meeting/1/ Mr. Mann suggested it might take up to six weeks. This seems to me an excessively long time. Can we do anything about it?

/1/January 28; see Documents 30 and 31.

34. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, February 3, 1961, 7 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations, 1/21/61-2/15/61. No classification marking. Prepared in Rusk's office by Phyllis D. Bernau.

TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. BUNDY

B said the Pres has been saying re Cuba that he has the feeling he has heard different arguments from different kinds of people and he wonders if Berle is going to be involved in that kind of problem and wants him to if it is all right with the Sec. The Sec said yes--he is in charge of the total Latin American task force--Willauer is a subcomm on the particular country. B said if there is a serious difference of view he would like the people to come over and argue with him. R confirmed that Berle is fully informed. B said he got an extremely instructive lecture from Mann and there is a divergence of his view and the Agency's view. If there is a real divergence it will help Mann's view to have it argued out direct with the Pres. R is not concerned as Mann's view is Berle's and his and the other part must not prevail. B said it may be important given the level of that feeling--the Pres is ready to listen--otherwise he is assuming it is going all right.

R said he would like to see the Pres this week end re high-level visitors--would prefer Sunday. B said O'Donnell will call this office to set a time.

35. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara

JCSM-57-61

Washington, February 3, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. According to a May 4 memorandum in which he detailed his briefings of the JCS on the paramilitary plan, Major General David W. Gray gave the JCS a 20-minute briefing on February 3 on the CIA Para-Military Plan, Trinidad area, which is outlined in JCSM-57-61. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT

Military Evaluation of the Cuban Plan

Attached hereto is the Military Evaluation of the Central Intelligence Agency Para-Military Plan, Cuba. Subject to your concurrence,/1/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff propose to forward copies of their assessment of the plan to the Director for Central Intelligence with the proposal that they meet with the Director for Central Intelligence and members of his staff for further discussion of this project.

/1/In a handwritten note on the source text at this point, McNamara authorized the Joint Chiefs to forward the assessment to the CIA and to discuss the project with CIA officials in light of the assessment.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer/2/

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.

Attachment/3/

/3/Top Secret; Limited Distribution. The memorandum is marked as a draft, but it is the assessment forwarded to McNamara on February 3, under cover of JCSM-57-61.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT

Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have evaluated the feasibility of the military portion of the CIA plan for action to effect the overthrow of the Castro regime and arrived at the following conclusions:
 - a. Since the success of this operation is dependent on the degree of local Cuban support, this factor should be a matter of continuous evaluation until a decision to execute the operation is made.
 - b. Based on an independent analysis by the Joint Staff the beachhead area is considered to be the best area in Cuba for accomplishment of the Task Force mission.
 - c. There should be a review of the plan for air movement to the embarkation point to eliminate the possibility of compromise.
 - d. In view of the complexity of the loading and marshaling phase of this amphibious operation, the current plans should be reviewed to ensure detailed coordination and centralized control.
 - e. If surprise is achieved and the estimates of Castro's air defense capabilities are correct, the plan of air operations is within the capability of the Air units and should be successful.
 - f. Since it is highly improbable that the airborne assault would be opposed, it should be successful.
 - g. The amphibious assault should be successful even if lightly opposed; however the personnel and plans for logistic support are marginal at best. Against moderate, determined resistance logistic support as presently planned will be inadequate.
 - h. The scheme of maneuver to secure the beachhead area is basically sound.
 - i. Additional planning is required concerning the control and utilization of indigenous facilities, and personnel both for combat and support functions.
 - j. It would appear more desirable for guerrilla bands to support from outside the beachhead area rather than

combining with the invasion force as currently planned.

k. Without interference from the air, obstacles or guerrillas the Cuban Army could move substantial forces to the area by D+2. Necessity to develop the situation and prepare a coordinated attack would take an estimated two additional days at a minimum. Interference by any of the three above factors would further delay a coordinated attack.

l. Since the Cuban Army is without experience in coordinated offensive action, the invasion force should be able to successfully resist the initial attacks.

m. Even if the task force is expanded by local volunteers, it is estimated that, lacking a popular uprising or substantial follow-on forces, the Cuban Army could eventually reduce the beachhead, but no estimate of the time this would require is possible.

n. This operation as presently envisaged would not necessarily require overt U.S. intervention.

o. In view of loading requirements, a decision as to the execution of this operation must be made by D-21.

p. In summary, evaluation of the current plan results in a favorable assessment, modified by the specific conclusions set forth above, of the likelihood of achieving initial military success. It is obvious that ultimate success will depend upon political factors; i.e., a sizeable popular uprising or substantial follow-on forces. It should be noted that assessment of the combat worth of assault forces is based upon second and third hand reports, and certain logistic aspects of the plan are highly complex and critical to initial success. For these reasons, an independent evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force and detailed analysis of logistics plans should be made by a team of Army, Naval, and Air Force officers, if this can be done without danger of compromise of the plan.

q. Despite the shortcomings pointed out in the assessment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that timely execution of this plan has a fair chance of ultimate success and, even if it does not achieve immediately the full results desired, could contribute to the eventual overthrow of the Castro regime.

2. It is recommended that the enclosed study be forwarded to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, for information and consideration.

[Here follows a 3-page section entitled "Military Evaluation of Para-Military Plan," which is identical with the conclusions outlined in paragraphs a-q above. The only substantive difference is the addition of a paragraph 2, under the heading "Facts Bearing on the Problem"; see footnote 7 below.]

Annex "A"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. Enemy Forces. (Appendix "A" for details)/4/

/4/Appendices A-E to Annex A are attached but not printed.

a. Cuban Army--Total, 32,000 personnel, including 9,000 police, organized into four infantry regiments (strength, 2,000), three artillery battalions, three tank battalions and one AAA battalion. Nearest Army force to beachhead is approximately 100 miles away, consisting of 6,000 troops (one infantry regiment, one artillery battalion and one tank battalion, not confirmed). In beachhead area, there is a police squadron.

b. Air Force--Three F-47; one F-51; 14 Sea Fury; 13 B-26; six TBM-38; 15 transport type aircraft; 22

helicopters of various types.

c. Navy--Total, approximately 5,000 personnel. Three PF; two PCE; 43 smaller craft.

d. Militia--Between 200,000 and 300,000 in strength. Well armed but combat capability is questionable. Approximately 1,200 militia are located in the beachhead area.

e. Combat Readiness of Cuban Armed Forces is low but improving. This improvement partially offset by deteriorating morale.

2. Friendly Forces. (Appendix "B" for details)

a. Cuban Task Force--1,004 personnel.

(1) An Infantry Battalion of four rifle companies (one airborne), totaling approximately 826 personnel and armed to include 4.2 mortars and 77 mm recoilless rifles, and a tank platoon of 5 M41 tanks.

(2) An Air Force consisting of 17 B-26's; 10 C-54's; 5 C-46's; supported by approximately 100 personnel, 18 of which are pilots. Maintenance is excellent and has adequate logistic support.

(3) Navy--3 LCU's; 2 LST type; 2 LCI; 4 LCP; 1 LSD (USN); and supported by approximately 40 Naval personnel.

b. Guerrillas--In Cuba, total 1,500 but in general area of beachhead (25 mile radius) five bands with an estimated strength of 660.

c. Cuban Volunteers after invasion. CIA is counting on a sizeable number of indigenous volunteers. This support will undoubtedly develop but the numbers cannot be estimated. Arms for 1,500 volunteers are included in initial lift.

3. Characteristics of the Invasion Area.

a. Terrain--The beachhead area is generally semicircular with a perimeter of approximately 11 miles. Within the beachhead area is a small city, a small airfield, roadnet and a river. The perimeter of the beachhead is generally anchored on low hill masses with a commanding hill mass, approximately 700 feet in height, at its north center. The area between the hill masses and the ocean is generally flat, with wooded and cultivated areas. Two good roads enter the area from the east and the west, with a railroad entering from the northeast. Tanks generally can operate throughout the beachhead.

/5/Trinidad.

b. Landing beaches--There are three small beaches in the landing area, two at river mouths and one on the west side of the bay formed by the rivers. The left river mouth beach is 100 to 150 yards in length, with 12 foot water depth up to the beach. The center beach, at the main river mouth, is 100 to 150 yards in length, with shoal water off the beach making it suitable only for LCVP's. The third beach, on the west side of the bay, is 50 to 60 yards in width with 7 feet of water up to the beach and easily identifiable by four buildings to the rear of the beach. Exits at all beaches are suitable for small vehicles, while the exit from the west beach is very good, suitable for vehicles and tanks. The seaward approaches are clear.

c. Airborne drop zone--The planned drop zone is approximately 2,000 yards in length, open and generally flat. It is located near the commanding hill mass within the beachhead. It is considered suitable for a company drop zone.

d. Strategic location--The beachhead is so located that it is remote from known concentrations of Cuban Army, access routes are limited and it can be readily isolated by cutting highway and railroad bridges at river crossings outside the beachhead area. Rugged terrain in the vicinity facilitates expansion of para-military operations.

4. Concept. (Appendix "C" for details) On D-1, air strikes are designed to neutralize Cuban Air Force, Cuban Naval patrol vessels, key communications facilities, and destroy tanks and artillery in parks. Second priority is isolation of the objective area. Following a feint on the night of D-1, prior to first light on D Day, the task force will invade by simultaneous air drop in the vicinity of the key hill mass and by amphibious landing on the selected beaches. Avoiding the city, control of the beachhead area will be established by seizing and organizing four strong points on key terrain along the perimeter which dominate entrance routes into the area. Contact will be established with guerrilla bands in general area of operations. Small air strip in area will be cleared. Every effort will be made to increase force by local volunteers for which arms will be provided. Force will establish control within beachhead area and if driven therefrom, be prepared to withdraw from beachhead area and link with guerrilla forces to continue guerrilla activities. For detailed concept of air employment and capabilities, see Appendix "D" to Annex "A".

5. Logistics. (Appendix "E" for details) The supply of Class I, III and V/6/ is adequate. The shipping is limited and allows no margin for miscalculation or unforeseen contingencies. Of the 826 personnel in the Brigade, only 18 are specifically designated for logistic tasks. These 18 are in the 85 man Brigade Headquarters. The quantities of Class I, III and V supplies are adequate for the operation. The Brigade is without engineer or bridging capability. Plans call for Class I, III and V supplies to be mounted-out from New Orleans, Guatemala and Nicaragua. These supplies are available for both air and surface lift. Transportation is adequate for the initial phases of the operation on an austere basis.

/6/Class I covered subsistence materials, including food, Class III involved petroleum products, and Class V was ammunition.

Annex "B"

DISCUSSION

1. Friendly Forces

a. A task force with an approximate strength of 1040 officers and enlisted men has been recruited, assembled and is now undergoing training. This task force consists of a ground force unit with an approximate strength of 826 personnel, a seaborne support element of approximately 40 individuals, and an air combat and support element with an approximate personnel strength of 100.

b. The ground force unit is organized along the lines of a U.S. Infantry Battalion and consists of one Headquarters and Support Company, four Rifle Companies, one Heavy Gun Company and one Tank (M41) Platoon. One Rifle Company has received airborne training, one Rifle Company has received training as motorized infantry to operate with the Tank Platoon, and three of the Rifle Companies are theoretically trained to engage in amphibious landings. To date, no actual training in amphibious landings has been accomplished by the Rifle Companies. Boat crews to operate the landing craft are currently undergoing training. M41 tank crews have not received sufficient training as yet; however, it is anticipated that adequate training will be provided within the United States. Eighty airborne trained personnel have received additional training as a special purpose unit, designed to parachute into general area of operation on D-Day to insure that strategic bridges are demolished and thereby denied to the enemy. (For further details on assault force, see Appendix "B" to Annex "A".)

c. Seaborne support unit has available a limited number of vessels and landing craft for training and for the

conduct of its operational mission. (For further details, see Appendix "B" to Annex "A".) A detachment of 11 personnel is receiving specialized training in underwater operations to qualify them to mark the channel of approach for landing craft on D-Day.

d. The Air Force combat and support element has available 18 trained pilots within its total strength of 100. Aircraft available and being used for training are: 17 B-26's, 10 C-54's, and 5 C-46's.

e. All of the above information was obtained by representatives of the Joint Staff as a result of a briefing held 31 January 1961. There is no indication that personnel of the task force have received a combat type checklist evaluation to determine its combat readiness.

2. Beachhead Area. The general objective area is isolated from the location of Cuban Army units and is strategically located so as to facilitate blocking rapid reinforcement by cutting bridges on the two main roads and the railroad into the area. The location of the area also facilitates expansion of military and para-military operations. The selected beaches for the amphibious assault are suitable for the landing envisaged, provide adequate exits, and can be readily identified from seaward. The airborne landing area is adequate for the planned one company drop and is adjacent to the company's objective area. Tanks can operate throughout most of the beachhead area. Overall, the objective area is considered desirable for the type operation envisaged.

3. Air Movement to the Port of Embarkation. The troops that are to be moved amphibiously will be flown to Puerto Cabezas during three consecutive nights prior to their departure for Cuba. This airlift is well within the capability of the volunteer force. However, this traffic converging on Puerto Cabezas, coming on the heels of recent construction there, might alert Castro-Communist elements who could possibly observe the loading of the troops on the LST's and report this information to Cuba. To eliminate this possibility, other plans for moving these troops to the LST's should be examined. For example: It might be feasible to airlift these troops from Retalehuleu to Swan Island for loading onto the LST's. This would reduce the likelihood of being observed by Castro-Communist elements, and would cut the time needed to move from the point of embarkation to the invasion beaches by approximately one day.

4. Sea Movement

a. The plan requires that shipping be loaded at New Orleans, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Vieques. Commencing at D-15, shipping will load supplies at New Orleans and proceed independently to ports in Guatemala and Nicaragua. At the same time, other ships of the invasion force will be loading personnel and equipment at Vieques. All shipping, upon completion of embarkation, will steam independently to a rendezvous area off the Cayman Islands to arrive on D-1. Each ship will travel on individual orders without knowledge of the orders of other ships in the force. The result will be dependent on the coordination and control exercised in the execution of a detailed, exacting plan. Once in the rendezvous area at the Cayman Islands, certain key personnel will conduct pre-D-Day transfer among shipping. The final movement into the objective area includes the rendezvous with the invasion fleet of one U.S. Navy LSD. Final juncture of shipping is effected at H-5 hours on D-Day off the invasion beaches.

b. The complicated and multiple ship movements for the 14 days prior to D-Day will require plans in exact detail, executed under centralized control and coordination.

5. Air Operations

a. Given the correctness of the current CIA estimate of Cuban air defense capabilities, and assuming the air attack will have the advantage of surprise, the D-1 and D-Day air operations should be generally successful.

b. However, if the CIA estimate is incorrect, and it develops that the Cubans possess jet aircraft and pilots, and ground to air missiles, the air strikes could fail.

c. Furthermore, if the element of surprise is lost, the Cubans could utilize a few of their Sea Furys and B-26 aircraft airborne. The Cubans could also set sugar cane fires generating smoke that could frustrate at least some air strike missions, with the over-all effect that the D-1 and D-Day air operations would not accomplish all assigned missions.

6. Airborne Assault. The task force has adequate transport aircraft to lift the entire airborne infantry company to the landing zone within the beachhead. In view of the size of the drop zone, and its location in relation to the airborne company's objective, the airborne assault should be successful in seizing and holding the key terrain objective.

7. The Amphibious Assault

a. The amphibious element of the force has received no amphibious training and is not now scheduled to receive any prior to the operation. This deficiency will not be too serious if estimate of unopposed landing holds true. Nevertheless, lack of sufficient trained shore party personnel will complicate control in moving personnel and materiel across the beaches. Facilities for handling beached boats are not available. Trained personnel are not generally available for traffic control, beach installations, and control of dump sites.

b. Beaches are adequate to land personnel and equipment according to plan. Routes of egress restrict the landing of heavy vehicles to the beach on the right flank. Beaches are generally marked by significant terrain features. In addition, UDT trained personnel will be utilized to mark the approaches to the principal beach on the right flank.

c. The amphibious assault does appear feasible, but there should be detailed plans to insure coordination of landing and effective handling of supplies and equipment across the beach and at least mockup training should be conducted.

d. The personnel and plans for logistic support are marginal at best. This operation may be supported logistically on an austere basis during an unopposed landing. If opposition increases, the logistical aspects will rapidly worsen. Against moderate, determined resistance, this plan will fail to provide adequate logistic support.

8. Concept of Control of Beachhead Area

a. The concept of the invasion assigns the airborne company the mission of seizing the key hill mass which dominates the northern portion of the beachhead area and the town. One company lands amphibiously on the left flank beach, then proceeds to an objective area on the left flank which controls routes of ingress from the west. The first company to land amphibiously on the right flank beach clears the airfield, then moves to an objective area on the northeast portion of the beachhead area which controls the main highway and railroad from the east. The last company leaves one platoon on the right flank beach to assist in beach operations; the remainder of the company clears the port, then proceeds to an objective area on the eastern part of the beachhead area to control the unimproved roads in that area that lead to the east.

b. The units will maintain control by establishment of strong points, road blocks, and neutralization of avenues of approach. Patrols will be utilized to cover the principal routes leading into the beachhead area.

c. A major problem could arise in control of indigenous personnel. In this regard, desirability of control of radio and news media may be stressed. Provisions need be made for the prevention of sabotage, operation of port facilities, traffic control measures to restrict civilian movement in the beachhead area, care and control of POW's, and utilization of indigenous labor. Particular attention is required to restrict local civilian personnel from interfering with air operations at the air strip within the beachhead area. The question of local procurement of materiel on the local market may merit consideration. The plan is deficient in that it does not provide for these matters. It has been indicated that plans are being prepared which will take these problems into account.

However, the size and composition of the force as it now stands is inadequate to fulfill the requirements described above.

d. The invasion force intends to establish contact with the guerrilla bands now operating in the general area of operations. According to currently available intelligence, it is estimated that within a 25 mile radius of the objective area, five guerrilla bands with a total estimated strength of 660 may cooperate with the task force. Another guerrilla band with an estimated strength of 90 is operating approximately 30 miles west of the objective area. Two additional guerrilla bands are operating some 40 miles north of the objective area. The concept is for these bands to reinforce the invasion force in the beachhead area. This part of the concept is not considered sound. It would appear that it would be desirable for the guerrilla bands now established within the area of operations to intensify operations and hold their current operating areas as a base to which the invasion force can withdraw if it is forced out of the beachhead.

9. Local Indigenous Support

a. Any invasion to overthrow the Castro regime would probably be supported by many segments of the population, especially if it showed some early success. Continued support of the invasion would depend largely on the identification of leaders with the hopes and aspirations of the bulk of the population. While some preliminary softening probably would be accepted as necessary for success of the operation, wholesale bombings would tend to unite the people behind Castro, especially if there was high loss of life as a result.

b. If the leaders of the movement can get their message across to the people rapidly and with a united voice, support probably will be forthcoming from all segments, including the armed forces and militia and widespread defections could be expected. However, a split in the leadership, or lack of a clear program appealing to the people, could well prevent any effective support developing. In the general area of operations, the loyalty of the militia and police units is probably divided between support for Castro and support for the anti-Castro guerrillas operating in the mountains. The militia units now engaged in counter-guerrilla operations were drawn from other provinces in order to assure their loyalty. Therefore, considerable local support for the invasion force can probably be expected. Likewise, if widespread support for the invasion force develops, it would reduce the militia units and rebel army elements available to oppose the landing force in subsequent operations.

10. Resistance to Invasion and Time and Space Factors on Cuban Army Reaction

a. The nearest Cuban Army Forces, approximately 100 miles away, are not normally concentrated but scattered throughout the area. Even if assembly of these forces commences on the evening of D-1, it is estimated that only a small element (approximately 1 battalion) could commence movement towards the area by the night of D-Day. Additional forces could begin departing for the area immediately thereafter as transportation becomes available. The initial elements of these forces could arrive in the area in about 8 hours, and could begin to probe the beachhead by D+1.

b. By U.S. combat standards without interference from the air, obstacles or guerrillas, a force of approximate regimental size should be able to attack late on D+1. However, in view of the inexperience of the Cuban Army in this type of operation it is estimated that a force large enough to attack in strength could not be assembled in the beachhead area before D+2. The necessity to develop the location of the invasion force positions and prepare a coordinated attack would probably take an additional two days, although minor attacks or piecemeal attacks could occur between D+2 and D+4. If there is interference as planned from the air, obstacles or guerrillas, the mounting of a coordinated counterattack would be further delayed.

c. Without interference, tank units could reach the area from Santa Clara by road in approximately 8 hours and from Managua by rail and road in a maximum of 56 hours after starting to load.

d. Even if the invasion task force is expanded by local volunteers, it is estimated that, lacking a popular uprising

or substantial follow-on forces, the Cuban Army could eventually reduce the beachhead, but no estimate of the time this would require is possible.

11. Political-Military Considerations

a. When this plan was originally briefed to the Joint Staff in outline form the impression was gained that the force would occupy a small perimeter in the mountains where it could fairly easily be surrounded and destroyed. If such an event should appear imminent after declaration of a provisional government and U.S. recognition, U.S. overt support would have to be given to uphold U.S. prestige regardless of the international consequences. The detailed explanation of the plan now reveals that if the beachhead area cannot be held, the force together with leaders of the provisional government will withdraw into the mountains and join existing guerrilla bands. In this eventuality, the invasion force will not have completely failed in its mission, and the U.S. would not necessarily be committed to overt support. Therefore, a decision to commit this force would not necessarily require a simultaneous decision for overt U.S. military action.

b. If the United States had not recognized the provisional government prior to abandonment of the beachhead, subsequent U.S. actions could be in the form of continued covert support of a guerrilla movement. If the United States had recognized the provisional government, prior to abandonment of the beachhead, then a decision as to whether U.S. prestige would require overt support would be required. This eventuality should be considered at the time the basic decision to execute the plan is made.

c. The present plan does not allow for the possibility of follow-up support from other Latin American countries in subsequent phases of the operation. Such support would increase the capabilities of the military force and, it is estimated, would intensify local Cuban support. The introduction of such forces would create problems of supply, command, prestige, etc. which would be solvable, but which would have to be anticipated and included in prior planning. Therefore, a decision as to possible OAS support should be sought without delay.

12. Ability to Accomplish Mission

a. The following are factors favorable to the invasion force:

- (1) Probably unopposed landing.
- (2) Probable lack of air opposition.
- (3) Availability of friendly air support.
- (4) Suitability of terrain for fixed defense.
- (5) Remoteness of beachhead area.
- (6) Assistance from guerrillas.
- (7) High motivation and morale.

b. Following are factors unfavorable to the invasion force:

- (1) Lack of reserves.
- (2) Lack of logistic support elements.
- (3) Lack of freedom of maneuver.

c. Following are unknown factors:

(1) Degree of popular support.

(2) Capabilities of Cuban Army to successfully counterattack.

d. Considering the above factors, on balance the invasion force should be able to accomplish objectives as stated in paragraph 2a and c./7/ Since objective stated in paragraph 2b is dependent on degree of popular support and success of the political, psychological part of this plan rather than on purely military factors, success of this part of the mission cannot be definitely assured, but it is estimated has a fair chance of success./8/

/7/Paragraph 2 of the first section of the study, not printed, lists a 3-part mission for the Cuban exile force:

"a. Invade the island of Cuba by amphibious and airborne assault.

"b. Hold a beachhead long enough to establish a provisional government, act as a rallying point for volunteers and a catalyst for uprisings throughout Cuba."c. Integrate with existing guerrilla bands and carry on guerrilla operations if driven from the beachhead area."

/8/According to General Gray's May 4 list of JCS briefings, on February 8 the Director of Central Intelligence and several CIA officials met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss the JCS comments on the Trinidad Plan outlined in JCSM-57-61. Agreement was reached that a team of military officers would evaluate the combat effectiveness of the Cuban Expeditionary Force.

36. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 4, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2-2461. Confidential. Drafted by Pryce on February 18. Initialed as accurate by Mann.

SUBJECT

Possible Cuban-U.S. Rapprochement

PARTICIPANTS

Constantine Kangles, Chicago Attorney (said to have represented the 26th of July Movement until January 1959, and subsequently registered agent of the Castro regime)

Thomas C. Mann--ARA

William T. Pryce--ARA

Mr. Kangles, having just left the Attorney General's office,/1/ called on Mr. Mann. In the course of a prolonged conversation Mr. Kangles said:

/1/At 2:24 p.m. on February 4, Secretary Rusk received a telephone call from Attorney General Kennedy concerning Kangles. Kangles was in Kennedy's office and Kennedy suggested that someone in the Department of State talk to him, as Kennedy saw no point in continuing to be directly involved in conversations with Kangles. The Attorney General stated, however, that it was worthwhile to talk with Kangles because of his relationship

with Castro. (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations, 1/21/61-2/15/61) Rusk in turn called Mann and relayed Robert Kennedy's message. Mann agreed to see Kangles as soon as he arrived at the Department. (Ibid.)

He had made a trip to Cuba hoping to meet with Raul Castro. He was not able to do so but did talk with Raul's "secretary" who related the following information on Raul Castro:

1. There has been a decided difference of opinion between Raul and Fidel since April 1960. In a recent conversation two points of disagreement emerged: a) Raul was strongly opposed to Fidel's policy of allowing the militia to have arms and ammunition, and b) Raul felt that some sort of "agreement" should be reached with the U.S. Raul was able to convince Fidel on the first point but not on the second.

2. Raul is alarmed at the degree of power exercised by Cuban Communists, particularly "Che" Guevara. He wished to remove the Cuban Communists from power but before doing so needed assurances from the U.S. that it would replace any support lost from the Sino-Soviet Bloc as a result of his actions. Specifically, Raul would want the U.S. to resume diplomatic relations with Cuba and begin buying Cuban sugar before he made his move. It was not clear whether or when Raul would break relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, but Mr. Kangles thought that a gradual forced withdrawal of Sino-Soviet influence, including an eventual break, would take place.

Mr. Kangles proposed that Mr. Gentry, who is reportedly an "advisor" to the Cuban Government, make a trip to Cuba in order to further sound out Raul on the above. Mr. Kangles would fabricate a story for Mr. Gentry saying that Mr. Gentry wished to travel to Cuba in order to clear up certain matters relating to his U.S. citizenship. In order to perform this travel it would be necessary for Mr. Kangles' passport to be validated for travel to Cuba.

Mr. Mann thanked Mr. Kangles for his information and said that he would talk it over with members of his staff and would be in touch with Mr. Kangles if this was thought fruitful.

37. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 6, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2-661. Secret. Drafted by Hurwitch.

SUBJECT

Views of Opposition Leader: Dr. Antonio Varona

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Antonio Varona

Dr. Carlos Piad

Ambassador Bonsal--ARA/COAS

ARA:CMA--Mr. Vallon

ARA:CMA--Mr. Stevenson

ARA:CMA/C--Mr. Hurwitch

Dr. Varona said he had come to discuss a very serious and unfortunate development affecting the Frente

Revolucionario Democratico (FRD) of which he is the leader. He related the following:

He had some time ago appointed Colonel Martin Elena as the Frente's military expert in charge of training and military planning. Despite repeated requests, neither he nor Col. Martin had been permitted to visit the "camp" where Cubans are being trained under the control and supervision of U.S. officials. On the latest occasion when Col. Martin, on Varona's instructions, had sought permission to visit the camp, he was bluntly told by a U.S. official named Roderick that the "training camp" activities were of no concern to the Frente. The primary function of the Frente, Roderick continued, was that of recruiting new members and supervising civilian activities of its members. Suggestion by the Frente of the possible composition of the future Government of Cuba was criticized by Roderick as an inappropriate Frente activity. In short, Martin was clearly given to understand that the U.S. was engaging in activities involving Cuban exiles and had plans affecting Cuba that the Frente was not entitled to know.

Dr. Varona took strong exception to the development. He insisted that Cubans in training should be placed under Cuban control, and that U.S. officials act only in an advisory capacity. He considered his organization as allied with, but not subordinate to, the U.S. He was extremely concerned that training activities at the "camp", carried on with the collaboration of Cuban military officers who were not controlled by the Frente, might result in the eventual establishment of a government in Cuba after Castro's overthrow in which the Cuban military elements would have a preponderant voice. A post-Castro government of this nature would be unacceptable to the majority of the Cuban people.

The U.S. attitude revealed to Martin was especially untimely in that the Frente Executive Committee was in the process of expanding to include other opposition group leaders such as Miro Cardona, Luis Conte Aguero, Alvarez Diaz and Carlos Hevia. Varona concluded by stating that the Frente would not accept this new state of affairs and would resign en masse if the present relationship of the Frente to the "training camp" were permitted to persist.

Ambassador Bonsal expressed his pleasure at the opportunity to talk again with Dr. Varona, but told him that he had no knowledge of the above matters and could therefore make no useful comment. He added only that situations of this kind are frequently the result of a misunderstanding. He then drew Dr. Varona into a general conversation on the situation in Cuba and invited him to call on him again on his next visit to Washington. Dr. Varona appeared most appreciative of the fact that he had been received by Ambassador Bonsal./1/

/1/Varona returned to see Bonsal on February 9 following a meeting he had just had with "certain United States officials." He complained that the attitude of these officials remained as it was before, and it was clear that the Frente was not to have any influence on activities at the "camp." Varona likened the situation to a time bomb, and said that he could not return to Miami unless a solution acceptable to the FRD was reached. He asked to see Berle, and Bonsal said that he would relay the request. (Ibid., 737.00/2-961)

38. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, February 7, 1961.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 3, Vol. 4, Ch 3. Secret; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT

Meeting on Cuba

PLACE

Office of Mr. Thomas Mann, Assistant Secretary of State

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Adolph A. Berle, Chief of Department of State Latin American Task Force

Mr. Thomas Mann, Assistant Secretary of State

Mr. William Bundy, Department of Defense

Mr. Haydn Williams, Department of Defense

Gen. Gray, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Mr. Wymberley Coerr, Department of State

Amb. Achilles, Counsellor of Department of State

Mr. Richard Goodwin, White House Staff

Mr. Richard Bissell, CIA

Mr. Tracy Barnes, CIA

Col. J.C. King, CIA

[name not declassified]

Mr. Berle chaired the meeting. The meeting lasted three hours--from 10 a.m. until 1 p.m. The following topics were discussed:

Naval Blockade

Mr. Berle indicated that he had given considerable thought to the establishment of a naval blockade of Cuba as a weapon against the Castro regime. The matter of a naval blockade was then discussed. The Defense representative, Mr. Williams, reported that a blockade of Cuba was physically feasible. Such a blockade, to be effective, would require the stopping, boarding and searching of all vessels destined to Cuba, regardless of flag. The opinion was expressed by Mr. Williams that the Soviet Government would consider such treatment of its vessels as an act of war. He also stated that unless Cuba committed a unilateral aggression against the United States, the blockade of Cuban ports would in itself be considered an act of war and would violate two treaties to which we are a signator, including the Rio Treaty. Other aspects of a blockade were discussed, and Mr. Berle concluded that a blockade of ingress would create more problems for us than it would solve. It was agreed that search and seizure tactics could be employed against shipping from Cuba at non-Cuban ports of call and especially in Western Hemisphere ports where local arrangements could be set up without any particular difficulty or risk.

Radar Surveillance

The possibility of detecting non-scheduled air flights from Cuba which might be directed at other American states, principally Venezuela, was discussed. Although radar coverage under certain circumstances might be fairly effective, it was the opinion of CINCLANT authorities that the chances of detecting non-scheduled Cuban flights would be--at best--one in ten. It was agreed that the best protection for places such as Venezuela or Colombia would be the erection of fixed radar intercept facilities in those countries to guard against surprise

attacks. It was noted that radar coverage by CINCLANT would not be effective against air-craft flying at altitudes of less than 500 feet.

The Agency Plan

The Agency Plan/1/ and the JCS evaluation/2/ thereof were also discussed. While the soundness of the plan itself was at no time questioned, a number of questions were raised. Would any American citizens be included in the landing party? Answer negative. However, Americans would accompany the ships and be involved in the landing exercise. Would any American citizens be involved in the air strike? Answer, probably some American flyers under contract, but the great majority would be Cubans. The possibility of civilian casualties resulting from the air strike was raised. Gen. Gray thought the chances minimal since the targets were easily identifiable and away from civilian populations. Mr. Bissell said every effort would be made to minimize the risk, but no guarantee could be made that some civilians employed at the targets would not be killed or injured.

/1/See Document 9.

/2/Document 28.

Considerable interest was evinced by both Mr. Mann and Mr. Berle on the possibility of the strike force reaching the safety of the mountains in the event they found themselves in an untenable position at the beachhead. Gen. Gray indicated he was confident that the strike force would be able to hold the beachhead at least six days before Castro would be in a position to throw any sizable group of army or militia units against the strike force. Since defensible mountain terrain is within only a few miles of the landing site, Gen. Gray was confident that the main body of the landing party could retreat to the mountains and maintain themselves there indefinitely. Later he also expressed the belief that the strike force could break through any encirclement that Castro might throw around the mountain area under consideration and make its way to the beach in the event an evacuation by sea should be required. The target site was not specifically identified during the discussion and Mr. Berle admitted to all concerned that he did not know and did not wish to know its exact location.

The question was raised as to the probable popular reaction to a landing of the nature contemplated. Col. King reported that our best information indicates that the civilian population and campesinos would probably be friendly to the invasion force, as they currently are to the guerrillas who have been operating in the hills. He added that intelligence also discloses that there is widespread dissatisfaction among field workers, who have been taken from their labors to serve in the militia, and that the morale of the militia itself is low, with many defections daily reported. Gen. Gray remarked that the combat effectiveness of the army was low, and that of the militia considerably lower. One reason for the low effectiveness of the army is absence of training in larger units. That to defend his long coast line Castro has had to spread his army thin, and that through the use of deception tactics he could be kept off balance on D-Day. However, Gen. Gray did question the wisdom of knocking out certain bridges in the target area on D-Day minus one, since he fears that this may provide Castro with a tip-off as to the actual landing site, although he admitted that it would probably be three or four days anyway before Castro could get any sizable force of troops with equipment to the area. In a later discussion of the possible world reaction to the air strike and landing party, Mr. Berle said that from time immemorial Cuba has experienced invasions from the sea. However, the simultaneous bombing of a number of Cuban targets from the air was another matter and one that could not be shrugged off. Although he did not pursue this line of thought, there appears to be no doubt that it is causing him some concern. The possibility of fuzzing up the location of the bases from which the planes operate through the use of deception devices was briefly discussed. In this connection the question of how far we can go to protect, or support, Somoza and Ydigoras was lightly touched on by Mr. Mann and Mr. Barnes, with Mr. Barnes stating that while no specific commitment has been made, we have indicated that we "would back them" in the event they are charged with intervention. Mr. Mann concurred that they should be backed.

Policy Approval

Mr. Berle stated that he would like, if possible, to lay before the Secretary and the President a proposal for action which has our unanimous agreement. However, he said if there is any difference or differences which cannot be resolved, it then would be necessary to take both points of view to the Secretary and to the President for their consideration. He then identified what he feels are the three broad courses of action open to us:

1. Drifting, with no military action by organized Cuban or American forces
2. Agency plan
3. Massive intervention--war.

He then enumerated his reasons for favoring the agency plan, which he referred to as the intermediate possibility. These points were:

1. The question of time. We cannot delay or drift. If we do, we will soon find Castro with a large military capability which can only be reduced by war.
2. It would take a long time and a lot of work before we could effectively prevent Castro from exporting his revolution to other areas of the Caribbean. The implementation of the Agency plan would give Castro things to preoccupy himself with at home and minimize the chance of his embarking on any foreign adventures.
3. We do not have to presume--if the Agency plan is implemented--that U.S. forces will have to be committed, since there is expert opinion that the strike force can find safe haven in the mountains and maintain itself there indefinitely.
4. There is intelligence that the invading force would attract popular support of the people of Cuba at this time. This may not be true some months later when Castro will have tightened his grip on the island.
5. And on moral grounds, since the risk of loss of life would be less with this proposal than with any other course.

In supporting Mr. Berle's contention that we cannot afford to wait, mention was made of the present training in Czechoslovakia of some 60 to 100 Cuban pilots in jet aircraft and the possibility that these pilots may complete their training in March of this year. No one questioned the fact that the acquisition of a jet capability by Castro would greatly alter the picture in his favor.

With the exception of Mr. Mann there appeared to be general agreement with Mr. Berle's summing up of the situation and the conclusion he arrived at. Specifically, Mr. Mann would not accept the premise that we do not have to presume commitment of U.S. forces as a follow-up to the landing of the strike force. He contended that once we permitted the strike force to land, we (the United States Government) were then committed; that the United States Government would have to underwrite the success of the venture even if it meant the employment of U.S. naval and military forces. This being the case it was essential, in his opinion, that we first take certain diplomatic action--specifically--consult with a number of other Latin American nations, in order to beef up our moral position in the eyes of the hemisphere before we embark on this adventure. He then outlined his "thesis" as follows:

1. He and other State Department officials (he suggested Mr. Berle might visit Brazil) would contact the presidents and foreign ministers of a number of important South American countries (Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and perhaps others) and consult with them on the problem of Cuba. Hopefully, they would share our view that Castro is a menace to the peace of the hemisphere and that positive action--preferably under OAS sponsorship--should be taken. If they are unwilling to go along with multilateral intervention within the framework of the OAS, perhaps they will be willing to break with Castro and recognize the Junta when it

surfaces itself in Cuba. If they are unwilling to take any action against Castro, then at least they will not be able to say--as they did in connection with the recent protective blockade of Guatemala and Nicaraguan coasts--that we did not consult them. Without specifically stating what we are planning to do, we would at least acquaint them with the fact that we were not going to permit Castro to menace the peace of the hemisphere, etc. Since anyone who knows how to read already knows that the United States is supporting training bases in Guatemala and financing revolutionary groups in the United States, there will be no doubt in the minds of these leaders as to the type of action we have in mind.

2. However, if a number of countries would break with Castro and recognize the Junta, this would open the way to legal intervention--would prepare public opinion at home and abroad--and give us a defensible position in the U.N. The use of armed forces and the supplying of arms to the Junta would then be possible with some degree of legality.

3. Mr. Mann indicated that it would take at least six weeks to complete these consultations, and consequently if his "thesis" is adopted, the landing of the strike force cannot take place prior to 31 March 1961 at the earliest.

Once the selected countries had been sounded out--and regardless of whether their reaction is favorable or unfavorable--Mr. Mann visualized the following sequence of events:

A. Consultation with other American countries--time, six weeks.

B. Members of a Junta enter Cuba clandestinely and from Cuban territory announce the establishment of a provisional government and request recognition of the United States and all Latin American nations. It would also request the support of all Cuban patriots at home and abroad.

C. In answer to this appeal the strike force would land and endeavor to carry out its mission of establishing a beachhead and increasing its real estate until Castro is finally overthrown.

D. The United States will recognize the Junta and endeavor to get other OAS states to do likewise.

E. If the strike force appears to be in danger of annihilation, the United States, preferably in concert with other OAS countries but unilaterally if necessary, will take whatever steps may be necessary to guarantee victory, and this in all probability will require the use of United States armed forces.

Mr. Berle then tried to get Mr. Mann to admit to the possibility or the probability that the strike force would not be annihilated but would, if faced with the necessity, be able to make its way to the mountains and to maintain itself there indefinitely--which is the opinion of our military experts. Assuming all this, Mr. Mann was asked whether he still insisted that prior commitment to employ the United States armed forces was necessary. Mr. Mann said that he would not agree to the landing of the strike force unless it was first agreed as policy that the United States Government was prepared to go all the way to insure victory.

Mr. Barnes then stated that he felt it was necessary to point out that the threat to the peace of the hemisphere now exists and that it is increasing, and that if we delay in taking action until later, we shall lose an immediate capability of dealing with the problem--namely, our strike force. He pointed out that pressure is building up, we are already losing recruits through the AWOL channel, that these men have been in training for six months, and that we had originally contemplated their going into action as early as last November; that we could not keep the lid on much longer.

At this juncture Mr. Bissell stated that he wanted it clearly understood that the Agency could not and would not guarantee that it could get any member of the Junta into Cuba prior to the landing of the strike force.

Mr. Berle's Counter Proposal

Mr. Berle then outlined another possible course of action which would achieve a certain measure of legality--and thus satisfy Mr. Mann's requirement of a defensible position in the U.N., etc.--and still permit us to proceed with the project. In broad outline his proposal is as follows:

1. To prepare public opinion and to put the hemisphere on notice as to the serious view the United States takes of the Castro menace, the United States Government would withdraw recognition of the Castro government. In other words, we would go one step further than a mere break of relations. We would publicly declare that the Castro regime is not recognized by the United States as the Government of Cuba.
2. Immediately thereafter a revolutionary group "seeking to be the Government of Cuba" would be surfaced. This group would publicize a program of action which would promise elections, individual liberties, etc., which the former Castro government had failed to provide, and we would "recognize" this group as a revolutionary group "seeking to be the government."
3. We would use our influence with other Latin American countries to also de-recognize Castro and to "recognize" the revolutionary group.
4. The strike force would go in, the revolutionary group would send its representatives in and form a revolutionary Junta, and civil war would become widespread on the island.
5. We would then take the initiative in calling the OAS into session and we would demand action under the OAS charter and the appropriate treaties which would restore peace in Cuba through armed military intervention. We would go to this meeting prepared to prove that Castro is a menace to peace, that his regime has become dominated by an extra-continental totalitarian power, namely the Soviet Union, and we would demand that the OAS take the action open to it and required of it by its treaty obligations.
6. If the other OAS nations jointly refuse to face up to their responsibilities and either take no action whatsoever, or stall, or attempt to mediate the Cuban problem--as a problem between the United States and Cuba--then we shall make it clear to the OAS that we consider the OAS ineffectual as an organization and that in order to live up to our responsibilities under the treaties and the Monroe Document,^{/3/} we have no recourse but to take unilateral military action to remove this menace to hemispheric peace and reestablish peace on the Island.

^{/3/}The reference is to the Monroe Doctrine, a unilateral policy statement made by President Monroe in an address to Congress on December 2, 1823.

Conclusion

Mr. Berle announced that since differences of opinion still existed as to what course of action should be recommended to the Secretary and the President, it would be necessary for him and Mr. Mann to take their differences to the Secretary for consideration. Mr. Goodwin then remarked that the President had made it quite clear that if there were unresolved differences of opinion on the Cuban problem, the persons concerned should come to the President's office and in his presence orally set forth their arguments for his consideration and eventual decision.

Mr. Berle thought they would be able to discuss the matter with the Secretary this afternoon and possibly with the President this evening.^{/4/}

Mr. Barnes brought up the question of training some 25 Cubans in the operation of M----- tanks at stateside army installations and asked that authority be given to the appropriate officials of the Defense Department in order that this needed training could take place at the earliest possible date. Although no one posed any serious objections to the training of these Cubans in an American army installation, there was some uncertainty as to

exactly who could authorize this. Someone said that perhaps the Secretary of State should send a letter to the Secretary of Defense/5/ but the question seemed to be left hanging, although it is most probable that Gen. Gray and the Defense officials attending may have considered Mr. Berle's and Mr. Mann's concurrence as sufficient authority on which to proceed.

/4/See Document 40.

/5/No such letter has been found.

39. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, February 8, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1961. Top Secret. The source text was initialed by the President.

When you have your meeting this afternoon on Cuba, I think you will find that there is a divergence of view between State on the one hand and CIA and Defense on the other. Defense and CIA now feel quite enthusiastic about the invasion from Guatemala--at the worst they think the invaders would get into the mountains, and at the best they think they might get a full-fledged civil war in which we could then back the anti-Castro forces openly. State Department takes a much cooler view, primarily because of its belief that the political consequences would be very grave both in the United Nations and in Latin America. I think they will urge careful and extended diplomatic discussions with other American states, looking toward an increasing diplomatic isolation of Cuba and the Dominican Republic before any drastic action is taken. This divergence of view has not been openly and plainly considered in recent task force discussions, as I understand it. Therefore, you are quite likely to hear it in quite fresh form this afternoon.

Dick Goodwin has been in on most of the Cuban discussions, and he and I join in believing that there should certainly not be an invasion adventure without careful diplomatic soundings. We also think it almost certain that such soundings would confirm the judgment you are likely to hear from State.

McG. B./1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

40. Memorandum of Meeting With President Kennedy

Washington, February 8, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/61-4/61. Top Secret. Prepared by Bundy on February 9.

PRESENT

Messrs. Rusk, Berle, Mann, Bohlen, McNamara, Nitze, Barnes, W.P. Bundy, Haydn Williams, Dulles, Bissell, McG. Bundy

The meeting opened with an account by Mr. Bissell of the current plan for launching the troops from Guatemala. He reported that the JCS, after careful study, believed that this plan had a fair chance of success--"success" meaning ability to survive, hold ground, and attract growing support from Cubans. At the worst, the invaders should be able to fight their way to the Escambray and go into guerrilla action. If the troops are to land in top

form, the operation should not be delayed, at the longest, beyond March 31, and the decision to land for it must be made before D minus 21.

Secretary Rusk stated that without careful--and successful--diplomatic preparation such an operation could have grave effects upon the U.S. position in Latin America and at the U.N. Mr. Berle said that it would be impossible, as things stand now, to avoid being cast in the role of aggressor. Both Mr. Rusk and Mr. Berle believed that no present decision on the proposed invasion was necessary, but both made clear their conviction that U.S. policy should not be driven to drastic and irrevocable choice by the urgencies, however real, of a single battalion of men.

The President pressed for alternatives to a full-fledged "invasion," supported by U.S. planes, ships and supplies. While CIA doubted that other really satisfactory uses of the troops in Guatemala could be found, it was agreed that the matter should be carefully studied. Could not such a force be landed gradually and quietly and make its first major military efforts from the mountains--then taking shape as a Cuban force within Cuba, not as an invasion force sent by the Yankees?

The State Department envisioned a long and complex effort to win support and understanding--from other American States for a strong line against Castro--the Dominican Republic thrown in. Mr. Berle believed that the President's own authority and leadership would be needed in making the U.S. view understood both at home and abroad. The President asked that the State Department prepare a clear statement of the course it would recommend, and meanwhile he urged all concerned to seek for ways in which the Administration would make it clear to Latin Americans that it stands squarely for reform and progress in the Americas.

The only new action authorized at the meeting was the organization of a small junta of anti-Castro Cuban leaders, to be supported by a larger Revolutionary Council. This junta will have a strong left-of-center balance, and it will be a response to the urgent demands of the troops in Guatemala for a sense of political direction and purpose. Its members will be selected for their ability, among other things, to join the landing force./1/

/1/In a separate memorandum on this meeting, also prepared on February 9, Bundy noted that the discussion resulted in a decision by the President to authorize the encouragement of a junta and a revolutionary council, and that plans would be prepared for extensive diplomatic conversations and possible public statements on the nature of the Cuban problem. He added that alternative plans for action by anti-Castro Cubans would be explored. Beyond that, no other action "will be taken until after further authorization from the President." (Ibid.)

McG. Bundy/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

41. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Task Force on Latin America (Berle) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, February 9, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Inter-Agency Staff Study. Secret.

This refers to the White House discussion yesterday./1/

/1/See Document 40.

CIA are preparing and sending over a paper indicating the danger that a number of countries will go over the watershed, in case the operation we discussed yesterday is abandoned. This will come to you, and if they are right, we shall have some stiff decisions to make early next week.

I'm assuming that the White House meeting authorized taking soundings to ascertain the possibility of OAS or Rio Pact Ministers' action. We are working on and will have an outline of the scope of such explorations. The CIA paper may suggest an enlargement of the measures which we may want to ask the other American countries to authorize.

42. Editorial Note

Cuba was discussed under two separate headings at the 476th meeting of the National Security Council on February 9, 1961. The available record of the discussion is very limited, however. According to the Record of NSC Actions, approved by the President on February 11, a proposed purchase of Cuban molasses by a United States firm was discussed under the heading of "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security." The Council also discussed Cuba in conjunction with an oral report by the Secretary of State under the agenda item entitled "Discussion of Crisis Areas." No further substantive record of the NSC discussion has been found. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

43. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy

Washington, February 11, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, Papers of Arthur Schlesinger, Cuba 1961, Box 31. Top Secret.

As you know, there is great pressure within the government in favor of a drastic decision with regard to Cuba.

There is, it seems to me, a plausible argument for this decision if one excludes everything but Cuba itself and looks only at the pace of military consolidation within Cuba and the mounting impatience of the armed exiles.

However, as soon as one begins to broaden the focus beyond Cuba to include the hemisphere and the rest of the world, the arguments against this decision begin to gain force.

However well disguised any action might be, it will be ascribed to the United States. The result would be a wave of massive protest, agitation and sabotage throughout Latin America, Europe, Asia and Africa (not to speak of Canada and of certain quarters in the United States). Worst of all, this would be your first dramatic foreign policy initiative. At one stroke, it would dissipate all the extraordinary good will which has been rising toward the new Administration through the world. It would fix a malevolent image of the new Administration in the minds of millions.

It may be that on balance the drastic decision may have to be made. If so, every care must be taken to protect ourselves against the inevitable political and diplomatic fall-out.

1. Would it not be possible to induce Castro to take offensive action first? He has already launched expeditions against Panama and against the Dominican Republic. One can conceive a black operation in, say, Haiti which might in time lure Castro into sending a few boatloads of men on to a Haitian beach in what could be portrayed as an effort to overthrow the Haitian regime. If only Castro could be induced to commit an offensive act, then the moral issue would be clouded, and the anti-US campaign would be hobbled from the start.

2. Should you not consider at some point addressing a speech to the whole hemisphere setting forth in eloquent terms your own conception of inter-American progress toward individual freedom and social justice? Such a speech would identify our Latin American policy with the aspirations of the plain people of the hemisphere. As part of this speech, you could point out the threats raised against the inter-American system by dictatorial states, and especially by dictatorial states under the control of non-hemisphere governments or ideologies. If this were done properly, action against Castro could be seen as in the interests of the hemisphere and not just of American

corporations.

3. Could we not bring down Castro and Trujillo at the same time? If the fall of the Castro regime could be accompanied or preceded by the fall of the Trujillo regime, it would show that we have a principled concern for human freedom and do not object only to left-wing dictators.

If the drastic decision proves necessary in the end, I hope that steps of this sort can do something to mitigate the effects. And, if we do take the drastic decision, it must be made clear that we have done so, not lightly, but only after we had exhausted every conceivable alternative.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr./1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

44. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Task Force on Latin America (Berle) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, February 14, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Inter-Agency Staff Study. Secret.

SUBJECT

Cuba

As the White House conference/1/ broke up, we

/1/No other record of this conference has been found.

(a) arranged leadership for the camps;

(b) kept the operation standing;

(c) agreed the situation would need review not later than early next week.

Should we not set up another White House meeting late this week to determine the next step?

In this connection the CIA paper/2/ I referred to in an earlier memorandum/3/ has probably reached you. I have seen it. It suggests that dismantling the Cuban operation may mean explosions in three or four countries in Central America. If this is accurate, we should be prepared for the consequences of dismantling.

/2/A possible reference to a draft of the paper on Cuba submitted by the CIA to the White House on February 17; see Document 46.

/3/Document 41.

The countries involved are [*1 line of source text not declassified*] Nicaragua and Guatemala.

I think the danger may be a little overdrawn [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] though Guatemala may be an issue, but we do have to get our lines straight.

45. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to Secretary

of State Rusk

Washington, February 15, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General 1/61-4/61. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Mann.

SUBJECT

The March 1960 Plan/1/

/1/Reference is to a memorandum prepared in the CIA entitled "A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime," which was approved by President Eisenhower on March 17, 1960. For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1958-1960, vol. VI, pp. 850-851.

Attached for your consideration is a list of my conclusions concerning the March 1960 plan which has been under discussion. If my conclusions are accepted, there can, of course, be no certainty we will not be faced with the necessity, perhaps before this year is out, of using armed force. If this should become necessary we would, I believe, be far better off to do whatever has to be done in an open way and in accordance with the American tradition after preparing public opinion both at home and abroad. If you should decide not to press at this time for a collective decision to recognize a rebel government in Cuba, we might explore, in a very general and tentative way, the possibility of getting agreement in principle that something along this line will be done if conditions within Cuba seem to offer a more solid basis for such action at the time the Foreign Ministers Meeting/2/ is held. I am intrigued with the thought that a great many of the impediments to dealing with the Cuban situation would be cleared away if a rebel government could be recognized.

/2/Reference is to the projected but still unscheduled Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics. The seventh such meeting was held in San Jose, Costa Rica, August 22-29, 1960. The eighth meeting was not held until January 22-31, 1962, in Punta del Este, Uruguay.

Finally, I thought it would be desirable for Mr. Berle, before he leaves for Brazil, to have a pretty clear idea of your views on the substantive points so that he can speak confidently and effectively.

LIST OF CONCLUSIONS

I

The March 1960 Plan

What is proposed is the landing of a brigade of approximately 800 men from bases in Guatemala and Nicaragua, supported by an air strike from the same bases either simultaneously with the landing or 24 hours preceding it. Naval craft, with some "contracted" United States nationals aboard, would transport the brigade and supply logistic support. It is planned that the brigade, if unopposed and if surprise were achieved, would be able to consolidate their position and hold a beachhead for a limited number of days. If internal support does not materialize, it is planned that the brigade could either march directly to nearby mountains or be withdrawn from the beach to other nearby beaches from whence they could move into the mountains. Once in the mountains they would operate as a guerrilla unit.

My conclusions regarding this proposal are as follows:

(1) The military evaluation of this proposal is that "ultimate success will depend upon political factors, i.e., a sizeable popular uprising or substantial follow-on forces."/3/ It is unlikely that a popular uprising would promptly

take place in Cuba of a scale and kind which would make it impossible for the Castro regime to oppose the brigade with superior numbers of well armed troops.

/3/See Document 35.

(2) It therefore appears possible, even probable, that we would be faced with the alternative of a) abandoning the brigade to its fate, which would cost us dearly in prestige and respect or b) attempting execution of the plan to move the brigade into the mountains as guerrillas, which would pose a prolonged problem of air drops or supplies or c) overt U.S. military intervention; a JCS staff officer has estimated there is at least a 10% chance that U.S. forces would be required unless alternative (a) were adopted.

(3) Execution of the proposed plan would be in violation of Article 2, paragraph 4, and Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,^{/4/} Articles 18 and 25 of the Charter of the Organization of American States,^{/5/} and Article 1 of the Rio Treaty, which, in general, proscribe the use of armed force with the sole exception of the right of self-defense "if an armed attack occurs."

^{/4/}For text of the Charter of the United Nations, see *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949*, pp. 95-110.

^{/5/}For text of the Charter of the Organization of American States, signed at Bogota, Colombia on April 30, 1948, see *ibid.*, pp. 230-242.

The Castro regime could be expected to call on the other American States (Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Rio Treaty) to assist them in repelling the attack, and to request the Security Council (Chapter 7 of the UN Charter) to take action to "maintain and restore international peace and security." The chances of promptly presenting both international organizations with a *fait accompli* are, in my opinion, virtually nil. It would therefore be extremely difficult to deal with Castro demarches of this kind. We could not disassociate ourselves from our complicity with Guatemala and Nicaragua; and if we tried to do so, both Ydigoras and Somoza are in possession of sufficient information to implicate the United States in the eye of reasonable men.

(4) Since the proposal comes closer to being a military invasion than a covert operation of the Guatemala type, account must be taken of the possibility that the execution of this proposal would attract to Castro additional support within Cuba. More important, a majority of the people of Latin America would oppose the operation, and we would expect that the Communists and Castroites would organize and lead demonstrations designed to bring about the overthrow of governments friendly to us. At best, our moral posture throughout the hemisphere would be impaired. At worst, the effect on our position of hemispheric leadership would be catastrophic.

(5) Time is running against us in Cuba in a military sense since it is probable Castro soon will acquire jet aircraft, since he may acquire missiles and since Castro needs time to train his army and militia. Nevertheless, Defense does not currently consider Cuba to represent a threat to our national security. If later it should become a threat we are able to deal with it. If so, new developments which make Cuba an immediate threat to our national security might increase our chances of obtaining hemispheric support for collective action.

(6) The intelligence community was, and probably still is, unanimously of the opinion that time is running against us in Cuba in the sense that a declining curve of Castro popularity is offset by a rising curve of Castro control over the Cuban people. Nevertheless, it is not impossible that rifts between leaders in the Castro regime, mounting economic difficulties and rising resentment with terrorist methods will lead to the eventual overthrow of the Castro regime by the Cubans themselves, aided only by the more "conventional" type of covert activities now being carried out. In any case, time is not currently running against us in terms of Latin American public opinion; there has already been a significant decline in Castro's popularity in Latin America, a trend which we have reason to hope will continue, assuming Castro continues to employ the same methods. If one looks at the Castro problem in the context of the struggle between the East and the West for Latin America, if one assumes

the success or failure of the Castro policies to achieve a better life for the masses will significantly influence future hemisphere thought and action, and if one assumes that discipline and austerity will be hallmarks of Castroism, the political advantages to us of letting Latin America see for itself the practical results of applying communist theory in a Latin American country could well give us a decisive advantage in the ideological hemisphere struggle ahead of us.

(7) I therefore conclude it would not be in the national interest to proceed unilaterally to put this plan into execution.

(8) I also conclude that in spite of the difficulty maintaining or re-creating our Cuban "asset", we should consider proceeding as planned only if we receive strong support for collective action by the two-thirds majority required by the Rio Treaty. The chances of obtaining this agreement within the time limits imposed on us by the plan are not good. The attitudes of Quadros, Lleras, Betancourt and Frondizi may well be decisive. Mexican support is not expected. Venezuelan support would certainly be conditional on simultaneous action against Trujillo.

(9) To determine whether Latin American support will be forthcoming it will be necessary discreetly to make soundings. There is no chance of obtaining Latin American support for a resolution authorizing the use of armed force against Cuba. Our best chance of getting support would be to propose a resolution for the collective recognition of a rebel government. The Latin Americans would understand the relationship between recognition of a rebel government and the Cuban "asset" in Central America without being told, i.e. that the recognition of the government would give at least a color of legality to support the proposed operation. A possible resolution along this line for Cuba is at Tab (A)/6/ and a possible resolution on the Dominican Republic is at Tab (B).

/6/None of the draft OAS resolutions attached to the source text is printed.

(10) The resolution at Tab (A) would be subject to the juridical objection that the rebel government does not control significant portions of Cuban territory and to the objection that not all members of the revolutionary junta are resident in Cuba. To this we would have to answer that the rebel government speaks for the guerrillas in the mountains who have been fighting for months. In any case, we will be much better off in the UN and the OAS if we are debating this issue than if we are debating the issue of whether the proposed operation constitutes an armed attack. It would offer the additional advantage of converting our posture from covert to overt, a posture which is in keeping with the American tradition.

II

Alternative Proposal

(11) Assuming you do not wish to engage in soundings to determine whether there is support for a resolution along the lines suggested at Tab (A) or having made the soundings we do not receive strong support from the American community, we should determine whether there would be support for collective action, short of the use of armed force, directed to the insulation of Latin America from Cuba and steps to control and, if possible, eliminate Castro-communist subversion. A draft resolution along these lines is at Tab (C).

(12) If the March 1960 plan is abandoned, it will be necessary to determine what use is to be made of the brigade, including the feasibility of their introduction into the mountains of Cuba as guerrillas. This would require further study.

III

Search and Seizure

(13) Consideration has also been given to the feasibility of reducing the future military risk by interception on the

high seas of arms, including jets and missiles, destined for Cuba. This has been abandoned as impracticable because of staff opinion that this would be clearly illegal and because of the probability that our friends and allies would be no more amenable now to a search and seizure procedure than they were during the Guatemalan venture. Furthermore, this procedure would have the disadvantage of bringing us head on into conflict with the Soviet Union.

IV

Other Considerations

(14) Outside the scope of this list of conclusions are non-ARA questions such as estimates of probable reactions of our NATO Allies and the Sino-Soviet Bloc.



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963
Volume X
Cuba, 1961-1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

Cuba, 1961-1962

46. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, February 17, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/61-4/61. Top Secret. A handwritten notation on the cover sheet of the paper reads "Bissell's View." A copy of the paper in CIA files indicates that it was drafted by Bissell. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 5, Area Activities-Cuba)

CUBA

1. Background: About a year ago the Agency was directed to set in motion the organization of a broadly based opposition to the Castro regime and the development of propaganda channels, clandestine agent nets within Cuba, and trained paramilitary ground and air forces wherewith that opposition could overthrow the Cuban regime. The concept was that this should be so far as possible a Cuban operation, though it was well understood that support in many forms would have to come from the United States. Great progress has been made in this undertaking. A Government-in-Exile will soon be formed embracing most reputable opposition elements. It will have a left-of-center political orientation and should command the support of liberals both within Cuba and throughout the hemisphere. It will sponsor and increasingly control trained and combat-ready military forces based in Central America. A decision must soon be made as to the support (if any) the United States will render the opposition henceforth.

2. Prospects for the Castro Regime: The Castro regime is steadily consolidating its control over Cuba. Assuming that the United States applies political and economic pressures at roughly present levels of severity, it will continue to do so regardless of declining popular support. There is no significant likelihood that the Castro regime will fall of its own weight.

a. The regime is proceeding methodically to solidify its control over all the major institutions of the society and to employ them on the Communist pattern as instruments of repression. The Government now directly controls all radio, television, and the press. It has placed politically dependable leadership in labor unions, student groups, and professional organizations. It has nationalized most productive and financial enterprises and is using a program of so-called land reform to exercise effective control over the peasantry. It has destroyed all political parties except the Communist party. Politically reliable and increasingly effective internal security and military forces are being built up.

b. Cuba is in economic difficulties but the Communist Bloc will almost certainly take whatever steps are necessary to forestall any decisive intensification of these troubles. Economic dislocations will occur but will not lead to the collapse or the significant weakening of the Castro regime.

c. At the present time the regular Cuban military establishment, especially the Navy and Air Force, are of extremely low effectiveness. Within the next few months, however, it is expected that Cuba will begin to take delivery of jet aircraft and will begin to have available trained Cuban pilots of known political reliability. During the same period the effectiveness of ground forces will be increasing and their knowledge of newly acquired Soviet weapons will improve. Therefore, after some date probably no more than six months away it will become militarily infeasible to overthrow the Castro regime except through the commitment to combat of a sizeable organized military force. The option of action by the Cuban opposition will no longer be open.

3. The Nature of the Threat: Cuba will, of course, never present a direct military threat to the United States and it is unlikely that Cuba would attempt open invasion of any other Latin American country since the U.S. could and almost certainly would enter the conflict on the side of the invaded country. Nevertheless, as Castro further stabilizes his regime, obtains more sophisticated weapons, and further trains the militia, Cuba will provide an effective and solidly defended base for Soviet operations and expansion of influence in the Western Hemisphere. Arms, money, organizational and other support can be provided from Cuba to dissident leaders and groups throughout Latin America in order to create political instability, encourage Communism, weaken the prestige of the U.S., and foster the inevitable popular support that Castro's continuance of power will engender. A National Estimate states: "For the Communist powers, Cuba represents an opportunity of incalculable value. More importantly, the advent of Castro has provided the Communists with a friendly base for propaganda and agitation throughout the rest of Latin America and with a highly exploitable example of revolutionary achievement and successful defiance of the United States."

4. Possible Courses of Action: For reasons which require no elaboration the overt use of U.S. military forces to mount an invasion of Cuba has been excluded as a practical alternative. Broadly defined the following three possible alternative courses of action remain for consideration:

- a. Intensification of economic and political pressures coupled with continued covert support of sabotage and minor guerrilla actions but excluding substantial commitment of the Cuban opposition's paramilitary force.
- b. Employment of the paramilitary force but in a manner which would not have the appearance of an invasion of Cuba from the outside.
- c. Commitment of the paramilitary force in a surprise landing, the installation under its protection on Cuban soil of the opposition government and either the rapid spread of the revolt or the continuation of large scale guerrilla action in terrain suited for that purpose.

These alternatives are discussed in the following paragraphs.

5. Diplomatic and Economic Pressure: There is little that can be done to impose real political and economic pressure on the Castro regime and no such course of action now under serious consideration seems likely to bring about its overthrow.

- a. A true blockade of Cuba enforced by the United States would involve technical acts of war and has now been dismissed as infeasible.
- b. Action to halt arms shipments from Cuba into any other part of the hemisphere would be cumbersome and easily evaded if air transport were employed. While undoubtedly of some value it is difficult to see that the institution of such measures would either impose severe pressure on the Castro regime or effectively insulate the rest of the hemisphere from it. Castro's principal tools of subversion are people, ideology, the force of example and money. The flow of these items cannot be dammed up.
- c. Further economic sanctions are theoretically possible but can quite readily be offset by an increase of trade

with the Bloc.

d. In any event, it is estimated that the prospects for effective international action are poor.

6. The Middle Course: Careful study has been given to the possibility of infiltrating the paramilitary force gradually to an assembly point in suitable terrain, hopefully avoiding major encounters in the process, and committing it to extensive guerrilla action. This course of action would have the advantage of rendering unnecessary a single major landing which could be described as an invasion. The infiltration phase would take on the coloration of efforts by small groups of Cubans to join an already existing resistance movement. Unfortunately, it has been found to be infeasible on military grounds. Basically the reasons (explained more fully in the attachment) are:

a. It is considered militarily infeasible to infiltrate in small units a force of this size to a single area where it could assemble, receive supplies, and engage in coordinated military action. Such an operation would have to be done over a period of time and the loss of the element of surprise after initial infiltrations would permit government forces to frustrate further reinforcements to the same area.

b. Military units significantly smaller than the battalion presently undergoing unit training would fall short of the "minimum critical mass" required to give any significant likelihood of success. Smaller scale infiltrations would not produce a psychological effect sufficient to precipitate general uprisings of wide-spread revolt among disaffected elements of Castro's armed forces.

c. Actually, the least costly and most efficient way to infiltrate the force into a terrain suitable for protracted and powerful guerrilla operations would be by a single landing of the whole force as currently planned and its retirement from the landing point into the chosen redoubt.

7. A Landing in Force: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have evaluated the military aspects of the plan for a landing by the Cuban opposition./1/ They have concluded that "this plan has a fair chance of ultimate success" (that is of detonating a major and ultimately successful revolt against Castro) and that, if ultimate success is not achieved there is every likelihood that the landing can be the means of establishing in favorable terrain a powerful guerrilla force which could be sustained almost indefinitely. The latter outcome would not be (and need not appear as) a serious defeat. It would be the means of exerting continuing pressure on the regime and would be a continuing demonstration of inability of the regime to establish order. It could create an opportunity for an OAS intervention to impose a cease-fire and hold elections.

/1/See Document 35.

a. Any evaluation of the chances of success of the assault force should be realistic about the fighting qualities of the militia. No definitive conclusions can be advanced but it must be remembered that the majority of the militia are not fighters by instinct or background and are not militiamen by their own choice. Their training has been slight and they have never been exposed to actual fire (particularly any heavy fire power) nor to air attack. Moreover, the instabilities within Cuba are such that if the tide shifts against the regime, the chances are strong that substantial numbers will desert or change sides.

b. There is no doubt that the paramilitary force would be widely assumed to be U.S. supported. Nevertheless, this conclusion would be difficult to prove and the scale of its activity would not be inconsistent with the potentialities for support by private Cuban and American groups rather than by the U.S. Government. It must be emphasized, moreover, that this enterprise would have nothing in common (as would the use of U.S. military forces) with the Russian suppression of Hungary or the Chinese suppression of the Tibetans. This would be a force of dissident Cubans with Cuban political and military leadership.

c. There would be adverse political repercussions to a landing in force but it is not clear how serious these would

be. Most Latin American Governments would at least privately approve of unobtrusive U.S. support for such an opposition move, especially if the political coloration of the opposition were left-of-center. The reaction of the rest of the free world, it is estimated, would be minimal in the case of unobtrusive U.S. support for such an attempt. It might produce a good deal of cynicism throughout the world about the U.S. role but if quickly successful little lasting reaction. Generally speaking it is believed that the political cost would be low in the event of a fairly quick success. The political dangers flowing from long continued large scale guerrilla warfare would be greater but there are diplomatic preparations that could be made to forestall extreme adverse reactions in this contingency.

8. Dissolution of the Military Force: A decision not to use the paramilitary force must consider the problem of dissolution, since its dissolution will surely be the only alternative if it is not used within the next four to six weeks. It is hoped that at least one hundred volunteers could be retained for infiltration in small teams but it is doubtful whether more than this number would be available or useful for this type of activity.

a. There is no doubt that dissolution in and of itself will be a blow to U.S. prestige as it will be interpreted in many Latin American countries and elsewhere as evidence of the U.S. inability to take decisive action with regard to Castro. David will again have defeated Goliath. Anti-U.S. regimes like that of Trujillo would gain strength while pro-U.S. Betancourt would undoubtedly suffer. Surely Ydigoras, who has been an exceedingly strong ally, would also be placed in a very difficult position for his support of a disbanded effort. It must be remembered in this connection that there are sectors of Latin American opinion which criticize the U.S. for not dealing sufficiently forcefully with the Castro regime. In fact, one reason why many Latin American governments are holding back in opposing Castro is because they feel that sooner or later the U.S. will be compelled to take strong measures.

b. The resettlement of the military force will unavoidably cause practical problems. Its members will be angry, disillusioned and aggressive with the inevitable result that they will provide honey for the press bees and the U.S. will have to face the resulting indignities and embarrassments. Perhaps more important, however, will be the loss of good relations with the opposition Cuban leaders. To date almost all non-Batista, non-Communist political leaders have been encouraged or offered help in fighting Castro. An abandonment to the military force will be considered by them as a withdrawal of all practical support. In view of the breadth of the political spectrum involved, this will cause some difficulties for the future since it is hard to imagine any acceptable post-Castro leadership that will not include some of the exiles dealt with during the past year.

9. Conclusions:

a. Castro's position is daily getting stronger and will soon be consolidated to the point that his overthrow will only be possible by drastic, politically undesirable actions such as an all-out embargo or an overt use of military force.

b. A failure to remove Castro by external action will lead in the near future to the elimination of all internal and external Cuban opposition of any effective nature. Moreover, the continuance of the Castro regime will be a substantial victory for the Sino-Soviet Bloc which will use Cuba as a base for increased activity throughout the Western Hemisphere, thereby accentuating political instability and weakening U.S. prestige and influence.

c. The Cuban paramilitary force, if used, has a good chance of overthrowing Castro or at the very least causing a damaging civil war without requiring the U.S. to commit itself to overt action against Cuba. Whatever embarrassment the alleged (though deniable) U.S. support may cause, it may well be considerably less than that resulting from the continuation of the Castro regime or from the more drastic and more attributable actions necessary to accomplish the result at a later date.

d. Even though the best estimate of likely Soviet reaction to a successful movement against Castro indicates problems to the U.S. arising from the removal or substantial weakening of the Castro regime, Soviet propaganda

and political moves will still be much less prejudicial to the long-range interests of the U.S. than would the results of a failure to remove Castro.

Appendix A

Clandestine Infiltration by Sea of Small Groups (up to 50 men)

1. The only areas of Cuba with mountainous terrain of sufficient extent and ruggedness for guerrilla operations are the Sierra Escambray of Las Villas Province in Central Cuba and the Sierra Maestra of Oriente Province at the eastern extremity of the island. The Sierra de los Organos of Western Cuba do not encompass sufficient area and are not rugged enough to sustain guerrilla operations against strong opposition. Of the two areas with adequate terrain, only the Sierra Escambray is truly suitable for our purposes, since the mountains in Eastern Cuba are too distant from air bases in Latin America available to CIA for air logistical support operations. Primary reliance would have to be placed on this method of supply for guerrilla forces.
2. The Government of Cuba (GOC) has concentrated large forces of army and militia in both Las Villas and Oriente Provinces. Estimates of troop strength in Las Villas have varied recently from 17,000 to as high as 60,000 men, while up to 12,000 men are believed to be stationed in Oriente.
3. While of dubious efficiency and morale, the militia, by sheer weight of numbers has been able to surround and eliminate small groups of insurgents. A landing by 27 men of the Masferrer Group in Oriente, for example, was pursued and eliminated by 2,000 militia. A similar group of insurgents in Western Cuba was attacked and destroyed by six battalions of army and militia (about 3,000 men).
4. A build-up of force in a given area by infiltration of small groups would require a series of night landings in the same general vicinity. Discovery of the initial landing by GOC forces would be almost a certainty, since security posts are located at all possible landing areas. Even if the initial landing were successful, the GOC could be expected to move troops and naval patrol craft to the area making further landings difficult if not impossible. Any small force landed, experience has shown, will be rapidly engaged by forces vastly superior in numbers. Therefore, it is considered unlikely that small groups landing on successive occasions would succeed in joining forces later. A series of surrounded pockets of resistance would be the result.
5. Repeated approaches to the Cuban coast by vessels large enough to land up to 50 men would probably provoke attack by the Cuban Navy and/or Air Force, either of which is capable of destroying any vessels which could be used by CIA for these purposes.
6. In the Sierra Escambray, which is the only area of Cuba in which true guerrilla operations are now being conducted, ill-equipped and untrained groups of up to 200 to 300 men have been hard pressed to survive and have been unable to conduct effective operations. The only worthwhile accomplishment of these bands has been to serve as a symbol of resistance. Smaller groups, even though better trained and equipped, could not be expected to be effective.
7. There are very few sites on the south coast of the Sierra Escambray where small boats can be landed. These are found principally at the mouths of rivers and are all guarded by militia posts armed with machine guns. A small group landing at such a point by shuttling from a larger vessel in small boats would probably receive heavy casualties.
8. Small-scale infiltrations would not produce a psychological effect sufficient to precipitate general uprisings and widespread revolt among disaffected elements of Castro's armed forces. These conditions must be produced before the Castro Government can be overthrown by any means short of overt intervention by United States armed forces. As long as the armed forces respond to Castro's orders, he can maintain himself in power indefinitely. The history of all police-type states bears out this conclusion.

9. The CIA Cuban Assault Force, composed entirely of volunteers, has been trained for action as a compact, heavily armed, hard-hitting military unit, and the troops are aware of the combat power which they possess as a unit. They have been indoctrinated in the military principle of mass and instructed that dispersion of force leads to defeat in detail. They will be quick to recognize the disadvantages of the infiltration concept, and it is unlikely that all would volunteer for piecemeal commitment to military action in Cuba. The troops can be used in combat only on a voluntary basis. The Government of the United States exercises no legal command or disciplinary authority over them.

Conclusions:

1. This course of action would result in large scale loss of life, both through military action against forces vastly superior in numbers and as a result of drum-head justice and firing squad execution of those captured.
2. This alternative could achieve no effective military or psychological results.

47. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, February 18, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/61-4/61. Top Secret.

Here, in sharp form, are the issues on Cuba. Bissell and Mann are the real antagonists at the staff level. Since I think you lean to Mann's view, I have put Bissell on top./1/

/1/See Documents 45 and 46.

On balance I think the gloomier parts of both papers are right. Diplomatic and public opinion are surely not ready for an invasion, but Castro's internal strength continues to grow. The battalion's dispersal would be a blow to U.S. prestige, but we should today have a hard time at the U.N. if it goes in.

The one hope I see is in an early--even if thin--recognition of a rival regime. I think if a Government-in-Exile can be surfaced promptly we could and should follow Mann's suggestion of working toward its recognition fairly soon. (We could also put in a full trade embargo against Castro, and you could sorrowfully read him out of the liberal family in a strong and factual speech about his outrages.) Then, conceivably, we could hold back Bissell's battalion for about three months and even build it up somewhat. And when it did go in, the color of civil war would be quite a lot stronger.

McG. B.

48. Editorial Note

According to summary notes prepared by General David W. Gray, a meeting was convened at the White House on February 17, 1961, to discuss the differing views held by Department of State and CIA officials on the best way to proceed with the paramilitary operation directed at Cuba. The President's appointment book establishes, however, that the meeting took place on February 18, after McGeorge Bundy passed to President Kennedy the contending memoranda drafted by Assistant Secretary of State Mann and Deputy CIA Director Bissell. (Document 47) (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book) According to Gray's notes on the meeting:

"Mr. Bissell discussed the status of planning and preparations. Mr. Bissell also discussed necessity for a decision concerning the surfacing of political leadership. Mr. Rusk discussed the fact that it would be much better to delay

any action and to attempt to build up OAS support. He was concerned about charge of aggression in UN. Mr. Berle believed that support could be generated in Latin America but not by 31 March. The President asked if there was anything he could do to develop a political position to support action such as a speech on traditional liberalism in the western hemisphere. He also asked if there was any way the build up of jets and rockets in Cuba could be linked to this operation. Mr. Bohlen expressed the view that Russia would not react if the operation was finished quickly but might react if it dragged on. The President indicated that he would be in favor of a more moderate approach to the problem such as mass infiltration. No definite decisions were reached at this meeting." (Summary notes prepared on May 9, 1961; *ibid.*, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

49. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Senator George A. Smathers

Washington, February 18, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations, 2/16/61-3/23/61. No classification marking. Senator Smathers was Democratic Senator from Florida.

Dear Senator Smathers: As I promised in my letter of January 10, we have studied the recommendation in your letter of January 7/1/ that the provisions of Section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951/2/ be invoked to prevent the importation of all dutiable Cuban exports in order to deprive the Castro regime of as many United States dollars as possible.

/1/Neither of the letters has been found.

/2/Section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 stipulated the withdrawal of all trade concessions as they applied to imports from the Soviet Union, or any other Communist-controlled country or area; 65 Stat. 72.

In fulfilling its responsibility to ensure a reliable source of sugar for the domestic market, the United States Government has, as you know, already taken the major step of eliminating imports of Cuban sugar, which constituted approximately 70% of Cuba's exports to the United States. The principal economic purpose of the application of further measures would, therefore, be to eliminate the remainder of Cuba's exports to the United States, consisting mainly of tobacco, molasses, fruits and vegetables. Toward the end of 1960, Cuba was exporting to the United States at the rate of \$65,000,000 a year, virtually all of which consisted of dutiable imports. This rate of export represents a reduction by approximately one-half of the rate of exports of these same products during early 1960, and also reflects the degree to which Cuba has altered its traditional trading pattern with the United States by trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

Sharing your serious concern over the nature and policies of the present Cuban Government, the Department has for some time been studying additional measures, including invocation of Section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended, with a view toward achieving the maximum economic effect while at the same time minimizing undesirable repercussions on our relations with other countries. The complexity of this problem is such as to require further study of economic, legal and foreign policy aspects. I am sorry that I cannot give you a final point of view at this writing.

Sincerely yours,

Dean Rusk

50. National Security Action Memorandum No. 23

Washington, February 21, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC-5902 Memoranda. Secret.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

In calling my attention to the letter which Senator George A. Smathers wrote to you/1/ suggesting urgent consideration of placing an embargo on Cuban fruits, vegetables and other commodities imported into the United States, the President said he would like to have from you a memorandum responding to the following three questions:

/1/Document 49.

- a. Would an embargo save us dollar foreign exchange?
- b. Would it make things more difficult for Castro?
- c. Would it be in the public interest?

The President asked that your memorandum to him include the views of the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

McGeorge Bundy

51. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy

Washington, February 24, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1961. Secret.

SUBJECT

Questions Arising from Senator Smathers' Recommendation that Remaining Exports from Cuba to the United States be Embargoed

Mr. Bundy's memorandum of February 21, 1961/1/ to me asked three questions:

/1/Document 50.

Question: Would an embargo save on dollar foreign exchange?

Answer: Cuban exports to the United States are steadily declining and are presently moving at the rate of \$60-70 million annually. An embargo would result in a saving of perhaps only 1/2 of this amount in dollar exchange since some of these items would probably be imported from other sources.

The principal items still imported from Cuba are tobacco, molasses, and fresh fruits and vegetables.

Imports of tobacco from Cuba in 1960 amounted to about 27 million dollars. United States cigar manufacturers would have difficulty finding comparable tobacco from other foreign sources, and would be forced to turn to domestically produced cigar filler. This is in surplus supply in the United States, and is higher priced. About 5 million dollars' worth of high quality cigars were imported from Cuba in 1960. An embargo on Cuban cigars would result in considerable inconvenience to United States consumers, as cigars of comparable quality could not be obtained from other sources.

Imports of fruits and vegetables from Cuba (amounting to over 10 million dollars in 1960) occur mainly during the period of December-May. These imports are largely supplementary to our domestic production and for the most part would not be replaced from other sources. Thus some saving in dollar exchange could result, although the 1960-61 season is for the most part completed.

Imports of molasses from Cuba amounted to over 11 million dollars in 1960. In a typical year Cuba provides about 25 percent of our total utilization of molasses. It is likely that an embargo on imports of molasses from Cuba would mean a saving of dollar exchange, as molasses for distillation would probably not be available from other sources. Some replacement supplies for livestock feed probably would be obtained from other sources.

Question: Would it make things more difficult for Castro?

Answer: It will deprive Castro of dollar exchange and to the extent that he is unable to dispose of approximately \$60-70 million annually of these commodities in this market or in other markets with convertible currencies, it will deplete his already low foreign exchange position. In my opinion, the economic disadvantage to Castro would outweigh any political advantage which he might gain by charging us with economic aggression and the unilateral application of economic measures.

Question: Would it be in the public interest?

Answer: For the reasons stated in answer to the second question I believe the answer to this is in the affirmative.

Some months ago serious consideration was given to applying the Trading With the Enemy Act.^{/2/} It was decided to postpone applying this Act until Latin American public opinion understood better the true nature of the danger which Castro represents to the Hemisphere, and until the possibility of securing multilateral action against Cuba through the OAS was improved. We therefore decided to rely on the existing authority granted in the Sugar Act^{/3/} and the Export Control Act,^{/4/} as interim measures to stop both imports of Cuban sugar as well as most of our exports to Cuba.

^{/2/}See Document 12.

^{/3/}Sugar Act of 1948, enacted August 8, 1947; 61 Stat. 922, as amended.

^{/4/}Export Control Act, enacted February 26, 1949; 63 Stat. 7, as amended.

Several weeks ago it was decided that Latin American public opinion would no longer strongly resist our unilateral application of the Trading With the Enemy Act even though the necessary two-thirds of the member nations of the OAS do not yet appear to be prepared to join in multilateral action. In addition, recent developments in Cuba, such as Cuba's urgent requirement to sell molasses and increased armed resistance to Castro, make it important that we act at once to deny the United States market to Cuban exports and to lend moral support and encouragement to those now engaged in resisting the Castro regime. Consequently I believe we should proceed with this action which, in our view, is the most effective measure available. Staff work between State and Treasury has now been virtually completed and I expect to be able to present to you early next week a final recommendation regarding the application of the Trading With the Enemy Act.

Dean Rusk

52. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State

Buenos Aires, March 4, 1961, 11 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3-461. Confidential; Priority.

1011. Arnaldo Musich, Economic Advisor Foreign Office, called Hoyt late this afternoon to inform Embassy "in confidence" action taken by GOA respect Cuban note February 23./1/ Stated telegrams sent directly by Taboada to Rusk/2/ and Roa informing them GOA designating special envoys to Cuban and US Governments because "GOA in its desire to improve relations between states is willing make available its friendly offices to seek formulas which might resolve or alleviate the state of tension originating in the worsening relations between the US and Cuba."

/1/On February 23, Raul Roa Garcia, Cuban Minister for External Relations, sent a note to each of the Foreign Ministers of the Latin American nations warning that the United States was creating conditions to attempt to justify indirect military aggression against Cuba. Roa called upon the Ministers to use their good offices to prevent aggression. A copy of the note was also sent to the United Nations. (U.N. doc. A/4701, February 28, 1961)

/2/Document 53.

Circular telegrams sent to all other American states and Canada telling of GOA action. Press conference held earlier in afternoon gave text note to Cuba.

Musich said envoys not yet named but those under consideration of highest calibre.

Musich instructed by President to emphasize to Embassy GOA had not referred to contents or accusations in Cuba note and in reply had merely repeated Roa's words, i.e., "interponer sus amistosos oficios en la busqueda de formulas que puedan resolver o aliviarla."

When questioned as to why GOA had decided this course Musich said it based on:

- (1) GOA concern that Cuban situation continuing be disturbing influence relations other Latin American states with US;
- (2) Solution must be one which will eliminate Soviet and Communist influence Cuba as well as stop exportation Cuban revolution without arousing leftist elements in hemisphere;
- (3) Other countries of hemisphere who have offered mediate have done so because of own internal problems, Argentina not in this class.
- (4) As President Frondizi had explained Schlesinger, McGovern/3/ Argentina of opinion overthrow Castro by anti-Castro Cuban from US or Guatemala would probably bring about criticism which would worsen Latin American relations.

/3/George McGovern, Director of Food for Peace and Special Assistant to the President, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., led a Food for Peace mission to Argentina, February 12-16. They met with President Frondizi on February 15. (Telegram 944 from Buenos Aires, February 16; Department of State, Central Files, 800.03/2-1661)

Hoyt pointed out action seems be change from statements made by Taboada to American Ambassador. Embtel 989/4/ and from reply to Chiriboga is that GOA action would seem have effect placing problem as one between US-Cuba rather than hemisphere problem which it is. Musich denied this GOA intent and reiterated banalities re desire be helpful.

/4/Telegram 989 from Buenos Aires, February 28, summarized a conversation between Ambassador Rubottom and Foreign Minister Taboada in which the problem posed by Cuba was discussed as engaging the concern of the

entire hemisphere. (Ibid., 303/2-2861)

Also pointed out to Musich Cuba had refused receive committee established by San Jose Conference/5/ and also refused any airing of problem despite US reiterated willingness have charges fully investigated. Hoyt pointed out US had not asked special envoy and in view fact committee created by San Jose available to study question Cuba not sure what attitude US would take toward unsolicited offer send envoy who would seem superfluous as long as committee available. Expressed regret we had not been consulted before action taken.

/5/Reference is to the Ad Hoc Good Offices Committee established on August 29, 1960, at the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics at San Jose, Costa Rica. The committee was composed of representatives of the Governments of Venezuela, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Costa Rica, and was directed to facilitate the settlement of controversies between American states and report to the Council of the Organization of American States. For text of final act of the seventh meeting, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 219-221.

Musich confirmed Amoedo finds situation in Cuba deteriorating. Hoyt then asked him whether it not evident Cuba note sent in desperation and action such as advocated by GOA would only help prolong his existence and hurt action anti-Castro Cuban groups. Musich just brushed question aside.

Comment: This apparently attempt by Argentina retain position leadership Latin America and take any play on Cuba away from Brazil. Furthermore, despite denials it has anything do with Argentina internal situation, it obvious this very definitely involved and that Placios Triumph and UCRI defeats last two elections in mind. May be indication Frondizi belief he can now use Cuban situation to political advantage, or that he at least unwilling permit too sharp a contrast in public eyes between GOA and apparent emerging Brazilian position. Emphasizes increasing importance influence Musich who states was with President and Foreign Minister until 4 a.m. today working out this action.

Rubottom

53. Telegram From Foreign Minister Taboada to Secretary of State Rusk

Buenos Aires, March 4, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3-1761. No classification marking. The telegram was sent in Spanish via commercial telegraph channels. The source text is a translation prepared by the Department of State Division of Language Services.

Mr. Secretary: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I have replied today to the note of February 23 received from Dr. Raul Roa,/1/ Minister of Foreign Relations of Cuba. In my reply I said that the Government of the Argentine Republic, once more confirming its unvarying determination to promote the best relations between states, is prepared to use its good offices to seek formulas to resolve or alleviate the state of tension caused by the worsening of relations between the United States of America and Cuba. To that end, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the Argentine Republic has considered the advisability of appointing a special envoy to the Government of the United States of America and another representative of the same character to the Government of Cuba. This possibility has also been made known to His Excellency Raul Roa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in my reply to the above-mentioned note.

/1/See footnote 1, Document 52.

May God keep Your Excellency

Diogenes Taboada

54. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, March 10, 1961.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 3, Vol. 4, Ch. 3. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. A handwritten note on the source text, in an unknown hand, indicates that this paper was used to brief Director of Central Intelligence Dulles for a meeting with the President.

STATUS OF EFFORTS TO FORM A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF CUBA

1. Late in February 1961, at the covert instigation of the Agency, six leading figures of the Cuban opposition met in New York City for the purpose of (a) agreeing to a procedure for the purpose of electing a Revolutionary Council which would subsequently become the provisional government of Cuba and (b) drawing up a minimal political-social and economic program which would spell out the basic political philosophy of that government. These six Cuban leaders were:

Manuel "Tony" Varona: (Center-Autentico-Party-FRD Member)

Manuel Artime: (Left of Center-MRR-FRD Member)

Justo Carrillo: (Left-Montecristi-FRD Member)

Manuel Ray: (Left-MRP)

Raul Chibas: (Left-MRP)

Felipe Pazos: (Left-MRP)

2. While the six men named above do not represent the broad political spectrum from left to right, and thus do not represent all the Cuban political opposition, they nonetheless do represent sectors of the opposition now in militant opposition to Castro. Moreover they are figures who enjoy good reputations and respect inside and outside of Cuba; but being in politics they are also controversial.

3. Following several days of deliberation this informal Committee of Six came up with the following formula for the election of a chairman of the Revolutionary Council. First, they agreed upon six candidates for the chairmanship. These are:

Dr. Felipe Pazos: (MRP-Left)

Dr. Justo Carrillo: (Montecristi-Left)

Dr. Jose Miro Cardona: (Independent-Center)

Dr. Carlos Hevia: (Independent-Right Center)

Judge Emilio Menendez: (Independent-Supreme Court Judge)

Manuel "Tony" Varona: (Autentico-Center)

The above names are currently being circulated among the various political groups both in and out of Cuba to ascertain the degree of acceptability of these individuals as candidates for the chairmanship. In 7-10 days hence,

the Committee of Six--which may enlarge itself to eight or ten in order to embrace additional significant sectors of the opposition--will then elect a chairman (Provisional President) from this slate of six.

4. The chairman, once elected, will then appoint a minimum number of members of his council. The complete council will not be named until the government is established in Cuba. In addition to persons who have been active in exile, the full council will include a majority of persons who have fought and served in the Cuban underground and in the hills. The members of the council--which will number some 20 to 24 ministers--will have for the duration of the provisional government both legislative and executive functions.

5. The Program:

The political economic-social program upon which agreement in principle has been reached by the "Committee of Six" includes--among others--the following basic planks:

A. Overthrow of Castro and return to law and order.

B. Re-establishment of Constitution of 1940 with certain amendments.

C. Holding of general elections in eighteen months.

D. The Provisional President will be ineligible to run for elective office in first general elections.

E. Adoption of economic policies designed to increase the national income and raise the standard of living.

F. Stimulation of investments of private capital, both national and foreign, and guarantee free initiative and private ownership in its broadest concept of social function.

G. Establishment of an Agrarian Program which will give full title to the peasants and at the same time provide the former owner a fair price in duly guaranteed bonds.

H. Restore to their legitimate owners the properties seized by the Castro Government, with exception of certain public utilities and other properties which the State considers expropriable in the national interest.

I. Dissolve the Militia.

J. Amnesty for political prisoners.

K. Illegalization of the Communist Party and eradication of Communism and all anti-democratic activity.

L. Denunciation of international agreements and treaties which undermine the national sovereignty and place the peace and security of the hemisphere in danger. Immediate resumption of traditional relations with the democratic countries of the world and the fulfillment of legitimate international pacts.

6. The foregoing was approved by the Berle task force on 7 March.

7. It is anticipated that within approximately 7 days a provisional Cuban government, in the form of a Revolutionary Council, will be formed. Hopefully it will merit the confidence and respect of the Cuban people and other peoples and governments of the hemisphere; it will be pledged to carry out a political, economic and social program which will hold forth to the people of Cuba the hope of a better future.

55. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy

Washington, March 10, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1961. Confidential.

SUBJECT

Cuba

I very much hope that your Saturday/1/ meeting will consider the problem of launching a comprehensive campaign to acquaint the hemisphere with the facts of the Castro situation. Such a campaign would seem an indispensable preliminary to any hard decisions on Cuba.

/1/March 11. See Document 59.

The recent willingness of liberal leaders, like Betancourt of Venezuela and Haya de la Torre of Peru, to condemn the Castro regime suggests that the time is ripe for a propaganda counter-offensive. A number of Latin Americans urged on me the importance of getting people to understand what has really happened in Cuba.

The campaign should consider the possibility of utilizing a variety of media through the hemisphere to make some sober points about the Castro regime--its Communist character, its provision of facilities to the USSR, its refusal to cooperate with the OAS, its intervention in the internal affairs of other republics, etc.

You might want to put together a group to look into this. I would suggest Berle, Murrow, Mann, Goodwin and myself.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

56. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara

JCSM-146-61

Washington, March 10, 1961.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret; Limited Distribution.

SUBJECT

Evaluation of the CIA Cuban Volunteer Task Force (S)

1. JCSM-57-61, dated 3 February 1961,/1/ which forwarded the conclusions of the Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba, pointed up the desirability for the conduct of an independent evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force and detailed analysis of logistics plans by a team of Army, Naval and Air Force officers if practicable without danger of compromise of the Plan.

/1/Document 35.

2. At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 February 1961, the Director of Central Intelligence concurred and requested that such an evaluation be conducted.

3. The report by the inspection team is attached as an Appendix hereto.

a. The conclusions contained in paragraphs 6 through 10 of the report are generally valid. In view of the odds for achieving surprise as expressed in paragraph 10 of the report, CIA should investigate means for improving the security and cover for movement of the Task Force. If this investigation reveals that appreciable improvement in security is not practicable, then the chances of success of the CIA Para-Military Plan should be reevaluated.

b. Implementation of the recommendation contained in paragraph 12 of the report would give more assurance of surprise. However, there are serious drawbacks to a totally airborne operation in these particular circumstances. Any damage to the airstrip or crash of an aircraft on the strip would probably hinder operations for a considerable period of time. This would be particularly serious since no alternate strip is available. Also, if only one Cuban combat plane escapes destruction and interdicts the field, the operation would be seriously handicapped. Therefore, it is not believed that the increased surprise achieved outweighs the risk of possible failure.

4. Based upon a general review of the military portion of the plan, an evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the forces, and an analysis of the logistics plans, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that, from a military standpoint, since the small invasion force will retain the initiative until the location of the landing is determined the plan could be expected to achieve initial success. Ultimate success will depend on the extent to which the initial assault serves as a catalyst for further action on the part of anti-Castro elements throughout Cuba.

5. It is recommended that:

a. The Secretary of Defense support the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in paragraph 4 above.

b. A decision with respect to the employment of this task force be made at the earliest practicable date in order to initiate final preparation and training.

c. A military instructor, experienced in operational logistics, be assigned to the training unit immediately for the final phase of training.

d. The views expressed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, and the recommendation contained in subparagraph c above, be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence, together with three copies of the report in the Appendix hereto, for his information and consideration.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment

EVALUATION OF CIA TASK FORCE

The Problem

1. To inspect the Cuban Volunteer Force in order to evaluate its military effectiveness and determine the adequacy of its logistic support.

Factors Bearing on the Problem

2. Approval of paragraph 1-p of JCSM 57-61, 3 February 1961 required an evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force and a detailed analysis of logistic plans.
3. The evaluation team left CONUS 24 February, spent two days in the training area, and returned to CONUS 27 February 1961.
4. For additional factors, see:
 - a. Enclosure "A" for air factors.
 - b. Enclosure "B" for ground factors.
 - c. Enclosure "C" for logistic factors.

Discussion

5. a. See Enclosure "A" for a discussion of the military effectiveness of the Cuban Volunteer Air Force.
- b. See Enclosure "B" for a discussion of the tactical training of the ground element and its capability to carry out its contemplated mission.
- c. See Enclosure "C" for a discussion of the adequacy of logistic support for Cuban Volunteer Forces relative to the assigned mission.

Conclusions

6. By 15 March 1961 the aircrews and support elements of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force will have achieved adequate military effectiveness to permit accomplishment of the air mission.
7. By 15 March 1961, the ground element of the task force will have achieved adequate military effectiveness to permit it to successfully carry out its mission.
8. The Cuban Volunteer Force is not able to sustain itself logistically for an extended operation. There is a marginal capability of operating for a period of thirty days with the present logistic organization.
9. The logistic organization is not well defined, solidly constituted, nor adequately trained. Assignment of a qualified military instructor for logistic training should increase the logistic capability to an acceptable minimum.
10. Surprise is essential to the success of the mission. However, odds against achieving surprise are believed to be about 85 to 15. Loss of surprise would likely create conditions beyond the military effectiveness of the Volunteer Cuban Force. This could lead to the destruction of part or all of the invasion force.

Recommendations

11. It is recommended that a decision to use this force against Castro be made at the earliest practicable date in order to permit final preparation and training to be initiated.
12. It is recommended that serious consideration be given to airlifting the troops of the invasion force, rather than continuing with the amphibious operation, except as it might be used as a cover, and for major logistic support.
13. It is recommended that a military instructor experienced in operational logistics be assigned to the training

unit immediately for the final phase of training.

Air Evaluator--Lt Col B.W. Tarwater, USAF/2/

Ground Evaluator--Col J.R. Wright, USA

Logistic Evaluator--Lt Col R.B. Wall, USMC

/2/Printed from a copy on which all the evaluators' names are typed.

Enclosure "A"

EVALUATION OF AIR ELEMENT CIA TASK FORCE

The Problem

1. To evaluate the military effectiveness of the Cuban Volunteer Air Force.

Factors Bearing on the Problem

2. Facts--The Cuban Volunteer Air Force has:

- a. 16 B-26 pilots, 9 of these have between 1800 and 11,500 hours total flying time, with between 76 hours and 33 minutes, and 99 hours 25 minutes training in the B-26 at Retalhuleu. Each of these pilots has flown approximately 20 strafing sorties, fired 16, 5 inch rockets and dropped 30 bombs--15 skip and 15 glide. The other 7 B-26 pilots have between 1200 and 6000 hours total flying time, with between 20 hours and 10 minutes, and 48 hours and 45 minutes training in the B-26 at Retalhuleu. Each of these 7 pilots has flown approximately 5 strafing sorties, fired 6, 5 inch rockets, and dropped 9 bombs--3 skip and 6 glide.
- b. They have 16 navigator-co-pilots for the B-26s with Loran and low level navigation qualifications.
- c. They have 7 crews trained in the C-46, and 8 crews trained in the C-54.
- d. Nine of the sixteen B-26 crews, three of the C-46 crews, and five of the C-54 crews have flown missions over Cuba from Retalhuleu. As far as is known all these crews successfully reached the assigned drop zones.
- e. Except for one ride with a Cuban pilot on a strafing, rocket firing, and bombing mission, evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the aircrews is based on second hand reports.
- f. All Americans and Cubans queried as to the operational effectiveness of the aircrews agreed that it was definitely adequate to accomplish the assigned mission.
- g. The Volunteer Air Force at Retalhuleu has an overall in-commission rate of approximately 92%.
- h. The para-drop personnel at Retalhuleu are daily successfully preparing para-drops.
- i. The armorers at Retalhuleu are daily successfully arming B-26 aircraft for strafing, rocket, and bombing training.
- j. There are adequate support personnel, aircraft, aircraft parts, P.O.L. and munitions on hand, on the way, or on order, to permit mission accomplishment. (See the Appendix for additional Facts Bearing on the Problem.)

3. Assumptions--on which CIA bases its current plan:

- a. The air strikes will be conducted with the benefit of surprise.
- b. The combat aircraft of the Cuban Air Force will probably be located on three, and not more than six airfields.
- c. Intelligence estimates indicating very poor Cuban air defense capabilities are accurate.
- d. The anti-aircraft gunners will continue to be required to receive permission from their headquarters in Havana before firing on unidentified aircraft.
- e. The B-26 missions will be flown from Puerto Cabezas.

4. Assumption--of the evaluator:

- a. As indicated by personnel in charge of the air operation:

(1) Simulated strikes against an airfield with dispersed aircraft, and a maximum effort refueling and rearming exercise, will be conducted by the B-26 crews during the first week in March, and any apparent weaknesses which may develop will be eliminated.

(2) After the B-26s have moved to Puerto Cabezas nine B-26s will be simultaneously refueled and rearmed in minimum time, and any apparent weaknesses which may develop will be eliminated.

- b. As indicated by personnel in charge of the air operation they will have adequate runway clearing equipment available during the air operation.

c. As indicated by personnel in charge, the operation will be conducted during the dry season, or a shelter will be built for the preparation and loading of the para-drops, and pierced steel planking will be provided to assure all weather parking for the aircraft.

Discussion

5. Due to operational and scheduled training requirements it was impossible to observe the Volunteer Cuban Air Force in simulated tactical operations as requested. Consequently, with the exception of one ride with a Cuban pilot on a strafing, rocket firing, and bombing mission, the evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the aircrews is based on an examination of personnel and training records, and conversations with Cuban and American personnel.

6. In evaluating the military effectiveness of the aircrews the following factors were considered:

- a. The pre-flight procedures, air work, gunnery, rocketry, bombing, and emergency procedures of the Cuban pilot, with whom the evaluator flew, were outstanding.

b. The Cuban pilots have much more total time than the average US pilot that went into combat in World War II.

c. Nine of the B-26 pilots have had between 76 and 100 hours in flying, navigation, and gunnery training in the B-26 at Retalhuleu; and the other seven B-26 pilots have received between 20 and 48 hours in flying, navigation, and gunnery at Retalhuleu, and also have more total time than the average US pilot that went into combat in World War II; and henceforth the seven pilots with the least training will be given priority in B-26 training at Retalhuleu until their time in the B-26 equals that of the first nine B-26 pilots.

d. All of the sixteen B-26 navigator-co-pilots are former pilots and have received Loran and low level navigation training at Retalhuleu.

e. The B-26 crews will participate in simulated tactical operations during the first week in March. Any weaknesses which may become apparent will be eliminated.

f. All Cubans and Americans queried as to the operational effectiveness of the aircrews agreed that it was definitely adequate to accomplish the assigned mission.

g. Nine of the sixteen B-26 crews, three of the C-46 crews, and five of the C-54 crews have flown missions over Cuba from Retalhuleu. As far as is known all of these crews successfully reached their assigned drop zones.

h. Aircrew effectiveness can be most realistically evaluated when measured against the mission requirements. The primary mission requirement of the Cuban Volunteer Air Force is the destruction of Castro's combat aircraft. The airstrikes against these aircraft are being planned on the basis of the assumption that surprise will be achieved. As a consequence, Castro's combat aircraft will remain based almost entirely upon three airfields, with possibly a few on three other airfields. Furthermore, with the benefit of surprise the numerous anti-aircraft guns at these six airfields, and other primary targets, will not be used against the initial strike, since Castro's anti-aircraft gunners are under orders not to fire on any aircraft without permission from their Headquarters in Havana. The rest of the air mission includes air strikes against 4 communication centers, destruction of interdiction targets, and other targets that may develop just prior to or during the invasion. Air drops and logistic support on an emergency basis will also be provided by the Volunteer Cuban Air Force.

i. In addition to the Cuban aircrews listed above, 6 American B-26 pilots, with between 3 to 6000 hours total time each, and combat time in World War II or Korea or both, will be given refresher training in the B-26 and used in the initial air strikes. One of the American pilots will be used in the strikes against each of the six airfields on which Castro's combat aircraft are based.

7. On the basis of the factors listed above it is logical to conclude that the aircrews of the Volunteer Air Force have sufficient military effectiveness to achieve the mission requirements.

8. Inasmuch as:

a. The volunteer Air Force at Retalhuleu has an overall in-commission rate of 92%.

b. The para-drop personnel at Retalhuleu are daily successfully preparing para-drops.

c. The armorers at Retalhuleu are daily successfully arming B-26 aircraft for strafing, rocket and bombing training.

d. There are adequate personnel, aircraft, aircraft parts, P.O.L., and munitions on hand, enroute, or on order to permit mission accomplishment. (See the Appendix) In view of the factors listed above, it is concluded that the maintenance, armament, para-drop, and supply capability of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force is adequate to promote military effectiveness to the extent necessary for mission accomplishment.

9. Based on an understanding of Castro's and the USSR's vital concern in maintaining Castro in power, first hand observations of security conditions at both Retalhuleu and Puerto Cabezas, and conversations with people assigned at both bases, it is concluded that the odds are about 85 to 15 against surprise being achieved in the attack against Castro's Cuba. If surprise is not achieved, it is most likely that the air mission will fail. As a consequence, one or more of Castro's combat aircraft will likely be available for use against the invasion force, and an aircraft armed with 50 caliber machine guns could sink all or most of the invasion force.

10. The reasons for believing that the odds are about 85 to 15 against surprise being achieved are as follows:

- a. With a communist infiltrated town approximately one mile from the airfield, and a railroad on one side of the base and a highway on the other, and trees surrounding the entire base, all providing a constant opportunity for observation of activities at Retalhuleu, it is believed the Castro-communists will know when the main invasion force is airlifted from Retalhuleu to Puerto Cabezas over a period of three nights.
- b. The airfield at Puerto Cabezas is presently being developed as the primary strike base. A tent city has been erected off one end of the main runway with adequate facilities for approximately 160 men. Plastic bags are being filled with aviation gas and placed on parking areas off the main runway. The airfield, which is three miles from the town of Puerto Cabezas, has been placed off limits and is guarded by 60 of President Somoza's best troops, thereby alerting anyone interested that something unusual is happening at the airfield. Furthermore, several commercial flights arrive daily on this same airstrip, and 50 Nicaraguans from the town of Puerto Cabezas are employed in readying the strike base; and of course they return to their homes in town each night. The docks from which the troops will move into ships for transport to Cuba are three miles from the airfield via a road which runs along the town. So again, in view of Castro-communist interest in maintaining Castro in power, it seems likely that they are aware of the present activities at Puerto Cabezas, and will know when the main invasion force goes aboard the ships for their two day trip to Cuba. Knowing this, it then becomes a not too difficult submarine or air search problem, or both, to determine where and when the force will land. Furthermore, once the main force boards the ships, and it becomes obvious the force is on its way, Castro's combat aircraft could be scattered from the six primary airfields, and the anti-aircraft crews alerted, and orders given to shoot unidentified aircraft on sight. These two actions, as well as others that could be taken, could create conditions beyond the military effectiveness of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force. This in turn could lead to the destruction of part or all of the invasion force.

11. A cursory consideration of some of the major factors concerned indicates that the troops of the invasion force could be air rather than amphibious lifted. This would reduce the time necessary to transport the invasion force from Guatemala to Cuba from five days to one day--thereby increasing the chances of achieving surprise by a factor of five to one.

12. Consequently, it's believed serious consideration should be given to airlifting the troops of the invasion force, rather than continuing with the amphibious operation, except as it might be used as a cover, and for major logistic support.

Conclusions

13. If the assumption of surprise is correct, and intelligence estimates of Castro's air defense capabilities are correct, by 15 March 1961 the aircrews and support elements of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force will have achieved adequate military effectiveness to permit accomplishment of the air mission.

14. The odds against achieving surprise however, are believed to be about 85 to 15. Loss of surprise would likely create conditions beyond the military effectiveness of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force. This could lead to the destruction of part or all of the invasion force.

Recommendations

15. It is recommended that serious consideration be given to airlifting the troops of the invasion force, rather than continuing with the amphibious operation, except as it might be used as a cover, and for major logistic support.

Air Evaluator--Lt Col B.W. Tarwater, USAF

Enclosure "B"

EVALUATION OF GROUND ELEMENT CIA TASK FORCE

The Problem

1. To evaluate the tactical training of the ground element of the task force and to estimate its capability to carry out its contemplated mission.

Facts Bearing on the Problem

2. For facts bearing on the problem, see Appendix "A".

Discussion

3. For discussion, see Appendix "B".

Conclusions

4. Based on observations and conversations with trainer personnel on the spot, it is believed that the ground element of this task force has been properly trained to successfully carry out its mission with the exceptions noted below.
5. Additional tactical training is required in defensive operations, coordination, preparation of defensive positions, and counter-attack. These matters are scheduled to be included in the future programmed training.
6. An early decision to proceed with this operation is imperative. The point of no return has been passed and a decision to abandon the scheme is untenable. In the event such a decision should be made, a revolt within the assembled force would probably occur with dire consequences both for the US trainer personnel and for US interests abroad.

Recommendations

7. It is recommended that a decision to proceed with the operation be made at the earliest practicable date.

Ground Evaluator--Colonel J.R. Wright, USA

Appendix "A"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. Length of service of personnel:
 - a. Varies--few days to 8 months.
 - b. Includes former members of the Cuban Constitutional Army, Rebel Army, militia, and personnel with no previous training.
2. Organization:
 - a. Brig. Hq. (116) and 4 rifle battalions (varies 109-162). T/O for each Bn 150. 1st Bn--parachutists (145).

b. Hv. Gun Bn (104) incl. 4.2 mort., 75 mm recoilless rifles (6-4.2 mort., 3 each RR).

c. Tank Bn (25) now training at Ft. Knox.

3. Training:

a. Guerrilla Opns--by civilian contract pers.

b. Basic military training--some by own personnel, remainder by Special Forces Teams.

c. 40 days at 16 hours per day supervised--additional on own time.

d. Airborne--Physical conditioning, 4 & 8 ft. platform, mock door, harness (chute) control, at least 3 jumps--jumpmaster at least 5 jumps.

e. Infiltration course--day and night--all pers.

f. Reaction course--all personnel.

g. Close combat, unarmed defense--all personnel.

h. Maps and compass--incl. night compass course.

i. Raids, ambushes, patrolling--day and night.

j. Weapons--familiarization firing on all weapons--cross training--field firing exercise.

k. Battalion and Brigade staff procedures and tactical operations including infantry--tank team theory, but no practical work--organization and conduct of the defense.

l. Demolitions and field fortifications.

m. Bayonet training.

n. Communications--nets and procedure.

o. Approximately 25% of all training conducted at night.

p. Physical conditioning stressed in all training.

q. Forward air controllers trained to mark targets and call in air strike, communications adequate.

r. Unit training through battalion (company) completed. Brigade (battalion) level training in progress. Will include simulated beach landings on terrain similar to objective area.

4. Observed Training:

a. Brigade (battalion) in attack;

(1) Included drop of parachute battalion (company) air support (2 B-26), simulated supporting fires by 4.2" and 81 mm mortar sections--blank ammo used.

(2) Use of terrain--good--covered routes used.

(3) Control--fair.

(4) Leadership--good.

(5) Reorganization on objective--good.

(6) Organization of position--good.

b. Battalion (company) in attack;

(1) Live ammunition used in pre-set problem.

(2) Demolition charges used to simulate incoming fire.

(3) Supporting weapons fired live overhead--fire on objective.

(4) Tactics were restricted due to nature of area.

(5) Use of weapons--good to excellent.

(6) Fire and maneuver--excellent.

(7) Evacuation of casualties--good.

(8) Control--excellent.

(9) Physical fitness--superior.

(10) Morale--superior.

c. Firing demonstration--Heavy Gun Battalion;

(1) Included 4.2" mortars, 81 mm mortars, 75 mm recoilless rifles and .50 cal MG.

(2) Accuracy--excellent.

(3) Control--excellent.

(4) Condition of equipment--superior.

(5) Immediate action--excellent.

d. Individual Training;

(1) Mechanical training, cal 30 light MG, M1917A1, Reaction course, field demolitions.

(2) Instructor personnel--good--used interpreters to communicate with trainees.

(3) Effectiveness of instruction--good--interest was high--almost all practical work.

5. Equipment:

- a. There are no shortages of equipment which adversely effect training except proper maps of the local area.
- b. Minor shortages in T/O&E are enroute to area and are arriving as rapidly as air lift permits.
- c. Equipment is well cared for and when all enroute is received will be adequate for contemplated mission.
- d. Communications equipment is partly military and partly commercial. These are 72 PRC-10's, 10 PE-33's, and 10 TP-1's used for tactical communications within the Brigade. Equipment is in excellent condition and all in working order. There is an adequate supply of batteries on hand.
- e. Parachutes are repacked in the area by well qualified riggers. There have been no chute failures to date.
- f. 5-M41 light tanks are at Ft. Knox where the tank unit is currently undergoing training. It was reported that driver training was completed and gunnery training was beginning.

6. Future Training Programmed:

- a. Brigade exercises;
 - (1) Brigade in attack--2 ea of 2 days duration.
 - (2) Brigade in defense--2 ea of 2 days duration.
 - (3) Simulated beach landing--5 ea--1 day exercises.
- b. Brigade march--35 miles cross-country to beach and return--2 days each way.
- c. Final shakedown, rehabilitation of equipment, repair and testing of weapons--7 days.

Appendix "B"

DISCUSSION

- 1. Individuals observed demonstrated a high degree of competence, considering the quality of personnel and the amount of time that they have been in training.
- 2. All personnel observed demonstrated excellent physical condition, high morale, and an apparent desire to get on with the job.
- 3. The leadership appears to be good. Leaders have been carefully selected and replaced when required by personnel who exhibited better potential than those originally selected. There have been very few leaders replaced in the course of the training. None of the leaders appears to harbor any personal political ambitions, nor a burning desire to make the service a career after the operation is completed.
- 4. All personnel can fire their weapons effectively, can and do maintain them properly, and are cross-trained on other weapons. Most of them have already fired more rounds than the average US soldier would fire in a two-year term of service.
- 5. The greatest problem facing the Brigade is the long confinement to the area which, while not now an immediate problem, could lead to a breakdown of discipline and control if prolonged or if the incentive which

binds them together is removed.

6. Personnel appear eager to learn and it was reported that they devote long hours outside of training time to study and practice.

7. The quality of the personnel is amazing. College graduates with degrees in engineering are employed in the FDC as computers. All forward observers and their radio operators are qualified to adjust the fire of the mortars. Most of the personnel are young, generally from 18 to 31 years of age, and come from the middle class. There are a few older men in camp, but they are not favored and if they can't keep up are returned to Miami.

8. Security

a. Every effort has been made to keep this operation secret, but it is obvious that many people in the area are aware of what is going on. Although all troop movements are made at night, firing, explosions, aircraft orbiting over an objective area, parachute drops, and an abnormal number of unfamiliar aircraft in the area are a dead giveaway. A clandestine radio transmitter is known to be operating in the Retalhuleu area. The mayor of Retalhuleu is a card-carrying communist and lives about a mile from the airstrip. Leaflets have been circulated in Guatemala City by the Communist Party giving many of the details of the activity. Although there are some inaccuracies in this material, much of it is accurate. It can therefore be presumed that Castro knows practically all about the operation except when, where, and in what strength.

b. There have been some cases of AWOL among the trainees. At the time of our visit, a group of eight including one company (platoon) commander was missing. On Saturday night, a group of 21 men left the camp and went into a small village nearby to attend a fiesta. By Sunday noon, 19 of this group had returned. Obviously, the presence of Cubans in fairly large groups is known to the people in the area.

Enclosure "C"

EVALUATION OF THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THECIA TASK FORCE

1. The Problem

a. The purpose of this inspection was to evaluate the adequacy of logistic support for Cuban Volunteer Forces relative to the assigned mission.

2. Factors Bearing on the Problem

a. Cuban Volunteer Forces are now in a field bivouac situation while conducting training operations.

b. There are no personnel in the training area either in the Special Forces instruction group or within the Cuban Volunteer Forces who are qualified to instruct in operational logistics.

c. Minimal training of Motor Transport drivers is being conducted due to political considerations.

d. No formal training in operational logistics is being conducted.

e. Aerial delivery equipment and capabilities are adequate for emergency air resupply requirements.

f. No significant shortages of equipment and material were evident. Items not in the training area were described by instructor personnel as being in the backlog of material in CONUS. There were no means by which the inspecting officer could verify this assertion.

3. Discussion

- a. Cuban Volunteer Forces are now in a field bivouac situation. Supply operations within the bivouac area are satisfactory. Supply support from CONUS to the training area is by air. Recent inclement weather caused a backlog of supplies to build up in CONUS. Planes did not fly to the training area for over one week. Airlift has been resumed, however supplies delivered from backlog stocks are not responsive to immediate needs. It appears that planes are loaded with material available and receiving units are unaware of items delivered until they open boxes after delivery. No action was being taken to designate priorities since all items were so considered. There was a lack of logistic coordination in this instance.
- b. Personnel are receiving limited logistic training due to the on-the-job situation in bivouac. Preparation of meals, break-down and issue of supplies, and repair and maintenance of equipment are being conducted in camp. No training is being conducted in the amphibious aspects of logistics. No shore party organization has been formed nor is training being conducted in shore party operations. No training is being conducted in the assault aspects of logistics to include: establishment and operation of supply point, inventory control, movement and distribution of supplies to deployed units, or field messing operations. The logistic concept of instructor personnel was that tonnages of supplies could be deposited in the objective area and units could help themselves to fulfill their requirements.
- c. The motor transport officer is receiving adequate training in convoy and general operational procedures. Local laws require that vehicles be operated by citizens of that country or by instructor personnel. Cuban Volunteer Force Motor Transport drivers receive no training in night and blackout driving. Actual driver training is extremely limited. In view of the complicated process of backing vehicles over sand and beach matting in to LCU's, this deficiency is considered of major importance.
- d. Facilities in the training area for the preparation and packaging of supplies for air drop were inspected. The capability is adequate for operations of an emergency resupply nature. Delivery is limited to parachute delivery or air landing of supplies.
- e. The medical organization of the force is well organized and equipped. The planning and procedures to be employed during the operation are simple, clear, concrete, and appear to be understood by all personnel involved. Equipment is adequate, clean, well cared for and properly packed. Personnel appear competent and adequate.
- f. Service functions are adequate. Enough trained personnel are available to perform the second and limited third echelon maintenance required. Tools and equipment are adequate.
- g. Clothing, weapons, individual, and organizational equipment are in good condition and well cared for. Vehicles utilized in the training area will be replaced for the operation. Rough terrain and maximum utilization have resulted in inordinate wear to tie-rods, springs, and various organic parts of the vehicles. This is understandable since the vehicles are standard, commercial types and are being utilized under field conditions.
- h. Morale appears excellent. There was some indication in remarks made by individuals that they were anxious to enter the objective area. Instructors indicated anxiety over the fact that delay in definitely indicating D-day would result in deterioration of morale. Many troops have been confined within the camp area on a rigorous training schedule for six months or more and are living under austere conditions. Their primary incentive is the prospect of moving to the objective area.
- i. A decision as to whether or not the operation will take place is necessary in the near future due to the impending rainy season. It is considered that operations during the rainy season would present unsurmountable difficulties in view of the limited equipment available. Logistic requirements for the shipment of supplies by railroad to POE; loading and sailing time for ships; etc., necessitate approximately a three-week leadtime. The

estimation of time involved was provided by CIA since they are handling shipping arrangements.

4. Conclusions

- a. The Cuban Volunteer Force is not presently able to sustain itself logistically for an extended operation. It has a marginal capability of operating for a period of thirty days with its present logistic organization.
- b. The logistic organization within the Cuban Volunteer Force is not well defined, solidly constituted, nor adequately trained. It needs emphasis to provide a cohesive, effective logistic support capability.
- c. It is imperative that an instructor experienced in operational logistics be provided to the training unit at the earliest practicable date.
- d. An organized shore party unit needs to be formed and trained as soon as possible.
- e. More vigorous action is needed in training motor transport drivers to handle vehicles. This could be partially accomplished by night operations within the camp areas.
- f. The Cuban Volunteer Force is adequately supported medically for operational functions well in excess of 30 days.
- g. The service capabilities of the Cuban Volunteer Force are adequate for the operation.

5. Action Recommended

- a. That a military instructor experienced in operational logistics be assigned to the training unit as soon as practicable.

Logistic Evaluator--Lt Col R.B. Wall, USMC

57. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara

JCSM-149-61 Washington, March 10, 1961.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret.

SUBJECT

Evaluation of Proposed Supplementary Phase, CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba (S)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have evaluated the military aspects of a supplementary phase to the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba, which is being proposed by the CIA to meet certain Department of State objections to the basic plan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff military evaluation of the basic plan was forwarded to you by JCSM-57-61, subject: "Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba," dated 3 February 1961./1/

/1/Document 35.

2. The details of the proposed supplementary phase to the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba, are set forth in the Appendix hereto.

3. The conclusions of the evaluation of the military aspects of the proposed supplementary phase are as follows:

- a. The selected objective area and the landing beach are suitable and adequate for the proposed operation.
- b. In the time available the company can be assembled, organized, and reasonably well trained to accomplish its mission.
- c. The company can be transported to and landed in the objective area.
- d. The concept of the plan and the known or expected location of Cuban military forces indicate that surprise should be achieved and that the landing will be unopposed.
- e. The company will have the capability to protect the provisional government representation and to sustain itself ashore for a minimum of three to four days and will have a good chance of sustaining itself indefinitely.
- f. The proposed operation can be supported logistically.

4. It is recommended that:

- a. The Secretary of Defense support the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in the above conclusions.
- b. The views expressed in the above conclusions be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for his information.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix

DETAILS OF PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTARY PHASE TO THE CIA PARA-MILITARY PLAN, CUBA

- 1. The purpose of this supplementary phase is to land an element of the provisional government and a Cuban volunteer infantry company of 162 men, in a separate objective area in Cuba prior to the implementation of the basic plan.
- 2. To accomplish this, CIA proposes to take the following measures:
 - a. Move 130 of the Cuban volunteers currently recruited in the Miami area to *[1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]* to join a cadre of 32 Cuban para-military trained personnel *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*. These 162 volunteers will be organized into a company and receive concentrated training by a cadre of US Army Special Forces personnel, from those currently assigned in Guatemala, for a period of approximately 12 days. The cadre of 32 para-military personnel have received approximately 9 months guerrilla training in Panama as action teams. Some of the 130 recruits have had previous military training.
 - b. This company will be equipped with small arms, mortars, and 57 mm recoilless rifles.
 - c. The company, with the provisional government representation, will be loaded *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* on a 1500 ton Cuban commercial ship presently under contract to CIA and transported to the

objective area. At the objective area, the landing will be effected at night by using four outboard motor fishing craft transported by the merchant ship. This landing will be made 24-48 hours prior to the implementation of the basic plan. After the main landing has been made this company will continue to act as guerrillas in support of the main effort.

d. The company will be provided with communications equipment for contact with CIA base and aircraft.

e. The CIA plan envisions the company moving onto the high ground approximately two miles from the beach where it will provide protection for the provisional government representation.

f. Plan calls for utilization of airdrop for logistic support.

3. The Cuban provisional government in the US will announce through news media the establishment of provisional government representation ashore in Cuba. The implementation of the CIA propaganda plan will immediately follow.

4. The basic para-military plan, details of which are set forth in the staff study, subject: "Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba," dated 3 February 1961, will then be implemented. To give the Task Force an increased capability a fifth infantry company is currently being organized in Guatemala. This company will have the mission of performing basic logistic tasks and constitute a reserve element for the Task Force.

58. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, March 11, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Material, 1961. Top Secret. A copy of this paper in CIA files indicates that it was drafted by Bissell for the March 11 meeting with President Kennedy. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 5, Area Activity-Cuba)

PROPOSED OPERATION AGAINST CUBA

1. Status of Preparatory Action: About a year ago the Agency was directed to set in motion: the organization of a broadly-based opposition to the Castro regime; a major propaganda campaign; support for both peaceful and violent resistance activities in Cuba; and the development of trained paramilitary ground and air forces of Cuban volunteers.

A decision should shortly be made as to the future of these activities and the employment or disposition of assets that have been created. The status of the more important activities is as follows:

a. Political: Over a period of nearly a year, the FRD (Frente Revolucionario Democrático), which was created in the hope that it would become the organizational embodiment of a unified opposition to Castro, has proved to be highly useful as a cover and administrative mechanism but important political elements refused to join it.

Accordingly, a major effort was undertaken three weeks ago to form a more broadly-based revolutionary council which would include the FRD, and which could lead to the setting up of a provisional government. Considerable progress has been made in negotiations with the principal Cuban leaders in which great efforts have been made to permit the Cubans to chart their own course. It is expected that the desired result will be accomplished shortly. What is emerging from these negotiations is a provisional government with a center to left-of-center political orientation, and a political platform embodying most of the originally stated goals of the 26 July movement. It is believed that this will command the support of a very large majority of anti-Castro Cubans although it will not be altogether acceptable to the more conservative groups.

b. Military: The following paramilitary forces have been recruited and trained and will shortly be in an advanced state of readiness.

(1) A reinforced battalion with a present strength of 850 which will be brought up to a strength of approximately 1,000 through the addition of one more infantry company to be used primarily for logistic purposes and as a reserve.

(2) A briefly trained paramilitary force of approximately 160 intended to be used for a diversionary night landing to be undertaken in advance of commitment of the battalion.

(3) An air force of 16 B-26 light bombers, 10 C-54s and 5 C-46s.

(4) Shipping including 2 1000-ton ships, 5 1500-ton ships, 2 LCIs, 3 LCU's and 4 LCV's.

A JCS team recently inspected the battalion and the air force at their bases in Guatemala. Their findings led them to conclude that these forces could be combat-ready by 1 April. Certain deficiencies were indicated that are in progress of correction partly by further training and partly by the recruitment of the additional infantry company referred to above.

c. Timing: It will be infeasible to hold all these forces together beyond early April. They are in large part volunteers, some of whom have been in hard training, quartered in austere facilities for as much as six months. Their motivation for action is high but their morale cannot be maintained if their commitment to action is long delayed. The onset of the rainy season in Guatemala in April would greatly accentuate this problem and the Guatemalan Government is in any event unwilling to have them remain in the country beyond early April. The rainy season in Cuba would also make their landing on the island more difficult.

2. The Situation in Cuba: We estimate that time is against us. The Castro regime is steadily consolidating its control over Cuba. In the absence of greatly increased external pressure or action, it will continue to do so regardless of declining popular support as the machinery of authoritarian control becomes increasingly effective.

a. The regime is proceeding methodically to solidify its control over all the major institutions of the society and to employ them on the Communist pattern as instruments of repression. The Government now directly controls all radio, television, and the press. It has placed politically dependable leadership in labor unions, student groups, and professional organizations. It has nationalized most productive and financial enterprises and is using a program of so-called land reform to exercise effective control over the peasantry. It has destroyed all political parties except the Communist party. Politically reliable and increasingly effective internal security and military forces are being built up.

b. There is still much active opposition in Cuba. It is estimated that there are some 1200 active guerrillas and another thousand individuals engaging in various acts of conspiracy and sabotage, the tempo of which has been rising in recent weeks. Nevertheless, the government has shown considerable skill in espionage and counter-espionage. It is making good use of the militia against guerrilla activities and the infiltration of people and hardware. The militia is relatively untrained and there is evidence that its morale is low but the government is able to use very large numbers against small groups of guerrillas and is able to exercise surveillance of suspicious activities throughout the island. Short of some shock that will disorganize or bring about the defection of significant parts of the militia, it must be anticipated that violent opposition of all kinds will gradually be suppressed.

c. At the present time the regular Cuban military establishment, especially the Navy and Air Force, are of extremely low effectiveness. Within the next few months, however, it is expected that Cuba will begin to take delivery of jet aircraft and will begin to have available trained and well indoctrinated Cuban pilots. During the

same period the effectiveness of ground forces will be increasing and their knowledge of newly acquired Soviet weapons will improve. Therefore, after some date, probably no more than six months away it will probably become militarily infeasible to overthrow the Castro regime except through the commitment to combat of a more sizable organized military force than can be recruited from among the Cuban exiles.

3. Possible Courses of Action: Four alternative courses of action involving the commitment of the paramilitary force described above are discussed in succeeding paragraphs. They are:

- a. Employment of the paramilitary force in a manner which would minimize the appearance of an invasion of Cuba from the outside.
- b. Commitment of the paramilitary force in a surprise landing with tactical air support, the installation under its protection on Cuban soil of the opposition government and either the rapid spread of the revolt or the continuation of large scale guerrilla action in terrain suited for that purpose.
- c. Commitment of the paramilitary force in two successive operations: First, the landing of one company without air support in a remote area in which it could sustain itself for some days (hopefully indefinitely), and second, the landing of the main force forty-eight hours later in a widely different location in the same manner as in paragraph 3.b. above.
- d. Commitment of the whole force in an inaccessible region where it would be expected to keep control of a beachhead for a long period of time to permit installation and recognition of a provisional government and a gradual build-up of military strength.

4. Covert Landing of the Paramilitary Forces: Careful study has been given to the possibility of infiltrating the paramilitary forces in a night amphibious landing, using man-portable equipment and weapons and taking ashore only such supplies as can be carried by the troops. The force would move immediately in-land to the mountains and commence operations as a powerful guerrilla force relying entirely upon continuing air logistical support. Shipping would retire from the coast before dawn and no tactical air operations would be conducted. Unfortunately, it is believed that such an operation would involve unacceptable military risks.

- a. The paramilitary force would run the risk of becoming completely disorganized and scattered in a night landing. (Such an operation is very difficult for even highly trained forces experienced in amphibious operations.)
- b. The force would not have motor transport, heavy mortar, 75 mm recoiling rifles, heavy machine guns, nor tanks. Initial ammunition and food supplies would be limited and it would be wholly dependent on air logistical support. If the rainy season commences in April, overcast conditions could prevent effective support. Casualties could not be evacuated.
- c. Since tactical aircraft would not participate, the objective area could not be isolated; enemy forces could move against the beachhead unimpeded. The Castro Air Force would be left intact.

5. A Landing in Full Force: This operation would involve an amphibious/airborne assault with concurrent (but no prior) tactical air support, to seize a beachhead contiguous to terrain suitable for guerrilla operations. The provisional government would land as soon as the beachhead had been secured. If initial military operations were successful and especially if there were evidence of spreading disaffection against the Castro regime, the provisional government could be recognized and a legal basis provided for at least non-governmental logistic support.

- a. The military plan contemplates the holding of a perimeter around the beachhead area. It is believed that initial attacks by the Castro militia, even if conducted in considerable force, could be repulsed with substantial loss to the attacking forces. The scale of the operation and the display of professional competence and of determination

on the part of the assault force would, it is hoped, demoralize the militia and induce defections therefrom, impair the morale of the Castro regime, and induce widespread rebellion. If the initial actions proved to be unsuccessful in thus detonating a major revolt, the assault force would retreat to the contiguous mountain area and continue operations as a powerful guerrilla force.

b. This course of action has a better chance than any other of leading to the prompt overthrow of the Castro regime because it holds the possibility of administering a demoralizing shock.

c. If this operation were not successful in setting off widespread revolt, freedom of action of the U.S. would be preserved because there is an alternative outcome which would neither require U.S. intervention nor constitute a serious defeat; i.e., guerrilla action could be continued on a sizable scale in favorable terrain. This would be a means of exerting continuing pressure on the regime.

6. A Diversionary Landing: As a variant of the above plan, it would be feasible to conduct a diversionary landing with a force of about 160 men in an inaccessible area as a prelude to a landing of the main assault force. The initial operation would be conducted at night without tactical air support. At least a part of the provisional government would go in with the diversionary landing and presumably the establishment of the provisional government on Cuban soil would thereupon be announced. The subsequent landing of the main assault force would be carried out as outlined in paragraph 5 preceding.

a. This course of action might have certain political advantages in that the initial action in the campaign would be of a character that could plausibly have been carried out by the Cubans with little outside help.

b. There would be a military advantage in that the diversionary landing would distract attention and possibly divide some enemy forces from the objective area for the main assault. If reports had reached the Castro government that troops trained in Guatemala were on the move, the diversionary landing might well be taken to be the main attack, thus enhancing the element of surprise for the main assault force. These advantages would be counterbalanced by the diversion of troops otherwise supporting the main unit.

7. Landing and Slow Build-up: Under this fourth alternative the whole paramilitary force could carry out a landing and seize a beachhead in the most remote and inaccessible terrain on the island with intent to hold indefinitely an area thus protected by geography against prompt or well-supported attacks from the land. This would permit the installation there of the provisional government, its recognition by the U.S. after a decent interval, and (if needed) a long period of build-up during which additional volunteers and military supplies would be moved into the beachhead.

a. A major political advantage of this course of action would be that the initial assault might be conducted in such a way as to involve less display of relatively advanced weaponry and of professional military organization than the landing in force discussed above, especially so as there is every likelihood that the initial landing would be virtually unopposed by land forces. Recognition could provide a suitable political and legal basis for a protracted build-up after the initial assault.

b. Such an operation would, however, require tactical air support sufficient to destroy or neutralize the Castro Air Force. If this were not provided concurrently with the landing, it would be needed soon thereafter in order to permit ships to operate into the beachhead and the planned build-up to go forward. If the initial landing could include seizure of an air strip, the necessary air support could fairly soon be provided from within the territory controlled by friendly forces. There is, however, no location which both contains a usable airstrip and is so difficult of access by land as to permit protection of a slow build-up.

c. This type of operation by the very fact of being clandestine in nature and remote geographically would have far less initial impact politically and militarily than courses two or three.

8. Conclusions:

- a. The Castro regime will not fall of its own weight. In the absence of external action against it, the gradual weakening of internal Cuban opposition must be expected.
- b. Within a matter of months the capabilities of Castro's military forces will probably increase to such a degree that the overthrow of his regime, from within or without the country, by the Cuban opposition will be most unlikely.
- c. The Cuban paramilitary force if effectively used has a good chance of overthrowing Castro, or of causing a damaging civil war, without the necessity for the United States to commit itself to overt action against Cuba.
- d. Among the alternative courses of action here reviewed, an assault in force preceded by a diversionary landing offers the best chance of achieving the desired result.

59. Editorial Note

According to summary notes prepared by General Gray, a meeting was convened at the White House on March 11, 1961, to discuss preparations for the Trinidad operation, as outlined in the paper prepared in the CIA on March 11. (Document 58) The President's appointment book indicates that the meeting took place at 10:05 a.m. and lasted until 12:15 p.m. The meeting was attended by Vice President Johnson, McNamara, Rusk, Mann, Berle, Dulles, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, Gray, and Colonel B.W. Tarwater. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book) Although not listed in the appointment book, Bissell called the meeting and no doubt attended and made the presentation for the CIA. According to Gray's notes on the meeting:

"At a meeting with the President, CIA presented a paper which summarized preparations to date for the Trinidad operation. After full discussion, the President stated that he was willing to take the chance of going ahead; that he could not endorse a plan that put us in so openly, in view of the world situation. He directed the development of a plan where US assistance would be less obvious and would like to meet again within the next few days." (Summary notes prepared on May 9, 1961; *ibid.*, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

The meeting with the President was preceded by a meeting of Bissell, Rusk, Mann, and Berle. Mann arranged the meeting between Bissell and Department of State officials after Rusk discovered that the meeting with the President to discuss the Trinidad operation had been called at Bissell's request without prior knowledge of or discussion with Department officials. Rusk felt that the CIA was attempting to bypass the Department of State, and he was assured by McGeorge Bundy that coordination of the planning for the operation rested with the Task Force on Latin America, under Berle. (Memorandum from Executive Secretary Lucius D. Battle to Rusk, March 9; Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3-961)

60. National Security Action Memorandum No. 31

Washington, March 11, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, National Security Action Memoranda, NSAMs #26-#50. Top Secret.

Memorandum of Discussion on Cuba, March 11, 1961

The President directed that the following actions be taken:

1. Every effort should be made to assist patriotic Cubans in forming a new and strong political organization, and

in conjunction with this effort a maximum amount of publicity buildup should be sought for the emerging political leaders of this organization, especially those who may be active participants in a military campaign of liberation. Action: Central Intelligence Agency.

2. The United States Government must have ready a white paper on Cuba, and should also be ready to give appropriate assistance to Cuban patriots in a similar effort. Action: Arthur Schlesinger in cooperation with the Department of State.

3. The Department of State will present recommendations with respect to a demarche in the Organization of American States, looking toward a united demand for prompt free elections in Cuba, with appropriate safeguards and opportunity for all patriotic Cubans. Action: Department of State.

4. The President expects to authorize U.S. support for an appropriate number of patriotic Cubans to return to their homeland. He believes that the best possible plan, from the point of view of combined military, political and psychological considerations, has not yet been presented, and new proposals are to be concerted promptly. Action: Central Intelligence Agency, with appropriate consultation.

McGeorge Bundy



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963
Volume X
Cuba, 1961-1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

Cuba, 1961-1962

61. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, March 15, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Material, 1961. Top Secret. A copy of this paper in CIA files indicates it was drafted by Bissell. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 5, Area Activity-Cuba)

REVISED CUBAN OPERATION

1. Political Requirements: The plan for a Cuban operation and the variants thereof presented on 11 March were considered to be politically objectionable on the ground that the contemplated operation would not have the appearance of an infiltration of guerrillas in support of an internal revolution but rather that of a small-scale World War II type of amphibious assault. In undertaking to develop alternative plans and to judge their political acceptability, it has been necessary to infer from the comments made on the earlier plan the characteristics which a new plan should possess in order to be politically acceptable. They would appear to be the following:

a. An Unspectacular Landing: The initial landing should be as unspectacular as possible and should have neither immediately prior nor concurrent tactical air support. It should conform as closely as possible to the typical pattern of the landings of small groups intended to establish themselves or to join others in terrain suited for guerrilla operations. In the absence of air support and in order to fit the pattern, it should probably be at night.

b. A Base for Tactical Air Operations: It was emphasized that ultimate success of the operation will require tactical air operations leading to the establishment of the control of the air over Cuba. In order to fit the pattern of revolution, these operations should be conducted from an air base within territory held by opposition forces. Since it is impracticable to undertake construction of an air base in the rainy season and before any air support is available, the territory seized in the original landing must include an air strip that can support tactical operations.

c. Slower Tempo: The operation should be so designed that there could be an appreciable period of build up after the initial landing before major offensive action was undertaken. This would allow for a minimum decent interval between the establishment and the recognition by the U.S. of a provisional government and would fit more closely the pattern of a typical revolution.

d. Guerrilla Warfare Alternative: Ideally, the terrain should not only be protected by geography against prompt or well-supported attack from land but also suitable for guerrilla warfare in the event that an organized perimeter could not be held.

2. Alternative Areas: Five different areas, three of them on the mainland of Cuba and two on islands off the

coast, were studied carefully to determine whether they would permit an operation fitting the above conditions. One of the areas appears to be eminently suited for the operation. All the others had to be rejected either because of unfavorable geography (notably the absence of a suitable air strip) or heavy concentrations of enemy forces, or both. The area selected is located at the head of a well protected deep water estuary on the south coast of Cuba. It is almost surrounded by swamps impenetrable to infantry in any numbers and entirely impenetrable to vehicles, except along two narrow and easily defended approaches. Although strategically isolated by these terrain features, the area is near the center of the island and the presence of an opposition force there will soon become known to the entire population of Cuba and constitute a serious threat to the regime. The beachhead area contains one and possibly two air strips adequate to handle B-26's. There are several good landing beaches. It is of interest that this area has been the scene of resistance activities and of outright guerrilla warfare for over a hundred years.

3. Phases of the Operation:

a. The operation will begin with a night landing. There are no known enemy forces (even police) in the objective area and it is anticipated that the landing can be carried out with few if any casualties and with no serious combat. As many supplies as possible will be unloaded over the beaches but the ships will put to sea in time to be well offshore by dawn. The whole beachhead area including the air strips will be immediately occupied and approach routes defended. No tanks will be brought ashore in the initial landing. It is believed that this operation can be accomplished quite unobtrusively and that the Castro regime will have little idea of the size of the force involved.

b. The second phase, preferably commencing at dawn following the landing, will involve the movement into the beachhead of tactical aircraft and their prompt commitment for strikes against the Castro Air Force. Concurrently C-46's will move in with gas in drums, minimal maintenance equipment, and maintenance personnel. As rapidly as possible, the whole tactical air operation will be based in the beachhead but initially only enough aircraft will be based there plausibly to account for all observable activity over the island.

c. In the third phase, as soon as there is adequate protection for shipping from enemy air attack, ships will move back into the beach to discharge supplies and equipment (including tanks). It must be presumed that counter attacks against the beachhead will be undertaken within 24 to 48 hours of the landing but the perimeter can easily be held against attacks along the most direct approach routes. The terrain may well prevent any sizable attacks (providing the enemy air force has been rendered ineffective) until the opposition force is ready to attempt to break out of the beachhead.

d. The timing and direction of such offensive action will depend upon the course of events in the island. At least three directions of break out are possible. Because of the canalization of the approaches to the beachhead from the interior, a break out will require close support by tactical air to be successful unless enemy forces are thoroughly disorganized. The opposition force will have the option, however, of undertaking an amphibious assault with tactical air support against a different objective area if it should seem desirable.

4. Political Action: The beachhead area proposed to be occupied is both large enough and safe enough so that it should be entirely feasible to install the provisional government there as soon as aircraft can land safely. Once installed, the tempo of the operation will permit the U.S. Government to extend recognition after a decent interval and thus to prepare the way for more open and more extensive logistical support if this should be necessary.

5. Military Advantages:

a. This is a safer military operation than the daylight landing in force originally proposed. The landing itself is more likely to be unopposed or very lightly opposed and the beachhead perimeter could be more easily held.

b. There are no known communications facilities in the immediate target area. This circumstance, coupled with the plan for a night landing, increases the chance of achieving surprise.

c. By comparison with any of the known inaccessible parts of the Oriente Province the objective area is closer to rear bases for air and sea logistical support.

d. The plan has the disadvantage that the build up of force can be only gradual since there is virtually no local population from which to recruit additional troops and volunteers from other parts of Cuba will be able to infiltrate into the area only gradually.

6. Political Acceptability: The proposal here outlined fits the three conditions stated in paragraph 1 above for the political acceptability of a paramilitary operation. The landing is unspectacular; no tactical air support will be provided until an air base of sorts is active within the beachhead area; the tempo of the operation is as desired; and the terrain is such as to minimize the risk of defeat and maximize the options open to the opposition force.

a. It may be objected that the undertaking of tactical air operations so promptly after the landing is inconsistent with the pattern of a revolution. But most Latin American revolutions in recent years have used aircraft and it is only natural that they would be used in this case as soon as the opposition had secured control of an air strip. Wherever in the island a paramilitary operation is attempted and whatever its tempo, command of the air will sooner or later have to be established, and aircraft will have to be flown into a beachhead to enable this to be done. Sooner or later, then, it is bound to be revealed that the opposition in Cuba has friends outside who are able and willing to supply it with obsolescent combat aircraft. This revelation will be neither surprising nor out of keeping with traditional practice.

b. An alternative way to handle this problem would be to make a few strafing runs against the Castro Air Force some days before the landing and apparently as an opposition act unrelated to any other military moves.

7. Conclusion: The operation here outlined, despite the revision of concept to meet the political requirements stated above, will still have a political cost. The study over the past several months of many possible paramilitary operations makes perfectly clear, however, that it is impossible to introduce into Cuba and commit to action military resources that will have a good chance of setting in motion the overthrow of the regime without paying some price in terms of accusations by the Communists and possible criticism by others. It is believed that the plan here outlined goes as far as possible in the direction of minimizing the political cost without impairing its soundness and chance of success as a military operation. The alternative would appear to be the demobilization of the paramilitary force and the return of its members to the United States. It is, of course, well understood that this course of action too involves certain risks.

62. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara

JCSM-166-61

Washington, March 15, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Top Secret. According to a memorandum for the record prepared by General Gray on May 4, Gray briefed the Joint Chiefs for 20 minutes on March 15 on the three concepts outlined in JCSM-166-61. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT

Evaluation of the Military Aspects of Alternate Concepts, CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba (S)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have evaluated the military aspects of three alternate concepts for the CIA

Para-Military plan for action to effect the overthrow of the Castro Government. The military evaluation of the basic plan was forwarded to you by JCSM-57-61, subject: "Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba", dated 3 February 1961./1/ and the evaluation of the proposed supplementary phase to the basic plan was forwarded to you by JCSM-149-61, subject: "Evaluation of Proposed Supplementary Phase, CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba", dated 10 March 1961./2/

/1/Document 35.

/2/Document 57.

2. The following CIA alternate concepts of operations were evaluated:

- a. Alternative I--Original para-military plan, except main landings at night, without benefit of airborne landing or air strikes. See Appendix A hereto for details and evaluation.
- b. Alternative II--At an objective area on NE coast, employment of airborne company at evening nautical twilight to seize key terrain features astride two separate roads leading into objective area to isolate same; this followed by night debarkation of remainder of Task Force; shipping then departs area prior to daylight; aircraft initiate air operations from airstrip within objective area following day. See Appendix B hereto for details and evaluation.
- c. Alternative III--At an objective area on the southern coast, amphibious landing of two infantry companies after dark to seize key areas; during the night, land remainder of Task Force; shipping then departs area prior to daylight; aircraft initiate air operations from the airstrips the following day. See Appendix C hereto for details and evaluation.

3. The conclusions of the evaluation of the military aspects of the three alternative concepts are as follows:

- a. Alternative I--Without the psychological impact of the original concept, together with the difficulties of landing at night in this area and the lack of ability to initiate air operations, the ultimate success of Alternative I is doubtful.
- b. Alternative II--Even though the Cuban Volunteer Force could be landed and sustained for a minimum of 3 days, the distance from the seat of government, together with the problem of continuous resupply over long distances, causes this course of action to be least likely to accomplish the objective.
- c. Alternative III has all the prerequisites necessary to successfully establish the Cuban Voluntary Task Force, including air elements, in the objective area and sustain itself with outside logistic support for several weeks; however, inaccessibility of the area may limit the support anticipated from the Cuban populace.
- d. Of the alternative concepts, Alternative III is considered the most feasible and the most likely to accomplish the objective.
- e. None of the alternative concepts are considered as feasible and likely to accomplish the objective as the basic para-military plan.

4. It is recommended that:

- a. The Secretary of Defense support the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in the above conclusions.
- b. The views expressed in the above conclusions be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence, together with three copies of the Appendices hereto, for his information and consideration.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer/3/

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.

Appendix A

Evaluation of the Military Aspects of the Original CIA Paramilitary Plan for Cuba: With the Changes That the Amphibious Landing Will Be Made at Night, Without Benefit of the Airborne Assault, or Air Strikes

1. The concept of the plan is as follows: Following a deception landing on the night of D-1 the Task Force, accompanied by provisional government representation, will invade at night by amphibious landing on the selected beaches. The force will immediately move around the city to occupy the high ground which dominates the objective area. At dawn control of the beachhead area will be established by seizing and organizing four strong points on key terrain along the perimeter which dominates entrance routes into the area. Contact will be established with guerrilla bands in the general area of operations. The small airstrip will be cleared. Every effort will be made to increase the force by local volunteers for which arms will be provided. The force will establish control within the beachhead area and if driven therefrom, will be prepared to withdraw and link with guerrilla forces to continue guerrilla activities.

2. The enemy forces, terrain, beaches, man-made installations and populace, remain the same as set forth in the original plan; the time and space factors remain the same with the exceptions that:

a. The amphibious landing will be made at night;

b. Immediately upon landing, the force will move around the city to occupy the high ground which dominates the city. Then at dawn they will move out to seize and organize the strong points on key terrain as originally planned;

c. The airborne assault and the air strikes will not be conducted.

3. a. Advantages

(1) The force will move ashore at night, increasing the possibility of achieving tactical surprise.

(2) The landing will be near a mountainous region in the event the force is unable to maintain its lodgement, and it becomes necessary to move out of the beachhead area and conduct guerrilla operations.

(3) The landing area is relatively near the seat of government, thereby making it potentially possible to move upon the ultimate objective area in a relatively short period of time.

(4) Large numbers of the populace in the landing area are believed to be antagonistic to Castro's regime.

(5) The beachhead area is considered to be the best area in Cuba for the accomplishment of the Task Force mission.

b. Disadvantages:

(1) The airstrip is inadequate for B-26 operations.

(2) Without benefit of air operations, elements of Castro's Air Force would be available for use against the force. These aircraft could make it impossible for the force to hold a lodgement in the beachhead area, or virtually any fixed or exposed position, thereby forcing the volunteers to move into the mountains as a guerrilla force almost immediately.

(3) It will be difficult for a force inexperienced in amphibious operations to locate and use the narrow landing beaches at night.

4. Conclusions:

a. Despite the disadvantages enumerated above, this concept would provide a fair chance of success in landing and seizing initial objectives.

b. The lack of air support and the difficulties of supply at night, or under possible air attack if attempted in daylight, indicate small chance of ultimate success for this concept.

Appendix B

Concept of Operation for an Alternate Proposal To Land on the Eastern End of the Island To Accomplish Objectives of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba

1. The concept of operation for landing on the Eastern end of the Island envisages the employment of an airborne company to land during the hours of darkness on D-Day to seize a landing pier in the area together with key terrain features astride two separate roads leading into the area. During the night of D-Day, ships transporting the remainder of the Cuban Volunteer Task Force will dock alongside the landing pier, discharge the personnel and supplies and depart the area prior to daylight. Units of the Task Force will proceed inland, seize an airfield, other strategic terrain features, and establish contact with the Airborne Company to assure protection of the lodgement area.

2. One company of the Cuban military forces is located in the objective area and probably patrols the area. The closest known Cuban Army units which could be used as reinforcements are, one Infantry Battalion and one Field Artillery Battalion located 35 miles away. These units probably could not be assembled and moved to the area in less than 24 hours due to limited transportation available and condition of the roads over which they must travel.

3. The objective area consists of rolling terrain adjacent to the shoreline and backed by swamp lands which extend inland. The terrain features and vegetation can provide adequate protection and concealment for the landing force. Water approaches to the landing pier are protected from the open sea by extensions of land on either side and depth of water will accept all shipping available to the Task Force. However, negotiation of the channels at night will be difficult.

a. There are two improved roads leading into the area; however, connection between them consists of unimproved roads and trails. Absence of a well developed road net combined with the swampy terrain will hamper movement of large military forces.

b. An airfield is located 1.5 miles Southeast of the proposed landing area. Its description is as follows:

Runway dimensions 4000'x120'

Surface construction is asphalt and oiled sand

The field will accept C-47 type aircraft

Runway extensibility, 11,000 ft.

Operations capabilities are negligible and the field can only be classified as a good all-weather emergency strip.

c. Adjacent to the landing pier is a village with approximate population of 18,000. The rural area adjacent thereto is underdeveloped and sparsely populated. Attitude of the local populace toward the Castro Government is not known, however, due to the remoteness of the area it may be assumed that a neutral attitude would prevail during the initial phases of the operation.

4. Conclusions

a. The selected objective area, drop zones and landing piers are suitable and adequate for the proposed operation.

b. The known or expected location of Cuban Military Forces indicates that complete surprise may not be attained.

c. Operational capabilities of the airfield in the area are negligible and can be classified as only a good all weather emergency strip.

d. Given the opportunity to seize its proposed objectives, the Task Force will have the capability to sustain itself without resupply for a minimum of 3 days.

e. A landing in this area would be so far removed from the seat of Government it is doubtful that the desired psychological effect on the Cuban people would be attained.

f. If the Task Force is required to abandon its primary mission, evacuation by sea could probably be accomplished or elements of the force could continue to operate as guerrilla units in the area. The mountainous area approximately 10 miles inland is considered suitable for guerrilla operations.

g. This operation would be difficult to support from a logistic standpoint.

h. The disadvantages outweigh the advantages of this proposed course of action.

Appendix C

Concept of an Alternate Proposal To Land on an Objective Area on the Southern Coast

1. Concept: Under cover of darkness, two companies will land over the two beaches at the head of the bay, rapidly move inland, seize their assigned objectives, and prepare to defend them. A small combat outpost will be landed on the east side of the entrance to the bay to provide warning and block the coast road from the east. A combat outpost will be established to close the road across the swamp to the west of the landing beaches. The remaining four companies will be landed prior to dawn and will proceed to their assigned objectives. All boats will withdraw to sea and be clear of the area prior to daylight. At daylight, B-26 aircraft will land on the seized airfield or airfields and conduct air operations from these locations immediately thereafter.

2. Enemy Forces: There are no known enemy forces in the objective area, although it is probable that militia patrols maintain surveillance over the coast road. The nearest concentration of Cuban Rebel Army forces are located at Managua, near Havana, and at Santa Clara. Rural police posts are located in the villages and towns, but their capability is limited to employment in small groups using small arms. The nearest sizable militia unit is

located at Cienfuegos, but there may be smaller militia elements as close as ten miles from the landing beaches.

3. Terrain: The terrain in the objective area is flat, swamp land covered with a dense growth of mangrove, except for a strip east of the landing beaches. This strip rises from 5 to 30 feet above mean sea level and is covered with scrub growth and high savanna grass. Entry into and exit from the area is confined to the established roads and a single track narrow gauge railroad bed. Trafficability off roads is poor except that foot troops may move with difficulty. There are approximately seven possible exits from the area to the north and west.

4. Beaches: The bay has a number of usable beaches located along the east shore, but the best are at the head of the bay. The two beaches selected are each approximately 400 yards long and have easy exits to the coast road which skirts the bay. Seaward approaches are clear and deep water extends to within a few yards of the shore. Beach gradients from available photography appear to be suitable for dry-ramp landings of personnel and light vehicles.

5. Man-Made Installations: There are two airfields in the area, one firmly packed sod strip, carried as approximately 4000 feet long and the other a newly constructed packed coral and sand strip approximately 6000 feet long. Recently it has been reported that the sod strip is being lengthened to over 6000 feet. Both strips are currently in various stages of construction. There has been considerable road building noted in this area in the past year. The coast road has been widened and resurfaced with a concrete surface. A new road has been constructed across the eastern portion of the swamp, but this road has not yet intersected the coast road. There are no roads to the west.

6. Attitude of Populace: The objective area is very sparsely settled with no towns or villages of any size. A few scattered houses, not closely grouped, comprise the only habitations in the area. The attitude of the populace vis-a-vis Castro is unknown.

7. Time and Space Factors: Due to the sparse population, tele-communications in the area are probably poor or non-existent. The area has been an historically suitable guerrilla area. Reaction time for the Cuban Rebel Armed Forces is probably greater than elsewhere on the island due to the distance to be covered, the nature of the terrain, and the relatively poor road net. However, the area is within range of suitable positions for Cuban heavy artillery (122 mm gun). Observation of fire would be restricted to aerial observation by aircraft.

8. Advantages and Disadvantages:

a. Advantages

- (1) Two probably usable airfields are in the area.
- (2) A remote and inaccessible area making reaction against the invasion force slow and difficult.
- (3) No known Cuban armed forces in the area.
- (4) Swampy terrain would prevent the use of armor against the invasion force except tank gun fire.
- (5) Defectors could join the invasion force, however with difficulty. A small band (approximately 100) of guerrillas are close to the area.
- (6) Surprise could probably be achieved if operation was carefully timed.
- (7) Relatively close to the seat of government for the resulting psychological effect on the Cuban people.

b. Disadvantages

- (1) Resupply, including food, must come from outside Cuba.
- (2) Exits from objective area could be sealed off and prevent expansion of operations.
- (3) Firm ground in area is within range of suitable heavy artillery positions.
- (4) No sizable immediate help could be expected from the local populace.
- (5) No civilian hospital facilities available.
- (6) All supply must be across the beach.

9. Conclusions:

- a. In the absence of significant enemy forces in the area, the invasion force can be landed successfully in the objective area and can be sustained in the area provided resupply of essential items is accomplished.
- b. The area meets the requirements imposed including the availability of an airfield, suitability for a clandestine landing, and possibly suitable for extending operations to cause the downfall of Castro.

63. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy

Washington, March 15, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/61-4/61. Secret.

SUBJECT

Cuba

1. Free elections statement. Tom Mann, on further consideration, has backed away from the idea of a demarche on free elections. He argues that the risk is too great that Castro might accept the challenge, stage ostensibly free elections, win by a large majority and thereafter claim popular sanction for his regime. Mann points out that a genuinely free election requires more than freedom of balloting; it requires freedom of press and assembly for some months prior to the election. Without such prior freedom from intimidation, the election itself will not be genuinely free, even with OAS supervision of the actual voting process.

I agree with this view. It does seem to me that setting up free elections as a test might give Castro an opportunity to put on a show and recover prestige.

2. White Paper. I am at work on a White Paper on Cuba. I wonder, however, whether we should not consider issuing at the same time a White Paper on the Dominican Republic. This would emphasize the fact that our opposition is to dictatorship in principle and not just to dictatorships which expropriate US business. Tom Mann agrees that it might be a good idea to issue a simultaneous White Paper on the Dominican Republic.

If you agree, let me know, and I will get someone at State to start putting the material together.

Cuban policy. I thought your response to the proposals submitted last Saturday/1/ was absolutely right. The trouble with the operation is that the less the military risk, the greater the political risk, and vice versa. It seems to me that the utilization of the men under conditions of minimum political risk is clearly the thing to aim at.

/1/March 11. See Document 59.

I had the impression that the military aspects of the problem had received more thoughtful attention than the political aspects. It did not seem to me that the political risks had been adequately assessed or that convincing plans had been laid to minimize them. For example, it was not clear that anyone had thought through the question of our public response if the operation should be undertaken. Do we take the public position that it is a spontaneous Cuban enterprise? Do you say in your press conference, for example, that the US had nothing to do with it? Do we swear this in the United Nations? What happens then when Castro produces a couple of prisoners who testify that they were armed, trained and briefed by Americans? Do we continue to deny this? or change our original story?

It would seem to me absolutely essential to work out in advance a consistent line which can hold for every conceivable contingency. Otherwise we will find ourselves in a new U-2 imbroglio, with the government either changing its story midstream or else clinging to a position which the rest of the world will regard as a lie.

I should add that there seems to me a slight danger of our being rushed into something because CIA has on its hands a band of people it doesn't quite know what to do with. When you were out of the room, Allen Dulles said, "Don't forget that we have a disposal problem. If we have to take these men out of Guatemala, we will have to transfer them to the US, and we can't have them wandering around the country telling everyone what they have been doing." Obviously this is a genuine problem, but it can't be permitted to govern US policy.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

64. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, March 15, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/61-4/61. Top Secret.

SUBJECT

Meeting on Cuba, 4:00 PM, March 15, 1961

CIA will present a revised plan for the Cuban operation./1/ They have done a remarkable job of reframing the landing plan so as to make it unspectacular and quiet, and plausibly Cuban in its essentials.

/1/See Documents 65 and 66.

The one major problem which remains is the air battle. I think there is unanimous agreement that at some stage the Castro Air Force must be removed. It is a very sketchy force, in very poor shape at the present, and Colonel Hawkins (Bissell's military brain) thinks it can be removed by six to eight simultaneous sorties of B-26s. These will be undertaken by Cuban pilots in planes with Cuban Air Force markings. This is the only really noisy enterprise that remains.

My own belief is that this air battle has to come sooner or later, and that the longer we put it off, the harder it will be. Castro's Air Force is currently his Achilles' heel, but he is making drastic efforts to strengthen it with Russian planes and Russian-trained pilots.

Even the revised landing plan depends strongly upon prompt action against Castro's air. The question in my mind is whether we cannot solve this problem by having the air strike come some little time before the invasion. A group of patriotic airplanes flying from Nicaraguan bases might knock out Castro's Air Force in a single day

without anyone knowing (for some time) where they came from, and with nothing to prove that it was not an interior rebellion by the Cuban Air Force, which has been of very doubtful loyalty in the past; the pilots will in fact be members of the Cuban Air Force who went into the opposition some time ago. Then the invasion could come as a separate enterprise, and neither the air strike nor the quiet landing of patriots would in itself give Castro anything to take to the United Nations.

I have been a skeptic about Bissell's operation, but now I think we are on the edge of a good answer. I also think that Bissell and Hawkins have done an honorable job of meeting the proper criticisms and cautions of the Department of State.

McGeorge Bundy/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

65. Editorial Note

According to summary notes prepared by General Gray, CIA officials returned to the White House on March 15, 1961, to present a revised plan for the operation against Cuba; see Document 64. The President's appointment book indicates that the meeting took place from 4:30 to 5:45 p.m. The meeting was attended by Vice President Johnson, McNamara, Rusk, Mann, Berle, Dulles, Bissell, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, and Gray. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book) Although not listed in the appointment book, it is likely that at least one member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, probably General Lemnitzer or Admiral Burke, also attended. According to Gray's notes on the meeting:

"At this meeting the Zapata plan was presented to the President and a full-length discussion of it followed. The President expressed the belief that uprisings all along the island would be better than to concentrate and strike. The President asked how soon it was intended to break out from this area and Mr. Bissell stated that not before about D+10. The President was also concerned about ability to extricate the forces. The President did not like the idea of the dawn landing and felt that in order to make this appear as an inside guerrilla-type operation, the ships should be clear of the area by dawn. He directed that this planning be reviewed and another meeting be held the following morning." (Summary notes prepared on May 9, 1961; Kennedy Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

66. Editorial Note

On March 16, 1961, CIA officials outlined for President Kennedy the revisions to the Zapata plan that the President had called for on the previous day. The President's appointment book indicates that the meeting took place in the White House from 4:15 to 5:23 p.m. The meeting was attended by Vice President Johnson, McNamara, Rusk, Mann, Berle, Dulles, Bissell, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, and Gray. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book) Although not listed in the appointment book, it is clear from his subsequent debriefing on the meeting that Admiral Burke also attended. According to Gray's notes on the meeting:

"At meeting with the President, CIA presented revised concepts for the landing at Zapata wherein there would be air drops at first light with the landing at night and all of the ships away from the objective area by dawn. The President decided to go ahead with the Zapata planning; to see what we could do about increasing support to the guerrillas inside the country; to interrogate one member of the force to determine what he knows; and he reserved the right to call off the plan even up to 24 hours prior to the landing." (Summary notes prepared on May 9, 1961, by General Gray; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

On March 17 Admiral Burke provided the JCS with additional details about the discussion of the revised Zapata plan. According to Burke, the President wanted to know what the consequences would be if the operation failed.

He asked Burke how he viewed the operation's chance of success. Burke indicated that he had given the President a probability figure of about 50 percent. President Kennedy also inquired what would happen if it developed after the invasion that the Cuban exile force were pinned down and being slaughtered on the beach. If they were to be re-embarked, the President wanted to know where they could be taken. According to Burke's account of the meeting: "It was decided they would not be re-embarked because there was no place to go. Once they were landed they were there." In the course of the discussion, it was emphasized that the plan was dependent on a general uprising in Cuba, and that the entire operation would fail without such an uprising. (Review of Record of Proceedings Related to Cuban Situation, May 5; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

67. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina

Washington, March 18, 1961, 11:57 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3-1861. Official Use Only. Drafted on March 17 in ARA by C.A. Boonstra and Mann. Cleared in CMA, RPA, in substance with Berle, and by Rusk.

1295. Verbatim Text. Proposed reply from Secretary to FonMin: "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's telegram of March 4/1/ concerning your reply of that date to the note of February 23 from the Minister of Foreign Relations of Cuba./2/

/1/Document 53.

/2/See footnote 1, Document 52.

The United States is pleased always to have the views of the Government of the Argentine Republic not only because of the attachment of our two governments to common principles of freedom but also because of the forthright and constructive stand which Your Excellency's Government has consistently taken in defense of constitutional democracy and spiritual and material progress of the peoples of the Americas.

I know that Your Excellency's Government shares fully with the Government of the United States the desire to see the people of Cuba advancing side by side with the peoples of all of the Americas under the banner of human dignity in a great hemisphere movement of economic development and social progress. I venture to express the belief also that Your Excellency's Government recognizes the reality of the capture of the Cuban revolution by the Sino-Soviet bloc and that its concern with respect to this development motivated Your Excellency's telegram of March 4 to me.

If the Government of Cuba should decide to separate itself, in fact as well as in theory, from the imperialistic ambitions of the Sino-Soviet bloc; if it should decide to honor, by its deeds as well as its words, its inter-American commitments and to make it possible for Cuba to regain its historic place within the inter-American family, this would indeed be a cause for deep satisfaction on the part of the Government and people of the United States. If the Government of the Argentine Republic should find it possible to determine whether the Government of Cuba is disposed to take effective steps to achieve these results, the Government of the United States, after such a determination, would be pleased to have the opportunity to discuss with Your Excellency's Government this hemisphere problem./3/

/3/The Embassy reported in telegram 1136 from Buenos Aires, March 22, that Ambassador Rubottom delivered the message transmitted in telegram 1295 to Foreign Minister Taboada. Taboada made no direct response to the Secretary's message, but stated that Argentina had not changed its attitude toward Cuba, and continued to align itself with the United States on major issues. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3-2261) The Embassy had reported earlier, in telegram 1043 from Buenos Aires, March 9, that Cuba had accepted the Argentine offer of good offices, and that the Argentine Government had released the text of the Cuban response to the press.

(Ibid., 737.00/3-961)

Accept, etc."

Rusk

68. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy

Washington, March 20, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Cuba 1961, Box 31. Secret.

1. CIA expects agreement on a selection of a Prime Minister tonight. Manuel Ray, the liberal leader, has indicated that he will back Miro Cardona, which makes the latter's selection almost certain. The group will then go ahead and pick up a cabinet.

The group may very likely make an announcement on its own almost immediately. I suggested that some liberal newspaperman, like Arnold Beichmann, be put in charge of its public relations. Everything possible ought to be done in the next few weeks to build up the status and dignity of the Government-in-exile as a functioning organization.

2. On the question of timing of the US White Paper,/1/ both Mann and Tracy Barnes (CIA) think that it should not come on the heels of the Government-in-exile. Barnes feels that the Government-in-exile must be given a little time to take root on its own. Mann feels in addition that the White Paper would constitute, in effect, a rejection of the recent Argentine demarche;/2/ the State Department has been warned that this might lead to an overthrow of the Frondizi government; so Mann would much rather delay the White Paper until there is time to compose the Argentine situation. We should have the draft in nearly final form by Friday;/3/ but release ought to be delayed, it is presently felt, until the end of the month.

/1/See Document 79.

/2/See Document 53.

/3/March 24.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr./4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

69. Memorandum From the Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) for Covert Operations (Barnes) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles

Washington, March 21, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Exiles, 1961. Secret.

SUBJECT

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Political Events

The following events and actions have occurred over the weekend and yesterday in Miami. Since the procedures have been pretty rapid-fire and since the parties of interest are moving about at the moment, there are a few

points which cannot be definitively stated:

1. A meeting was held on Saturday evening, 18 March, attended by 13 of the 15 members of the FRD (the 2 not present were Goar Mestre and Pepin Bosch) both of whom were out of town), plus 5 non-members of the FRD, i.e. Manolo Ray plus 4 other members of his MRP Party; namely, Dr. Felipe Pazos, Jorge Beruff and two brothers, Armando Lora and Raul Lora. For your information the following is the total membership of the expanded FRD with the names of the five original members underlined.

Left

Carrillo

Jesus Fernandez

(Labor, 30 Nov)

Left of center

Artime

Collada (Labor for Friginals)

Miro Cardona

Center

Varona

Rasco

Fernandez Travieso

(Student for Muller)

Alvarez Diaz

Sergio Carbo

Pepin Bosch

Right

Maceo

Vargas Gomez

Carlos Hevia

Goar Mestre

2. You will remember that it was agreed as a result of a number of meetings between Tony Varona, representing the FRD, and Manolo Ray, the principal non-FRD political leader, that the following procedure should be

adopted in the formation of an exile political government:

- a. A chairman of a revolutionary council should be selected who, in turn, would select the main membership of the council. After establishment in Cuba, such council would be transformed into a provisional government with the chairman as the president.
- b. The selection of the chairman was to be from a panel of six candidates whose names were chosen by an organization committee of six individuals agreed to by Ray and Varona. The two leading candidates were Miro Cardona and Felipe Pazos.
3. After the above Ray/Varona agreements, the Cuban exile groups swung somewhat against Ray with the result that the five-man FRD headed by Varona was expanded to fifteen members in an effort to strengthen Varona's position.
4. At our request, the enlarged FRD agreed to go ahead with the selection of a chairman of the revolutionary council and to include in this process Ray and some of his MRP Party associates. The result was the meeting of 18 Cubans referred to in para. 1 above. Our representative opened the meeting with a prepared speech urging unity, asking the Cubans to assume responsibility in this important task and requesting that a chairman be selected by Monday night, 20 March. He then left the meeting. After two long sessions, the meeting, with everyone voting, unanimously selected Miro Cardona.
5. Miro Cardona is presently on his way to New York accompanied by Tony Varona, Justo Carrillo, Arttime, all original members of the FRD; plus Manolo Ray and two of his MRP Party, Felipe Pazos and Raul Chibas. In addition, Rojas, the former Cuban Ambassador to London, is accompanying the party as interpreter. The purpose of the trip is to announce officially the election of Miro Cardona and the formation of a Revolutionary Council. Presumably all of those accompanying Miro Cardona, with the possible exception of Rojas, are members of the Council although this has not been definitively confirmed nor do we have any indication, if they are members, as to whether they have any assigned portfolio. The Miami Herald ran a small story yesterday on the proceedings but it was a pure news story and not in any sense an announcement.
6. We understand that the New York release will also include a statement of principles which is expected to be very close to the points agreed to by Ray and Varona in their talks referred above. A copy of these points is attached. You will remember that they were known to Mr. Berle's State Department Task Force and considered acceptable.

C. Tracy Barnes/1/

A/DDP/A

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Attachment

- A. Overthrow of Castro and return to law and order.
- B. Re-establishment of Constitution of 1940 with certain amendments.
- C. Holding of general elections in eighteen months.
- D. The Provisional President will be ineligible to run for elective office in first general elections.
- E. Adoption of economic policies designed to increase the national income and raise the standard of living.

F. Stimulation of investments of private capital, both national and foreign, and guarantee free initiative and private ownership in its broadest concept of social function.

G. Establishment of an Agrarian Program which will give full title to the peasants and at the same time provide the former owner a fair price in duly guaranteed bonds.

H. Restore to their legitimate owners the properties seized by the Castro Government, with exception of certain public utilities and other properties which the State considers expropriable in the national interest.

I. Dissolve the Militia.

J. Amnesty for political prisoners.

K. Illegalization of the Communist Party and eradication of Communism and all anti-democratic activity.

L. Denunciation of international agreements and treaties which undermine the national sovereignty and place the peace and security of the hemisphere in danger. Immediate resumption of traditional relations with the democratic countries of the world and the fulfillment of legitimate international pacts.

70. Memorandum From Gerald P. Lamberty of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs to the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Hurwitch)

Miami, March 22, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3-2261. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Lamberty worked in the economic section of the Embassy in Havana until it was closed in January. Thereafter, he and a number of the other members of the Embassy staff were transferred to an office of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, which was established in Miami to maintain liaison with the Cuban exile community.

SUBJECT

Miscellaneous Comments on Local Situation

A well-informed, reliable source, who would prefer to remain unnamed, passed on the following information:

1) The Cubans are up in arms about Mr. B./1/ So are some Americans. The complaints are that he is high-handed, refuses to think beyond the military phase, is impatient with economic or political problems, knows nothing about Cuba or Cubans, and speaks with a German accent. There are also complaints he plays favorites and boasts he can make or break any organization or leader.

/1/Frank Bender.

2) Artime is a growing power. Artime's rivals claim he has two main pillars of support--the Jesuits and Mr. B.

Mr. B. is supposed to like Artime because the latter talks military problems rather than political. Mr. B. is supposed to be much more interested in the military aspects of the situation, and thus prefers Artime to his more politically minded companions.

Cubans, including Varona and Miro Cardona, argue that this attitude permitted Castro and the Communists to come to power--that everyone thought that once Batista was out everything would be fine. All Cuban leaders try to explain this to Mr. B. except Artime.

One example of favoritism cited is that when Varona finally was given permission to visit the camps, Artime went along with him, while no other leaders were permitted to go.

Opponents of Artime claim he is trying to make up for his lack of a military organization or mass support by tapping the one source of Cuban manpower that is not being used--the Batistianos. These opponents say some Batistianos already have been recruited for the camps.

3) Miro Cardona was extremely elated following the meeting of March 20 which named him to head the new Revolutionary Council. Miro is quoted as saying "the meeting today will go down as one of the brilliant pages of Cuban history."

Miro said it appears that all difficulties are being ironed out within the Frente and the MRP and between the two groups and that the meeting to be held in New York will probably merely be a formality to put the final stamp on agreements which have already been reached.

Miro said agents who had just arrived from Cuba sat in on the meeting at the Frente, and brought a "vote of confidence" from the underground in the program being pursued here, and in the men who are pursuing it. They also brought a call for the exiles to hurry the attack on Castro.

Miro said "I smell something. The whole thing is coming very fast. It is jumping, not walking."

4) A writer and photographer from Life Magazine are trying to make arrangements to go into Cuba with a small guerrilla unit when the push comes. They already have brought their gear.

5) Many Cuban politicians and diplomats are going into the secret training camps for Cuban guerrillas. They are determined to carry guns in the planned attack on Castro's Cuba. Their reason is their conviction that only those who fight Castro actively, with guns will be listened to by the Cuban people after Castro is gone. Ambassador Guillermo Salazar, who represented Castro in Bern, left for camp on Monday, March 13, to serve as a medical doctor with the troops when they go into Cuba. Ambassador Sergio Rojas Santamaria, who served in London, is leaving within a few days.

71. Editorial Note

The Chronology of JCS Participation in Bumpy Road, maintained in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, indicates that the initial meeting of the inter-agency Working Group established to coordinate planning on the Zapata operation was held on March 22, 1961:

"The first meeting of the official Working Group which consisted of Gen Gray representing the DOD, Mr. Braddock representing State, and Mr. Barnes representing CIA. This group was given the responsibility by the President at the last meeting to coordinate interdepartmental planning and operations for the conduct of 'Bumpy Road.' At this meeting, Gen Gray presented a suggested outline operation plan for the agreed upon course of action. It was agreed, however, that time did not permit full implementation of a plan. However, this Working Group would draw up an agreed list of tasks to be accomplished by the agencies concerned and submit same to their bosses for approval." (Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

72. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to Secretary of Defense McNamara

CM-154-61

Washington, March 25, 1961.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT

Tasks, Para-Military Plan, Cuba

1. Recommend you approve the enclosed memorandum which sets forth the tasks to be accomplished by the Department of State, Department of Defense, and Central Intelligence Agency Representatives charged with the coordination of planning and conduct of the subject plan./1/ The memorandum includes a time schedule for the completion of tasks set forth for the Pre-D-Day Phase.

/1/According to the Chronology of JCS Participation in Bumpy Road, maintained in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, on March 28 McNamara approved the agreed list of tasks to be accomplished by the Department of Defense, as outlined in CM-154-61. (Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

2. In accordance with your desires, Brigadier General David W. Gray, USA, Chief, Subsidiary Activities Division, J-5, the Joint Staff, has been designated the DOD Representative and has been directed to keep your office informed on the status of plans and operations.

L.L. Lemnitzer/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.

Enclosure

Washington, March 23, 1961.

MEMORANDUM FOR

Secretary of State

Secretary of Defense

Director of Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT

Tasks, Para-Military Plan, Cuba

1. The Working Group assigned to work out the detailed tasks for the planning and conduct of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba, and act as members of a Central Office for the operation, has agreed upon the tasks to be accomplished by the representatives of your respective departments and agency. The tasks are set forth for three phases: Pre-D-Day Phase; D-Day and Post-D-Day Phase until Recognition; and Post-Recognition Phase.

2. The tasks for the Pre-D-Day Phase are set forth in Enclosure A hereto.

3. The tasks for the D-Day and Post-D-Day Phase until Recognition are set forth in Enclosure B hereto.

4. The tasks for the Post-Recognition Phase are set forth in Enclosure C hereto.

5. The proposed time schedule for the Pre-D-Day Phase is attached as Enclosure D hereto.

Department of State Representative

Department of Defense Representative

CIA Representative

Enclosure A

PRE-D-DAY PHASE

1. Department of State representatives will:

- a. Prepare White Paper for Presidential approval.
- b. Provide assistance to Mr. Schlesinger in preparation of material for Presidential statements.
- c. Provide Working Group with Policy Statement as to what "recognition" really means.
- d. Determine action, if any, to be taken regarding disclosures to Latin American countries--e.g.

(1) Guatemala

(2) Nicaragua

and other countries, e.g.

(1) United Kingdom

(2) France

e. Provide policy guidance for all aspects of the development of the Free Cuba Government.

f. Prepare plans for overt moral and other possible non-military support prior to recognition of the Free Cuba Government of the objectives of the Cuban Volunteer Force and of the Revolutionary Council, including possible action in the United Nations or in the Organization of American States.

g. Prepare plans for overt moral and other possible non-military support of the objectives of the Free Cuba Government when established.

h. Provide policy guidance to USIA to support this plan.

i. Prepare plan for Post-D-Day actions.

2. Department of Defense representatives will:

a. Continue to provide training and logistic support to the Cuban Volunteer Force as requested by CIA.

b. Prepare logistics plans for arms, ammunition, and equipment support beyond the capabilities of the initial CIA logistics support.

- c. Prepare plans for provision of support from operational forces as required.
 - d. Prepare letter of instruction to the Services, CINCLANT and CONAD for support of this operation.
 - e. Keep CINCLANT planners informed.
3. CIA representatives will:
- a. Establish a Central Office from which Executive Department and Agency representatives will coordinate planning and conduct operations.
 - b. Continue to supply guerrilla forces in Cuba as feasible and required.
 - c. Assist in the organization of a Free Cuba Government.
 - d. Conduct an interrogation of two or three members of the Cuban Volunteer Force to determine full extent of their knowledge of actual facts and provide information to the President as soon as possible.
 - e. Finalize detailed plans for the employment of the Volunteer Force in Cuba and follow up plans. Execute these plans on order.
 - f. Continue to recruit, train and equip the Cuban Volunteer Force.
 - g. Prepare detailed plans for establishing contact with the internal opposition, establishing such control, coordination and support of this opposition as may be desirable and feasible.
 - h. Exert effort to arrange defection of key Cuban personnel. (N.B: The defection of the military commander of the Isle of Pines, or at least officers who could control the Isle, would be particularly desirable.)
 - i. Continue detailed intelligence collection on Castro activities throughout Latin America particularly his efforts to export revolution.
 - j. Support the preparation of a White Paper to be issued by the Free Cuba Government.
 - k. Review cover plans.
 - l. Coordinate with DOD representatives logistic follow-up support requirements.
 - m. Review and implement a pre-D-Day psychological warfare plan.
 - n. Review Psychological Warfare Plan for D-Day and Post-D-Day Phase.
 - o. Intensify UW activities in Cuba.

Enclosure B

D-DAY AND POST-D-DAY PHASE UNTIL RECOGNITION

1. Department of State representatives will:
- a. Take such steps as may be feasible for the protection of U.S. citizens in Cuba.

b. Execute plans for support of the Revolutionary Council or Free Cuba Government in the United Nations or Organization of American States and to counter communist and/or Castro charges in the United Nations or Organization of American States, as appropriate.

c. Lend support to the objectives and actions of the Cuban Volunteer Force and the Free Cuba Government.

d. Revise plans as necessary for support of the Free Cuba Government.

e. Recognize Free Cuba Government as appropriate.

2. Department of Defense representatives will:

a. Provide follow-up logistic support as requested by CIA and/or in accordance with logistics plan.

b. Provide support from operational forces as directed.

c. Prepare detailed plans to support the U.S. aid plan for the Free Cuba Government for implementation when overt support is given.

d. Coordinate support by DOD agencies and commands.

3. CIA representatives will:

a. Execute and support over-all para-military plan.

b. Inform DOD representatives of logistics requirements.

c. Continue execution of psychological warfare plan.

d. Be responsible for the continuous operation of the Central Office and present briefings of the situation as required or directed.

e. Introduce representatives of the Revolutionary Council and of the Free Cuba Government into Cuba at an appropriate time.

Enclosure C

POST RECOGNITION PHASE

The Departments and the Agency will prepare, coordinate and execute, as appropriate, such contingency plans as may be required and will, moreover, plan for the resumption of their regularly assigned functions in relation to the new Cuban government.

Enclosure D

TIME SCHEDULE

1. D-14

a. Department of State Representatives:

(1) Complete White Paper for Presidential approval.

(2) Provide policy guidance for all aspects of the Free Cuba Government (continuous).

b. Department of Defense Representatives:

(1) Continue to provide training and logistic support to the Cuban Volunteer Force as requested by CIA.

c. CIA Representatives:

(1) Establish a Central Office.

(2) Continue to supply guerrilla forces in Cuba as feasible and required (continuous).

(3) Assist in organization of Free Cuba Government.

(4) Continue to train and equip the Cuban Volunteer Force.

(5) Coordinate with DOD representatives logistic follow-up support requirements (continuous).

(6) Intensify UW activities in Cuba.

2. D-11

a. Department of State Representatives:

(1) Provide assistance to Mr. Schlesinger in preparation of material for Presidential statements (continuous).

(2) Complete plans for overt moral and other possible non-military support of the objectives of the Free Cuba Government when established.

3. D-10

a. DOD Representatives:

(1) Complete letter of instruction to the Services, CINCLANT and CONAD for support of this operation.

4. D-9

a. Department of State Representatives:

(1) Provide Working Group with Policy Statement as to what "recognition" really means.

(2) Have approved policy position regarding action, if any, to be taken regarding disclosures to foreign countries.

(3) Complete plans for overt moral and other possible non-military support prior to recognition of the Free Cuba Government of the objectives of the Cuban Volunteer Force and of the Revolutionary Council, etc.

(4) Complete plans for Post-D-Day actions.

b. DOD Representatives:

(1) Complete logistics plans for DOD follow-up support.

c. CIA Representatives:

- (1) Finalize detailed plans for the employment of the Cuban Volunteer Force.
- (2) Complete detailed plans for establishing contact with the internal opposition and for establishing such control, coordination and support of this opposition as may be desirable and feasible.
- (3) Initiate effort to arrange defection of key Cuban personnel.
- (4) Complete review and implement a pre-D-Day Psychological Warfare Plan for D-Day and post-D-Day phase.
- (5) Complete review of Psychological Warfare Plan for D-Day and post-D-Day phase.

5. D-8

a. CIA Representatives:

- (1) Complete support of a White Paper to be issued by the Free Cuba Government and arrange to have that Government issue same.

6. D-7

a. CIA Representatives:

- (1) Complete review of cover plans.

7. D-6

a. CIA Representatives:

- (1) Conduct an interrogation of two or three members of the Cuban Volunteer Force to determine full extent of their knowledge of actual facts and provide information to the President as soon as possible.

8. D-5

a. DOD Representatives:

- (1) Brief CINCLANT and CONAD planners.

b. CIA Representatives:

- (1) Complete contingency plan for the disposition, if necessary, of the Cuban Volunteer Force.
- (2) Complete preparation of final briefing on entire operation.

9. D-3

a. Department of State Representatives:

- (1) Provide policy guidance to USIA to support this plan.

b. CIA Representatives:

(1) Complete detailed intelligence collection on Castro activities throughout Latin America.

10. D-2

a. DOD Representatives:

(1) Complete plans for provision of support from operational forces as required.

b. CIA Representatives:

(1) Present final briefing on entire operation (if not given prior to this date).

73. Memorandum From the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)

Norfolk, Virginia, March 28, 1961.

//Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Sensitive; Limited Distribution.

SUBJ

CIA Operation Crosspatch

REF

(a) Your memo CM-152-61 of 24 Mar 1961/1/

/1/Not found.

1. I will be prepared to execute the missions directed in enclosures A, B and C of reference (a). I will be prepared also to reinforce the Naval Base at Guantanamo with a reinforced Marine Battalion Landing Team from the Caribbean Amphibious Squadron.

2. I intend to provide at least two destroyers instead of one for the convoy. The purpose of providing two is for mutual support, defense against possible coordinated surface and air attack, and in case units of the convoy become separated.

3. The following is a summary of forces in the area and their planned employment:

a. The antisubmarine carrier *Essex* with seven destroyers is scheduled to be conducting ASW operations in the Gulf of Mexico during the period 3-18 April. About 7 April a squadron of jet aircraft will be flown aboard *Essex*. The ASW group will then proceed to an area southwest of Cuba. The convoy destroyers and combat air patrol will be provided from this group. The control of the combat air patrol may be exercised from the ships best situated and equipped at the time and as directed by the Commander of the ASW Group or *Essex*.

b. There will be 18 destroyer types conducting routine training operations in the Guantanamo area during the two week period commencing 3 April.

c. PHIBRON-2 with BLT 1/6 embarked will be operating in the area south of Guantanamo preceding a

scheduled visit to Jamaica 13 April.

d. One jet fighter or attack squadron will be conducting routine training operations in the vicinity of each of the following bases:

Guantanamo

Key West

4. I request that the JCS inform CINCNORAD of these plans in order that Florida may be protected from possible retaliatory attack.

5. There is a necessity for issuing specific "rules of engagement" orders to units involved. Therefore, with your concurrence, I intend to issue the following instructions:

a. In executing the destroyer mission a DD commanding officer will:

(1) Place his ship between the convoy and any suspicious or Cuban surface craft sighted.

(2) Warn the craft not to approach within gun range of the convoy.

(3) If the surface craft persists in closing the convoy, fire a warning shot across his bow.

(4) If he continues to close the convoy to 2000 yards or he opens fire on the convoy, open fire on him, persisting until he surrenders, retires, or is destroyed.

b. In executing the combat air patrol mission pilots and air controllers will be instructed as follows:

(1) Any unidentified aircraft approaching within radar range of the convoy and closing will be investigated.

(2) If investigation reveals the aircraft to be Cuban the investigating aircraft will make successive close passes ensuring that the Cuban aircraft is aware of his presence.

(3) If Cuban aircraft maintains course to close the convoy CAP will continue to make close passes in an attempt to divert.

(4) If Cuban aircraft insists in closing and takes position to attack the convoy it will be fired on until it retires or is destroyed.

6. It is noted that the subject of your memorandum is "CIA Operation Crosspatch." Since a number of my staff and various others in the Atlantic Command associate this code name with establishment of Swan Island radio last year it is suggested that this term not be used by DOD personnel when referring to the current operation./2/

/2/Crosspatch was the early CIA operational name for what later became known as Operation Bumpy Road. The operation codename was changed to Bumpy Road effective April 1 at the request of the Department of the Navy. (JCS 2304/26, April 1, Tab B, Annex 29, Taylor Report Part III; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)/2/

Robert L. Dennison

74. Editorial Note

On March 29, 1961, President Kennedy held a meeting at the White House at 4:15 p.m. and discussed the Zapata plan for over an hour with McGeorge Bundy, McNamara, Dulles, Bissell, Bowles, Mann, Schlesinger, and William Bundy. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book) Although not listed in the appointment book, it is clear from the notes taken at the meeting that General Lemnitzer and General Gray also attended the meeting. According to summary notes on the meeting prepared by General Gray on May 9:

"Mr. Bissell discussed the results of photo reconnaissance, the possible use of a small diversionary force of 150 and a plan to obtain key defections. The President inquired whether there had been any statements by Castro indicating knowledge of the plan and answer was in the negative. Mr. Bissell presented the plan as to the disposal of the force in the event the operation was cancelled. The general idea was to bring the force into Belle Chase, debrief them, give them leave and then reassemble those who wished to continue at some other training base. The President also questioned whether the force could fade into the brush and not look like a failure and also the possibilities of diverting the force while still at sea. Mr. Bissell indicated that if the operation failed, the force would probably have to be withdrawn. At this meeting the tentative D-Day of 5 April was postponed and the next tentative date set as 10 April. The next decision meeting was set as 4 April." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

General Lemnitzer's notes on the meeting list, under the heading of main developments, "change in timing, later at night, ships do not approach until after dark, build-up of small para-mil force--diversionary--east end," and "Cover plan. If failure--must be re-landed in Cuba." (National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, Notes, Miscellaneous Meetings, 1961)

Secretary of Defense McNamara later recalled that the President issued instructions at this meeting that prior to the invasion the brigade leaders were to be informed that U.S. strike forces would not be allowed to participate in or support the invasion in any way. McNamara wrote that Kennedy asked that the brigade leaders be queried as to whether they believed the operation would be successful with this restriction and whether they wished on that basis to proceed. McNamara recalled that the President was subsequently informed that the brigade leaders indicated that, despite the prohibition on the use of U.S. strike forces, they wished to proceed with the invasion. McNamara noted that his recollection of these details was confirmed in discussions with McGeorge Bundy and Bissell. (Notes Relating to Instructions on Bay of Pigs Invasion, February 9, 1963; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, Cuba)

75. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, March 31, 1961.

//Source: Yale University, Bowles Papers, Box 300, Mansfield, Folder 536. No classification marking.

On Tuesday, April 4th, a meeting will be held at the White House at which a decision will be reached on the Cuban adventure.

During your absence I have had an opportunity to become better acquainted with the proposal, and I find it profoundly disturbing.

Let me frankly say, however, that I am not a wholly objective judge of the practical aspects.

In considerable degree, my concern stems from a deep personal conviction that our national interests are poorly served by a covert operation of this kind at a time when our new President is effectively appealing to world opinion on the basis of high principle.

Even in our imperfect world, the differences which distinguish us from the Russians are of vital importance. This is true not only in a moral sense but in the practical effect of these differences on our capacity to rally the

non-Communist world in behalf of our traditional democratic objectives.

In saying this, I do not overlook the ruthless nature of the struggle in which we are involved, nor do I ignore the need on occasion for action which is expedient and distasteful. Yet I cannot persuade myself that means can be wholly divorced from ends--even within the context of the Cold War.

Against this background, let me suggest several points which I earnestly hope will be fully taken into account in reaching the final decision.

1. In sponsoring the Cuban operation, for instance, we would be deliberately violating the fundamental obligations we assumed in the Act of Bogota establishing the Organization of American States. The Act provides:

"No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements.

"No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind.

"The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever"

I think it fair to say that these articles, signalling an end of US unilateralism, comprise the central features of the OAS from the point of view of the Latin American countries.

To act deliberately in defiance of these obligations would deal a blow to the Inter-American System from which I doubt it would soon recover. The suggestion that Cuba has somehow "removed itself" from the System is a transparent rationalization for the exercise of our own will.

More generally, the United States is the leading force in and substantial beneficiary of a network of treaties and alliances stretching around the world. That these treaty obligations should be recognized as binding in law and conscience is the condition not only of a lawful and orderly world, but of the mobilization of our own power.

We cannot expect the benefits of this regime of treaties if we are unwilling to accept the limitations it imposes upon our freedom to act.

2. Those most familiar with the Cuban operation seem to agree that as the venture is now planned, the chances of success are not greater than one out of three. This makes it a highly risky operation. If it fails, Castro's prestige and strength will be greatly enhanced.

The one way we can reduce the risk is by a sharply increased commitment of direct American support. In talking to Bob McNamara and Ros Gilpatric at lunch Tuesday at the Pentagon, I gathered that this is precisely what the military people feel we should do.

3. Under the very best of circumstances, I believe this operation will have a much more adverse effect on world opinion than most people contemplate. It is admitted that there will be riots and a new wave of anti-Americanism throughout Latin America. It is also assumed that there will be many who quietly wish us well and, if the operation succeeds, will heave a sigh of relief.

Moreover, even if the reaction in Latin America is less damaging than we expect, I believe that in Europe, Asia,

and Africa, the reaction against the United States will be angry and the fresh, favorable image of the Kennedy Administration will be correspondingly dimmed. It would be a grave mistake for us to minimize this factor and its impact on our capacity to operate effectively in cooperation with other nations in other parts of the world.

4. If the operation appears to be a failure in its early stages, the pressure on us to scrap our self-imposed restriction on direct American involvement will be difficult to resist, and our own responsibility correspondingly increased.

5. A pertinent question, of course, is what will happen in Cuba if this operation is cancelled and we limit ourselves to small and scattered operations?

There is the possibility that the Castro effort will be a failure without any further intervention from us. It is not easy to create a viable Communist state on an island, totally dependent upon open sea lanes, with a large population, and inadequate resources. As Castro applies more and more pressure, the spirit of rebellion is likely to grow.

6. It appears more likely that Castro will succeed in solidifying his political position. Although this would be sharply contrary to our national interest, it does not mean that we would be impotent to deal with him.

If the Soviets should attempt to provide Castro with substantially larger amounts of arms, including naval vessels, we have the power to throw a blockade around Cuba and to extend it, if necessary, to petroleum supplies. This could bring the Cuban economy to a grinding halt within a few months.

Technically, this would be an act of war. However, I believe we would find it vastly easier to live with direct action of this kind in the face of what we could fairly describe as an open Soviet move to establish Cuba as a military base than with the covert operation now under consideration.

7. Another possibility is that Castro, once he has created sufficient military power, will move against a neighboring area, such as Haiti, the Dominican Republic, or perhaps into Central America. If this occurs, we can move to block him with whatever force is required, presumably through the Organization of American States and with the full support of the people in Latin America and elsewhere.

Since January 20th our position has been dramatically improved in the eyes of the world vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

The Kennedy Administration has been doing particularly well in Africa and Latin America, and with a little luck in Laos and more affirmative policies, we may soon be able to improve our position in East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. Within the next few months we can also begin to strengthen our relations with Western Europe.

I believe it would be a grave mistake for us to jeopardize the favorable position we have steadily developed in most of the non-Communist world by the responsible and restrained policies which are now associated with the President by embarking on a major covert adventure with such very heavy built-in risks.

I realize that this operation has been put together over a period of months. A great deal of time and money has been put into it, and many able and dedicated people have become emotionally involved in its success. We should not, however, proceed with this adventure simply because we are wound up and cannot stop.

I believe that it is important for you to discuss this venture with people who can bring to it a fresh and objective view; for instance, Ed Murrow, Abe Chayes, Harlan Cleveland, Phillips Talbot, George McGhee, Soapy Williams, or Phil Coombs.

If you agree after careful thought that this operation would be a mistake, I suggest that you personally and privately communicate your views to the President. It is my guess that your voice will be decisive.

In that event he may decide to call off tomorrow's meeting and transmit his decision directly to Allen Dulles, Bob McNamara and other interested people.



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

Cuba, 1961-1962

76. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)

SM-363-61

Washington, April 1, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. The source text is marked "Draft" and is Enclosure A to JCS 2304/26, April 1. The covering memorandum of JCS 2304/26 indicates that the Joint Chiefs approved SM-363-61 on April 1 and forwarded it to CINCLANT. (Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

SUBJECT

"Bumpy Road"

REFERENCE

Your memo Special C0029/61, dated 28 March 1961, Subject: "CIA Operation Crosspatch"/1/

/1/Document 73.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the contents of the reference memorandum and have concluded the following:

- a. The assignment of an additional destroyer as escort for the convoy is approved.
- b. The disposition and employment of LANTCOM forces in the general area is considered normal and will insure the readiness of your command in case of an emergency.
- c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff letter of instruction for the subject operation is now before the Secretary of Defense for approval. That letter, which is also addressed to you, provides for informing CINCONAD of his requirements.
- d. Your rules of engagement are approved. It was also noted that no mention was made of Soviet submarines. Your current instructions in regards to Soviet submarines will apply for attack. In the event the convoy is shadowed or closed by a surfaced submarine, it will be treated under the rules for engagement as a surface ship. If the convoy is shadowed or closed by a submerged submarine;

(1) Request submarine identify itself.

(2) If identity refused, repeat request stating its actions considered hostile and attack will be made if identity not given.

(3) If identity still refused, assume submarine is attacking force and attack with all authorized means available until submarine retires, surfaces and identifies itself (thereby coming under rules of engagement for surface ships), or the submarine is destroyed.

2. It will be noted that the nickname "Bumpy Road" has now been applied to the CIA Para-military Plan. This nickname is assigned with the concurrence of CIA.

3. You will be kept informed of any changes in requirements and/or schedule for the subject operation resulting from the final review.

77. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, April 1, 1961, 5 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-161. Confidential; Priority.

2362. Eyes Only Secretary. [Here follows the account of the discussion between Chairman Khrushchev and Ambassador Thompson on Laos and the Congo; the full text of this telegram is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, volume V.]

Turning to Cuba he [Khrushchev] could not agree with our policy there. Each country should be free to choose its social system. They did not agree, for example, with Yugoslav internal policies but this did not prevent them from having good relations with that country. He said President had indicated that financial aid would be given to aid in overthrow of present Cuban Govt. Bands of emigres had been formed and threats made against Cuban Govt. He said Soviet Govt would openly support Cuban Govt and would give them economic aid. He pointed out Soviet Union had no base in Cuba and only base there belonged to US. He then went on to question our policy of having bases all around Soviet Union.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Reverting again to Cuba he asked why we did not establish diplomatic relations with that country and try to resolve our problems with it peacefully. He made clear Cubans had not put him up to this but he was merely speaking his own mind.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.] I went on to say that I thought what bothered us particularly about Cuba was its use as a base for attempts on overthrow of other Latin American govts. When he disputed this I said I had heard Cuban pilots were being trained in Czechoslovakia in flying jet planes. Cuba would never be able attack US and therefore these presumably were designed for use against other Latin American countries. I said we had been most patient with Castro. In first place we had cut off supply of arms to Batista and although there had been differences of opinion in US about Castro we had been fully prepared accept his govt. However he had made most violent statements against us and had confiscated our assets there without compensation and finally had insisted on reducing our Embassy to handful of people. We had tried to be patient but he had given us no choice. Khrushchev replied Castro said we were using Embassy to harbor spies and Castro was not Communist. He said he had not heard of any training of jet pilots but if he were Castro he would buy jet planes since these were necessary to prevent arms being dropped to counter-revolutionaries from planes flying from US. He thought that in one case we had even admitted this. I said we had taken strict steps to prevent such activities

although there had I believed been one case in which a plane had gotten through. In concluding Khrushchev said we should continue to be patient and should try to improve our relations with Cuba.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Thompson

78. Editorial Note

According to a memorandum for the record prepared by Naval Commander G.A. Mitchell, Secretary of Defense McNamara was briefed on April 2, 1961, on the proposed rules of engagement that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved on April 1 in SM-363-61, Document 76. McNamara had reservations about the latitude allowed by the rules:

"On 2 April the Secretary of Defense was briefed on the Bumpy Road situation and advised as to the approved rules. He was further advised by the JCS that after the President had made a firm 'go ahead' decision, these rules should be submitted to the President for his approval. The Secretary of Defense felt that the rules were allowed too much interpretation at lower level and stated that the JCS should study the matter further." (Mitchell's memorandum is undated but covers developments dealing with the rules of engagement for Operation Bumpy Road through April 20; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, Paramilitary Study)

79. Editorial Note

On April 3, 1961, the Department of State released a 36-page pamphlet entitled "Cuba." This "White Paper" was initially drafted in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs but was extensively revised in the White House by Arthur Schlesinger, with the assistance of Richard Goodwin. President Kennedy carefully reviewed the final draft. The White Paper charged that Premier Castro had instituted a "repressive dictatorship" in Cuba, had delivered his country "to the Sino-Soviet bloc," and was mounting an attack on the entire inter-American system. The United States called upon Cuba, in the White Paper, "to sever its links with the international Communist movement" and "to restore the dignity" of the original Cuban revolution. "If this call is unheeded, we are confident that the Cuban people, with their passion for liberty, will continue to strive for a free Cuba." (Department of State Publication 7171, Inter-American Series 66, April 1961) There is extensive material relating to the preparation of this paper in the Kennedy Library, Papers of Arthur Schlesinger, Cuba (White Paper).

President Kennedy was asked to comment on the White Paper on Cuba during a press conference on April 12. He was asked whether the White Paper meant that he considered Fidel Castro a Communist. Kennedy replied: "I would not want to characterize Mr. Castro except to say that by his own words he has indicated his hostility to democratic rule in this hemisphere, to democratic liberal leaders in many of the countries of the hemisphere who are attempting to improve the life of their people, and has associated himself most intimately with the Sino-Soviet bloc, and has indicated his desire to spread the influence of that bloc throughout this hemisphere." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961*, page 259)

80. Editorial Note

On April 4, 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered, approved, and forwarded to Secretary McNamara JCSM-210-61, a plan of logistic support for the Zapata operation. The plan included a detailed concept of development for the later phase of the operation and programmed covert military support for the concept. (Chronology of JCS Participation in Bumpy Road; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

From 6 to 8:18 p.m. that evening, President Kennedy met at the Department of State with members of the Joint Chiefs and others involved in planning the Zapata operation. The President's appointment book does not indicate

the participants in the meeting, but notes taken on the meeting establish that Senator William Fulbright was invited to participate. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book) According to summary notes on the meeting prepared by General Gray on May 9:

"This meeting was held in the State Department and Senator Fulbright was also present. Senator Fulbright spoke out against the plan. The President again indicated his preference for an operation which would infiltrate the force in units of 200-250 and then develop them through a build up. Colonel Hawkins from CIA expressed the belief that landing small groups would merely serve to alert Castro and they would be eliminated one by one. He indicated that a group of 200 was below the critical number able to defend themselves. Mr. Rusk expressed opposition to the plan but Mr. Berle and Mr. Mann expressed general approval. Mr. McNamara also expressed approval of the general concept. The President indicated that he still wished to make the operation appear as an internal uprising and wished to consider the matter further the next morning." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

After the conference with the President on April 4, Secretary McNamara requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reconsider the rules of engagement for the Bumpy Road operation to ensure that the United States would not become overtly engaged with Castro's armed forces. (Memorandum for the record, prepared by Mitchell; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, Paramilitary Study)

81. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy

Washington, April 5, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1961. Secret.

SUBJECT

Cuba

1. When you asked me after the meeting yesterday/1/ what I thought about the Cuban proposal, I am afraid that I did not give a properly ordered answer.

/1/See Document 80.

2. My brief answer is that I am in favor of a continuation and expansion of the present approach to Cuba--i.e., quiet infiltration of anti-Castro exiles into Cuba and subsequent support through air drops. The beachhead operation, with the landing and recognition of the provisional government, would represent, however, a change of phase in our Cuban policy. If entirely successful, it would have the highly beneficial result of getting rid of the Castro regime. If we could achieve this by a swift, surgical stroke, I would be for it. But in present circumstances the operation seems to me to involve many hazards; and on balance--and despite the intelligence and responsibility with which the case for the action has been presented--I am against it.

3. The following considerations concerning the beachhead operation seem to me vital:

a) No matter how "Cuban" the equipment and personnel, the US will be held accountable for the operation, and our prestige will be committed to its success.

b) Since the Castro regime is presumably too strong to be toppled by a single landing, the operation will turn into a protracted civil conflict.

4. If these assumptions are true, it seems to me that the operation involves the following hazards:

a) The protraction of the struggle and the commitment of American prestige (especially if we proceed to recognize and supply a provisional government) will create increasing pressure on us to guarantee the success of the operation through ever more intense and overt involvement. It will seem increasingly intolerable to subject ourselves to the humiliation of a defeat in Cuba. If the landing fails to trigger uprisings behind the lines and defections in the Militia (and the evidence that it would do so is inconclusive), the logic of the situation could well lead us, step by step, to the point where the last step would be to dispatch the Marines.

b) The protraction of the struggle will give the Soviet Union a magnificent opportunity to wage political warfare. Cuba will become our Hungary; and, since our pretensions to international good behavior have been greater than those of the Russians, we would be more damaged by Hungary than they were (and they were considerably damaged). The situation is made to order for the Communist agitprop apparatus. Jose Marti Brigades and no doubt Abraham Lincoln Brigades will be recruited to support Castro, not just from beyond the Iron Curtain, but in Western Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America. There will be demonstrations and riots around the world on the model of the movement for Loyalist Spain in the late Thirties. There will be resolutions in the United Nations, with testimony by prisoners or Castro agents about the US preparation of and responsibility for the action.

(I must say, however, that I question the view that this operation would have serious substantive effect on Soviet policy, in Laos or elsewhere. My guess is that the Soviet Union regards Cuba as in our domain and is rather surprised that we have not taken action before this to rid ourselves of Castro.

(I also think that the operation would be more easily accepted in Latin America, where there is spreading knowledge about the nature of the Castro regime, than in Western Europe, Africa or Asia, where it will seem gross, unprovoked and bullying imperialism.)

c) As the struggle protracts itself and as the political campaign mounts against the US, our government--and you--will have to meet penetrating questions about our role in the affair. We will have either to evade the questions and thereby tacitly plead guilty; or deny involvement; or declare ignorance. Each course presents obvious difficulties. If we admit involvement, we admit action taken in violation of the basic characters of the hemisphere and of the United Nations. If we justify such violation by pleading a higher law, we place ourselves thereafter on the same moral plane as the Soviet Union. If we deny involvement, few will believe us; and we invite a repetition of the U-2 episode, which made us look absurd before the world.

Whatever we do, the effect will be to spoil the new US image--the image of intelligence, reasonableness and honest firmness which has already had such an extraordinary effect in changing world opinion about the US and increasing world confidence in US methods and purposes.

d) And there is the Fulbright point: our responsibility for the post-Castro regime. The eyes of the world will be upon us, and we cannot afford a post-Castro mess. On the basis of the documents/2/ they have submitted to us containing their ideas for the future, I rather share his doubts as to the competence of the exile leaders.

/2/The reference is unclear.

5. These hazards would be outweighed, in my judgment, by the advantage of getting rid of Castro

a) if the operation could be swift and surgical

b) if support were forthcoming from our allies, both in Latin America and in Europe

c) if the danger to the US were visible and overwhelming.

Conditions (a) and (b) seem doubtful. Of (c), it can only be said that it is not self-evident to many people (including the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee).

The counter argument would be: why not wait? Every month Castro is making himself more unpopular both through the hemisphere and in his own country. Every month more people through the world are coming to understand the nature of his regime. Opinion has changed tremendously in the last six months; it will change even more in the next six months, if Castro is not made a martyr. The combination of internal discontent and external isolation will doom his regime.

The counter argument to this, of course, is that time will permit a military build-up and a perfection of internal control which will make Castro invulnerable to anything but a major invasion. In the meantime, he will prosecute his campaign against the hemisphere. The counter argument to that is that the measures which increase his invulnerability will also increase his unpopularity; that the more he tries to totalitarianize and terrorize Cuba, the more he makes Communism an object of hatred through the hemisphere; and, if he uses his military strength against any other state, he gives us the excuse we need for collective intervention.

I am not sure that this debate permits a categorical judgment on the question whether time would run for or against us in Cuba.

6. The consequences of abandonment remain to be considered. Abandonment would conceivably suggest a US failure of nerve. It might seem to place a premium on the defiance of Castro; it would certainly dishearten those in Latin America who have exposed themselves by demanding action against Castro; it would certainly disillusion the brave men we have gathered in Guatemala; it would confront us with the problem of demobilizing and resettling these men. The fact that the expedition was conceived, prepared and then called off at the last moment would increase Castro's prestige and power.

These are all powerful points. They weigh very heavily in my mind on the side of going ahead. However, I hesitate to say that we should do something simply because we have seemed to commit ourselves to doing it which, if we were starting fresh, we would not do.

On balance, I think that the risks of the operation slightly outweigh the risks of abandonment. These latter risks would be mitigated somewhat if we could manage a partial rather than a total abandonment (i.e., if we could put the men into Cuba quietly).

We might also be able to make some diplomatic capital out of the abandonment. We might have Thompson say to Khrushchev, for example, that we have discouraged an invasion of Cuba; that this shows our genuine desire to compose differences; but that K. should tell his friend to behave, because our patience is not inexhaustible and we cannot hope to restrain the Cuban patriots indefinitely. Conceivably we might be able to turn abandonment to some diplomatic advantage within the hemisphere too.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

82. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Coerr) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, April 5, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-561. Confidential. Drafted by Coerr and by William I. Cargo, Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs. Cleared in substance by Cleveland in IO.

SUBJECT

Suggestion that we support Miro Cardona, President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, at the UN

Discussion

The above suggestion has been made with a view to gaining publicity favorable to the Cuban Revolutionary Council and to blunting the attack that Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa is expected to make against the United States in the UNGA.

Although the basic UN concept is that the UN is an organization of states, UNGA procedures would permit a hearing of Miro Cardona by Committee One if proposed by a member of that committee and approved by its majority vote. Most nations, however, including the Europeans and the Afro-Asians--and very probably the Latin Americans--would almost certainly fear the precedent of giving a hearing to a minority dissident group and many could be expected to vote against the proposal. The Soviet bloc and extreme neutralist group would probably oppose. While Committee Four has heard individual petitioners under specific Charter provisions, Committee One has heard non-governmental persons only rarely. We would face almost certain defeat if we were to support a hearing for Miro Cardona.

The United States has privately opposed the hearing of representatives of the FLN in connection with the Algerian question; and soon will again oppose a hearing for North Korean representatives, in Committee One. U.S. support for a hearing of Miro Cardona might well weaken our position on this kind of an issue.

Recommendation

That we do not support a hearing for Miro Cardona. (Should you approve this recommendation we will support other means of doing it.)/1/

/1/The source text is stamped to indicate that Rusk initialed his approval on April 4. April 5, the date typed in the heading of the document, is probably the date on which Rusk received and approved the recommendation in the memorandum.

83. Editorial Note

At 8:30 a.m. on April 5, 1961, Secretary of Defense McNamara and General Lemnitzer met at the White House with CIA officials Allen Dulles, Richard Bissell, and General Cabell in advance of the meeting called by President Kennedy to continue consideration of the Zapata plan. McNamara and Lemnitzer discussed with the CIA officials the proposed rules of engagement for the projected operation against Cuba. "It was agreed that the rules should definitely spell out the President's desire that if United States forces were required to protect CEF ships from damage or capture the operation would be aborted and the CEF ships directed to a port to be designated by the JCS." (Memorandum for the record, by Mitchell; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, Paramilitary Study)

President Kennedy met later with the participants in the 8:30 meeting and with unspecified representatives from the Department of State. The President's appointment book does not indicate either the time or the participants in the meeting. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book) According to summary notes on the meeting prepared by General Gray on May 9:

"There was a very small meeting with the President where only Secretary McNamara, General Lemnitzer and representatives of State and CIA were present. At this meeting the general idea of fake defections and preliminary strikes were discussed. The President indicated approval of the general idea but indicated that everyone should consider further measures overnight and there would be another meeting the following morning." (Ibid., National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

84. Editorial Note

At 9:15 a.m. on April 6, 1961, President Kennedy convened another meeting at the White House to discuss the projected Zapata operation against Cuba. According to the President's appointment book the meeting lasted an hour and a half, and was attended by Rusk, McNamara, Dulles, Berle, Mann, and Coerr. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book) Although Bissell is not listed in the appointment book, Gray's notes indicate that he attended and made the principal presentation for the CIA. Gray was also there, and it is probable that Lemnitzer, Burke, and Cabell attended as well. According to summary notes on the meeting prepared by General Gray on May 9:

"At this meeting Mr. Bissell presented the plan to arrest Mas Farer, to seize a B-25 aircraft known to be operating against Cuba and also to seize one or more small boats being used by counter-revolutionaries. All of this intended to show US disassociation with former Batista followers. Mr. Bissell then gave an outline of the planned defection of a pilot on D-3, coupled with air strikes and a D-2 guerrilla landing. This would then be followed by a guerrilla uprising on D+5 in Pinar Del Rio. The President indicated that the council should not be informed ahead of time. Mr. Rusk, when queried by the President, stated that he felt that this plan was as good as could be devised, but that we should now take a look at other questions that might arise. One would be what would the US do in the event there was a serious call for help? Second, what might the Soviets do? The President indicated that Mr. Macmillan had been informed of the prospect. The President questioned whether or not a preliminary strike wasn't an alarm bell. The President also asked as to the last date on which he could delay or cancel the operation, and he was told 16 April. He wanted to know what he could do if the operation was called off and was told by Mr. Bissell that the plan was to divert the force to Vieques. At the end of the meeting the President gave the following guidance: continue planning, spread the convoy, provide additional air protection for the Miami area, increase press conferences for Cardona, limit air strikes to essential targets, and diversionary landing was OK. In summary, the President indicated a desire to use the force but he wanted to do everything possible to make it appear to be a Cuban operation partly from within Cuba but supported from without Cuba, the objective being to make it more plausible for US denial of association with the operation although recognizing that we would be accused." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

85. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)

CM-179-61

Washington, April 7, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Top Secret. In a memorandum for the record summarizing the changes in the rules of engagement for the Bumpy Road operation, Commander Mitchell noted that this memorandum was drafted in response to a memorandum sent from the CIA to General Gray on April 7, modifying the U.S. naval support requirements. The modifications called for destroyers to provide area coverage, rather than convoying the CEF ships, from 0600 on D-2 to the transport area. The requirement for U.S. naval air cover was changed to provide an additional day of air protection, from 0600 to sunset on D-2 and D-1. D-Day was changed to April 17. Mitchell noted that CM-179-61 was dispatched by special courier to Admiral Dennison on April 8. He added that the naval task group assigned to screen the Cuban Expeditionary Force was already at sea and had made an anti-submarine sweep of the area off Nicaragua. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT

"Bumpy Road"

REFERENCES

a. CM-152-61 Dated 24 March 1961, Subj: CIA Operation Crosspatch/1/

b. CINCLANT Memo Serial Special 00029/61 Dated 28 March 1961/2/

c. SM-363-61 Dated 1 April 1961/3/

/1/Not found.

/2/Document 73.

/3/Document 76.

ENCLOSURES/4/

/4/A handwritten note in the margin at this point reads: "Deleted from this copy, GAMitchell, Cdr. USN" Mitchell drew a box around the first five enclosures listed to indicate that they had been deleted from the copy included in the Taylor Report. Another copy of CM-179-61, with all of the enclosures attached, is in the Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials.

A. DD Support

B. LSD Support

C. Combat Air Patrol

D. Navigational Reference Points

E. Individual Ship Movement Schedule (Code Name)

F. Instructions for DD Escort and CAP

1. Reference a requested certain naval support for the subject para-military operation. Due to required changes in concept of movement of surface units, the requirements for U.S. Naval support as set forth in reference a are superseded by those contained in Enclosures A, B, and C hereto.

2. Enclosures D and E contain the required navigational and individual ship movements information for the ships of the Cuban Volunteer Force.

3. It is necessary to take precautions to assure that U.S. support of the Cuban Volunteer Force is not apparent and that support for this operation be undertaken so that the United States may plausibly deny participation. In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to modify the instructions for the escorting destroyers and the combat air patrol. Accordingly, the specific "rules of engagement" as set forth in references b and c are superseded by the instructions contained in Enclosure F hereto.

4. D-Day is now scheduled for 17 April 1961.

L.L. Lemnitzer/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Enclosure F/6/

INSTRUCTIONS FOR DESTROYER ESCORT AND COMBAT AIR PATROL/7/

/7/Commander Mitchell subsequently summarized the changes in the rules of engagement, outlined in Enclosure F, as follows:

"The changes to the rules pointed out the necessity for avoiding any sign of U.S. participation. The U.S. naval air cover was to be flown in such a manner that the planes did not appear to be covering the CEF ships. During daylight hours the escorting destroyers were to maintain maximum practicable range ahead of the CEF ships and to use courses and speeds so that they provided protection but didn't appear to be screening the CEF ships. During the hours of darkness the destroyers could close the CEF ships to provide adequate protection. The destroyers were not to approach within 20 miles (instead of the previous 3 miles) of Cuban territory and, as soon as the San Marcos (the LSD) had withdrawn from the transfer area for the landing craft, the destroyers were to withdraw to join the U.S. naval task group (about 125 miles from Blue Beach). The rules of engagement were modified so that U.S. naval units would not open fire on Cuban ships or aircraft until they opened fire (or opened bomb bays and started a bombing run) (Note: Sea Furies and T-33's do not have bomb bays) on the CEF ships. In essence, the U.S. protecting forces could only open fire if the CEF was attacked. (Instead of opening fire when a Cuban ship or aircraft made a threatening move.) If the U.S. forces intervened to protect the CEF ships, the operation was automatically cancelled. U.S. forces were then to take all steps short of firing on the CEF ships to cause them to withdraw to a port to be designated by the JCS." (Memorandum for the Record, Rules of Engagement Operation "Bumpy Road"; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

1. The US destroyers providing the area coverage of the Cuban Volunteer Force ships will take the following precautions to avoid overt association with ships of the Cuban Force:

- a. During daylight hours they will maintain maximum practicable range ahead of the ships of the Cuban Force and maintain a patrol using courses and speeds so as to provide protection but not appear to be screening the Cuban Force ships.
- b. During the hours of darkness the US destroyers are permitted to take station with respect to the Cuban Force ships to provide adequate protection.
- c. US Naval support will not be used to support the landing operation. The US destroyers covering the transport ships of the Cuban Force will not close within 20 miles of the target area. After withdrawal of the San Marcos from Point Oldsmobile, the US destroyers will withdraw to Point Packard and rejoin the US Naval Task Group.

2. The surface and subsurface special rules of engagement are as follows:

a. Prior to the rendezvous of the Cuban Force ships:

- (1) If intervention by US forces is required to protect the Cuban Force ships from attack or to prevent their capture, the US forces will intervene as necessary to protect the Cuban Force ship(s).
- (2) This intervention will cancel the landing operation and the US destroyers will take measures short of firing on the Cuban Force ships, to cause them to withdraw to a port to be designated by the JCS upon receipt of the report of intervention.
- (3) Subsequent to the intervention and withdrawal, the US destroyers will maintain close escort of the Cuban Force to provide protection and witness compliance with the withdrawal order.

(4) U.S. forces will open fire only if the Cuban Force ship(s) is attacked.

b. After rendezvous of the Cuban Force ships at 1730 R, D-1 Day and until convoy has moved to a point within 20 miles of the objective area, a DD commanding officer will:

(1) Place his ship between the convoy and any suspicious or Cuban surface craft sighted.

(2) Warn the craft not to approach within gun range of the convoy.

(3) If the surface craft persists in closing the convoy, the DD will intervene as necessary to protect the Cuban Force ships, then follow instructions set forth in paragraph 2a(2) and (3) above.

c. Intervention by US destroyers after Cuban Force convoy has moved to a point within 20 miles of the objective area will be limited to that required to assist the San Marcos at her request.

3. The combat air patrol mission pilots and air controllers will be instructed as follows:

a. The CAP will take station so that it will not give the appearance of covering the ships of the Cuban Force.

b. The "rules of engagement" are as follows:

(1) Any unidentified aircraft approaching within radar range of the Cuban Force ships and closing will be investigated.

(2) If investigation reveals the aircraft to be Cuban, the investigating aircraft will make successive close passes ensuring that the Cuban aircraft is aware of his presence.

(3) If Cuban aircraft maintains course to close the Cuban Force ship(s) CAP will continue to make close passes in an attempt to divert.

(4) If Cuban aircraft insists in closing and attempts to take position to attack the Cuban Force ship(s), the CAP aircraft will open fire if the Cuban aircraft commences to fire on the Cuban Force ship(s) or if it opens its bomb bays and commences its bomb run.

86. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy

Washington, April 10, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/61-4/61. Secret.

SUBJECT

Cuba: Political, Diplomatic and Economic Problems

1. Introduction. The operational planning for the Cuban project seems much farther advanced than the political, diplomatic and economic planning which properly should accompany it. As a result, preparations to deal with the political, diplomatic and economic repercussions of the operation are inadequate. Unless we speed these preparations, we run the risk that a successful military result may be to a considerable degree nullified by seriously adverse results in the political, diplomatic and economic areas.

2. What is at stake. In the days since January 20, your administration has changed the face of American foreign

policy. The soberness of style, the absence of cold war cliches, the lack of self-righteousness and sermonizing, the impressive combination of reasonableness and firmness, the generosity to new ideas, the dedication to social progress, the tough-minded idealism of purpose--all these factors have transformed (to use that repellent word) the "image" of the United States before the world. The result has been to go far toward restoring confidence in the intelligence, maturity and restraint of American leadership. People around the world have forgotten the muddling and moralizing conservatism of the Eisenhower period with surprising speed. The United States is emerging again as a great, mature and liberal nation, coolly and intelligently dedicated to the job of stopping Communism, strengthening the free and neutral nations and working for peace. It is this reawakening world faith in America which is at stake in the Cuban operation.

3. U.S. vulnerabilities. I do not mean to suggest that the use of force to protect a reasonable national security interest would necessarily have an adverse effect on the world per se. If force is used efficiently and effectively, and if the threat to national security is demonstrable and convincing, the controlled use of force for limited objectives might well enhance respect for the United States. To define these conditions, however, calls immediate attention to one of our main vulnerabilities in the Cuban affair. In the first place, however "Cuban" the operation will seem to be, the U.S. will be held accountable for it before the bar of world opinion: our own press has seen to that. Beyond this, there is an obstinate fact: A great many people simply do not at this moment see that Cuba presents so grave and compelling a threat to our national security as to justify a course of action which much of the world will interpret as calculated aggression against a small nation in defiance both of treaty obligations and of the international standards we have repeatedly asserted against the Communist world. It is only necessary to remark that the people who fail to understand the pressing necessity for this action include the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (and that he has said that the only members of his Committee whom he thinks would support the action are Senators Dodd and Lausche--which perhaps suggests the kind of people to whom the idea will automatically appeal).

4. In short, many people in the United States and probably most people outside the United States will--unless countermeasures are put into immediate play--see a vast gap between what they regard as the minor threat presented by a tiny nation of 7 million to the great United States and the massive response (i.e., the instigation of civil war and the overthrow of the government) proposed by the United States. To say that the Russians are doing worse in Laos is true but irrelevant, since we profess to be acting according to higher motives and higher principles than the Russians. Because the alleged threat to our national security will not seem to many people great enough to justify so flagrant a violation of our professed principles, these people will assume that our action is provoked by a threat to something other than our security. Given the mythology of our relationship to Latin America, they will assume that we are acting, not to protect our safety, but to protect our property and investments. In short, for many people the easiest explanation of our action will be as a reversion to economic imperialism of the pre-World War I, Platt-Amendment, big-stick, gunboat-diplomacy kind.

It need hardly be said that the apparent revival of these strains in American foreign policy--and especially their revival in connection with the most dramatic foreign policy initiative of the new administration--will jeopardize the new "image" of the United States and will threaten to wipe out the great gains of the last two and a half months.

5. How the USSR will exploit the situation. We can consider the measures necessary to prevent this outcome better if we first speculate about the Communist reaction to a landing in Cuba.

The first Communist effort will be to nail down the already existing impression that such a landing is sponsored by the U.S. In doing this, the Communists have already had the indispensable assistance of the American press. They will be able to make their case almost entirely by quotations from U.S. sources. No matter how ostensibly "Cuban" the operation in fact is in personnel and in equipment, most of the world--our friends as well as our foes--will assume (on the basis of American press reports) that it is American in its conception and in its preparation.

If the landing succeeds in setting off uprisings behind the line and in stimulating defections from Castro's militia, and if the regime collapses with reasonable speed, then the political damage will be minimized. But if it settles down to a protracted conflict, then we can be certain that the world Communist agitprop apparatus will swing into full and vigorous action.

6. The Communists will be able to count, first, on a generalized sympathy for the underdog against the bully, for David against Goliath--as in such past cases as the Boers vs. Britain or Finland vs. the USSR. Even some of our friends will derive a certain satisfaction from watching Castro defy the great United States.

The Communists will next seek to use the alleged U.S. initiative to bolster the Marxist interpretation of history. They will portray it as an effort on the part of the greatest capitalist nation to punish a small country for its desire to achieve political and economic independence. Throughout the underdeveloped world, they will try to persuade local nationalists to identify Castro's cause with their own struggles. There will be particular emphasis (already visible in official Cuban propaganda) on Castro as the defender of the colored races against white imperialism.

The first stage in this will be the fomenting of riots and demonstrations. American Embassies will be attacked and American diplomats (and other American personnel) mobbed. The underdeveloped countries will be urged in the United Nations to defend their own future freedom of action by defending Castro; we can expect to be placed on the defensive in the U.N. for some time and to be subjected to a series of harassing debates and resolutions. Ex-colonial nations everywhere will be called on to identify their own problems with those of Castro.

Nor will Soviet agitational operations be confined to Asia, Africa and Latin America (though they will probably be most profitable there). The assault against Castro will add fuel to the fires of anti-Americanism throughout Europe. It will be the latest scandal of St. German des Pres (Sartre of course hailed Castro's Cuba; even Raymond Aron's recent series of pieces after his Cuban visit, published in Figaro in February, were relatively measured and would not lead people to think that drastic action against Castro was necessary to save the west). The people who have been crowding Trafalgar Square to protest the bomb will be crowding it again to shout for Castro and denounce the U.S. as the last stronghold of imperialism.

We can doubtless weather the public opinion storm. The second stage will be operational. Funds will be collected for Castro around the world. No Russian troops need be sent to Cuba; but volunteers will quickly appear from Western Europe, from Asia and especially from Africa, organized in Jose Marti Brigades and even probably in Abraham Lincoln Brigades. U.S. efforts to intercept shiploads of such volunteers will heap further coals on the anti-American conflagration. One ship sunk, and there will be new mobs, new demonstrations, new riots and new brigades.

The model for this operation, of course, will be the Spanish Civil War; but the added dimension of imperialism vs. nationalism will mean that the whole thing is even more made to order for Soviet exploitation. The objective will be to portray the Soviet Union as the patron and protector of nationalists, Negroes, new nations and peace and to portray the Kennedy Administration as a gang of capitalist imperialists maddened by the loss of profits and driven to aggression and war. If this strategem is permitted to succeed, it will abolish all the progress we have made in recent months to win the confidence of the new nations. Even political leaders in other lands who understand our problem and sympathize with our objective will hardly be able to ignore the surge of public anger in their own countries.

7. Countermeasures to nullify the Communist offensive. Our problem is how to protect the post-January 20 impression of the United States as a mature and liberal nation, opposed to imperialism and colonialism and dedicated to justice, peace and freedom.

The operational contribution to this effort--i.e., Cubanizing the operation and doing nothing which would be inconsistent with a spontaneous Cuban effort--has been worked out with skill and care. But the supporting political and diplomatic measures seem still in a highly rudimentary stage.

8. The United States line. The impending Stevenson speech in the United Nations represents our first effort at a political-diplomatic counter-offensive. The essential elements of this speech are (a) that Castro is threatened, not by Americans, but by Cubans justly indignant over his betrayal of his own revolution, (b) that we sympathize with these patriotic Cubans, and (c) that there will be no American participation in any military aggression against Castro's Cuba. If our representatives cannot evade in debate the question whether the CIA has actually helped the Cuban rebels, they will presumably be obliged, in the traditional, pre-U-2 manner, to deny any such CIA activity. (If Castro flies a group of captured Cubans to New York to testify that they were organized and trained by CIA, we will have to be prepared to show that the alleged CIA personnel were errant idealists or soldiers-of-fortune working on their own.)

If this--or something like it--is the general line we are prepared to take and stick to, then the State Department should prepare a definitive statement of this position.

That statement should be communicated first to the information officers of our government likely to be confronted with questions about the Cuban operation--Salinger, Murrow, Tubby, White, Sylvester. A meeting of these officers should be convened in the next few days.

At an appropriate moment, the statement should be communicated to United States Ambassadors, and especially to those in the new nations.

What about the Senate Foreign Relations Committee? What about the House Foreign Affairs Committee? What about Senators and Congressmen in general? Someone should begin to think what they should be told.

A Committee for a Free Cuba should be organized with impressive liberal names to backstop the Revolutionary Council and offset the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

9. Diversionary measures. Some thought should be given to possible diversionary measures which might offset the Soviet propaganda offensive. The arrest of Masferrer was a good stroke./1/ Could not something be done against the Dominican Republic in the next few days?--some new call for action against the Trujillo tyranny? Can we not affirm in some striking way our support for some progressive government in Latin America, like Venezuela? Can we not do something in Africa or Asia which will counteract the Soviet claim that we are unregenerate imperialists? Could something be brought before the United Nations in the next ten days which would permit us to take a strong anti-imperialist position?

/1/On April 8 agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation took into custody Rolando Masferrer, a former pro-Batista Cuban senator and head of a private army.

10. Protection of the President. The character and repute of President Kennedy constitute one of our greatest national resources. Nothing should be done to jeopardize this invaluable asset. When lies must be told, they should be told by subordinate officials. At no point should the President be asked to lend himself to the cover operation. For this reason, there seems to me merit in Secretary Rusk's suggestion that someone other than the President make the final decision and do so in his absence--someone whose head can later be placed on the block if things go terribly wrong.

Someone should start thinking about press conferences.

Q. Mr. President, can you tell us about the reported invasion of Cuba this morning?

A. We are doing our best to get the exact facts. So far as I can tell at present, a number of opponents of the Castro regime have landed on Cuba. I understand that the Revolutionary Council is trying to make contact with these people.

Q. Sir, according to the newspapers, the rebel forces were trained in American camps and supplied by American agencies.

A. There have been many thousands of Cuban refugees in Florida in these last months. I have no doubt that many of them have been determined to do what they can at the earliest possible moment to restore freedom to their homeland. They have the sympathy of American citizens in this effort--just as the forces of Castro enjoyed similar sympathy three years ago when they were conducting their rebellion against Batista. I suppose that, just as the Castro forces got money and arms from sources in the United States, these new rebels may well have too. But, so far as I can tell, this is a purely Cuban operation. I doubt whether Cuban patriots in exile would have to be stimulated and organized by the United States in order to persuade them to liberate their nation from a Communist dictator.

Q. Mr. President, have you any plans for the recognition of the Revolutionary Council as a provisional government?

A. None at this time.

Q. Mr. President, is CIA involved in this affair?

A. As I said a moment ago, I imagine that elements in the United States helped these opponents of Castro, as they helped Castro himself in 1958. I can assure you that the United States Government has no intention of using force to overthrow the Castro regime or of contributing force for that purpose unless compelled to do so in the interests of self-defense. [Hardly satisfactory: it is imperative that a better formula be worked out before your next press conference.]/2/

/2/Brackets in the source text.

Q. Mr. President, would you say that, so far as Cuba is concerned, the U.S. has been faithful to its treaty pledges against intervention in other countries? Would you say that it has resolutely enforced the laws forbidding the use of U.S. territory to prepare revolutionary action against another state?

A. ????

11. Protection against involvement. A great danger is that U.S. prestige will become committed to the success of the rebellion: that, if the rebellion appears to be failing, the rebels will call for U.S. armed help; that members of Congress will take up the cry; and that pressures will build up which will make it politically hard to resist the demand to send in the Marines. If we do this, then our intervention will become blatant and obvious and the political consequences almost irreparable. We will have presented the Soviet Union with an American Hungary.

The first protection against step-by-step involvement is to convince the Cuban leaders that in no foreseeable circumstances will we send in U.S. troops. U.S. prestige will not be publicly committed to the success of the operation until we recognize a provisional government; so we must tell the Revolutionary Council that it cannot expect immediate U.S. recognition; that recognition will only come when they have a better than 50-50 chance of winning under their own steam; that this is a fight which Cubans will have in essence to win for themselves. These points must be made clearly and emphatically; my present impression is that the exiles expect recognition as soon as they land in Cuba.

When senatorial voices are raised demanding overt U.S. intervention, our people must be primed to oppose this demand.

12. Support of Free Cuba. If this operation should succeed, the United States will acquire full responsibility for

post-Castro Cuba. The eyes of the world will be fixed on Cuba, as they were never fixed, for example, on post-Communist Guatemala. We simply will not be able to afford another Castillo Armas. If the post-Castro regime begins by devoting its first attention to owners of expropriated properties and to foreign investors; if it kicks the ordinary people off the beaches and out of the hotels; if it tries to turn back the social and economic clock--such things would triumphantly document the Soviet contention that the American motive in overthrowing Castro was to make Cuba safe again for American capitalism.

I personally do not have great confidence in the competence of the Revolutionary Council. Their statements and manifestos do not up to this point exhibit much realistic understanding of the social and economic problems they would encounter in post-Castro Cuba. Their approach seems essentially legalistic; they are thinking in terms of the assurances of liberties to the professional and business classes. They have done very little to reassure the lower classes that the social and economic gains of the Castro period will not be reversed.

If we are not going to be cursed throughout the underdeveloped world as unregenerate imperialists, post-Castro Cuba will have to be at least as progressive as Betancourt's Venezuela. The Revolutionary Council must be made to understand this. Above all, we must begin thinking very quickly of a man sufficiently astute, aggressive and influential to go to Habana as U.S. Ambassador and make sure that the new regime gets off on a socially progressive track.

13. Emergency economic program. The civil conflict will probably create much disorganization and havoc. The exact economic state of post-Castro Cuba cannot, of course, be predicted. But economics somewhere should be at work on a series of relief and reconstruction programs pegged at various levels of need; and someone should be checking the immediate availability of the commodities necessary to meet the requirements. Someone else should be drafting the necessary legislation. We ought to have a look at these things in the next week or so.

In addition, another group of economists should be working on a long-range development plan for Cuba to serve as a guide for the post-Castro government. The main sketch for such a plan should be ready by May 1.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr./3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

87. Operation Order From the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison) to the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark)

CINCLANTFLT No. 25-61

Norfolk, April 10, 1961.

//Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Limited Distribution; CO Eyes Only/By Hand. The order was signed for Dennison by Vice Admiral Fitzhugh Lee. Special Task Group 81.8 was commanded by Rear Admiral John E. Clark. The Task Group was composed of: Carrier Unit 81.8.1, USS *Essex* (CVS-9); Destroyer Unit 81.8.2, commanded by Captain G. M. Slonim, composed of USS *Waller* (DDE-466), USS *Conway* (DDE-507), USS *Cony* (DDE-508), USS *Eaton* (DDE-510), USS *Bache* (DDE-470), USS *Beale* (DDE-471), and USS *Murray* (DDE-576); Convoy Escort Unit 81.8.3, commanded by Captain R. P. Crutchfield, composed of USS *Eaton* (DDE-510) and USS *Murray* (DDE-576); Amphibious Support Unit 81.8.4, commanded by Commander R. Cousins, composed of USS *San Marcos* (LSD-25); and Replenishment Unit 81.8.8, com-manded by Captain P.K. Blesh, composed of USS *Elokomin* (AO-55).

[Here follows the text of Operation Order 25-61, Annex A, and Appendix I to Annex A. The operation order outlines the units involved in the operation, the overall situation and intent of the operation, the type of friendly and unfriendly forces involved, and the tasks to be undertaken. Annex A briefly outlines the Concept of

Operations, including the stipulation that "U.S. Naval vessels and aircraft will not enter Cuban Territorial Waters or airspace (three mile limit)." Appendix I to Annex A presents, in outline form, with scheduled times listed, a detailed Table of Events from the point at which the Cuban Expeditionary Force was scheduled to embark to the transfer to landing craft off the coast of Cuba.]

Appendix II to Annex A

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. DD's assigned to provide area coverage of the CEF will avoid overt association with the CEF ships/1/ as follows:

/1/The ships of the Cuban Expeditionary Force were identified in Operation Order 25-61 as *Blagar* and *Barbara J*, which were described as ex-U.S. Navy LCIs, SS *Caribe*, SS *Atlantico*, SS *Houston*, and SS *Rio Escondido*, identified as WW II Liberty hulls, but it was subsequently established that they were not. The LCIs would be flying Nicaraguan ensigns and the merchant ships would be flying Liberian ensigns.

(a) During daylight hours. Maintain maximum practicable range ahead of CEF ships and use patrol courses and speeds to provide protection but not appear to be screening the CEF.

(b) During hours of darkness. DD's may take station with respect to the CEF ships to provide adequate protection.

(c) DD's will not be used to support the landing operation and will not close within 20 miles of the objective area. After withdrawal of TG 81.8.4 from Point Oldsmobile/2/ all DD's will proceed to join CTG 81.8.

/2/Appendix III to Annex A gives the coordinates for the codeworded reference points listed in the operation order. Point Oldsmobile is 22-01.5N, 81-02W.

2. Surface and sub-surface rules of engagement as follows:

(a) Prior to rendezvous of CEF ships at Point Zulu:/3/

/3/The coordinates for Point Zulu are not given in the operation order.

(1) If intervention by US forces is required to protect the CEF ships from surface attack or to prevent their capture, US forces will intervene as necessary to protect the CEF ship(s).

(2) This intervention will cancel the landing operation and TG 81.8 ships will take measures short of firing on CEF ships to cause them to withdraw to a port to be designated by the JCS upon receipt of the report of intervention.

(3) Subsequent to intervention and withdrawal, TG 81.8 DD's will maintain close escort of the CEF ships to provide protection and witness compliance with the withdrawal order.

(4) US forces will open fire only if CEF ship(s) is attacked.

(b) After rendezvous of CEF ships at Point Zulu on D-1 Day and until convoy has moved to a point within 20 miles of the objective area, a DD commanding officer will:

(1) Place his ship between the convoy and any suspicious or Castro surface craft sighted.

(2) Warn the craft not to approach within gun range of the convoy.

(3) If the surface craft persists in closing the convoy, the DD will intervene as necessary to protect the CEF ships, then follow the instructions set forth in paragraph 2 (a) (2) and (3) above.

(c) Intervention by TG 81.8 DD's after the CEF convoy has moved to a point within 20 miles of the objective area will be limited to that required to assist CTU 81.8.4 at his request.

3. The CAP pilots and air controllers will be instructed as follows:

(a) CAP will be stationed so that it will not appear to be covering the CEF ships.

(b) Air rules of engagement are as follows:

(1) Any unidentified aircraft approaching within radar range of CEF ships and closing will be investigated.

(2) If investigation reveals the aircraft to be Castro's, the investigating aircraft will make successive close passes ensuring that the Castro aircraft is aware of his presence.

(3) If Castro aircraft maintains course to close CEF ship(s), CAP will continue to make close passes in an attempt to divert.

(4) If Castro aircraft commences firing on the CEF ship(s) or opens its bomb bays and commences a bomb run, CAP will open fire.

Robert L. Dennison/4/

Admiral, U.S. Navy

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[Here follow Appendix III to Annex A, which outlines reference points; Annex B, which deals with communications; and Annex C, which briefly summarizes intelligence relating to the operation.]

88. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, April 10, 1961, 8 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1061. Confidential; Priority.

2803. Cuba. Padilla Nervo/1/ (Mexico) came to see me Sunday to report that he had been asked to join in co-sponsoring an African-Asian resolution on Cuba along with Morocco, UAR and Indonesia. He told me his FonMin had approved Mexican sponsorship if US did not object. He did not seem to be very much involved in the matter, but advanced several arguments as to why a res like the Chile-Ecuador res of 4 Jan 1961/2/ would be desirable.

/1/Luis Padilla Nervo, Permanent Representative of Mexico at the United Nations.

/2/See Document 10.

In first place, he insists that OAS does not exclude in any way access by an American state to UN before OAS consideration. He said this view is universally shared. He said also that if any res called for peaceful solution they

would have to vote for it even if they did not cosponsor. The idea that such a res admitted the existence of a dispute which we denied, he said, would appeal to few in view of recent newspaper reports of American encouragement for counter revolutionary activities.

Finally, he made the point that if the res is not adopted by UN, Cuba can come back over and over again as they already have done, and if a res were adopted, the next step would be in the OAS.

He handed me a draft of a res which we are transmitting by separate telegram./3/ When I demurred to operative para 1, he suggested that perhaps it would be more acceptable if UN merely expressed the hope our difficulties with Cuba would be resolved by peaceful means.

/3/The Mexican draft resolution was transmitted to the Department in telegram 2804, April 10. The operative paragraphs of the resolution read as follows:

"1. Recommends to the Governments of the Republic of Cuba and of the USA that they make every effort to resolve their differences by peaceful means;

"2. Urges member states to refrain from any action which might aggravate the present tension between the two countries." (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1061)

Finally, he suggested for our consideration the appointment of a GOC/4/ of Latin American states either named by the Pres of GA or including same ones named by Costa Rican conference, Mexico, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia, Brazil and Chile./5/

/4/Good Offices Committee.

/5/See footnote 5, Document 52.

At our meeting today I told him that we were still strongly opposed to any res for the familiar reasons, and he assured me he would talk to his FonMin tonight and implied in circumstances they would not co-sponsor an ASAF/6/ res but if one were submitted anyway, they would probably have to vote in favor. He added while he still believed in validity of his arguments, he would state forcibly to FonMin Tello US was strongly opposed to any res and said he would let us know the result of his conversation.

/6/Asian-African.

Stevenson

89. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, April 11, 1961, 9 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1161. Confidential; Priority.

2821. Cuba. Yost met with Freitas Valle (Brazil), Amadeo (Argentina), Sosa Rodriguez (Venezuela), Padilla Nervo (Mexico), Fabregat (Uruguay), Schweitzer (Chile), Araujo (Colombia)/1/ to discuss Cuban item.

/1/U.N. Representatives Cyro de Freitas-Valle, Mario Amadeo, Carlos Sosa Rodriguez, Luis Padilla Nervo, Enrique Rodriguez Fabregat, and Daniel Schweitzer. Araujo was not listed by the United Nations as a Representative of Colombia.

Sosa Rodriguez said Guinea, without as far as he knew any LA co-sponsor, had planned table res this afternoon.

Res was based on Chile-Ecuador SC draft./2/ He had asked Guinea delay submission to which Guinea had agreed. Sosa Rodriguez said LAs did not want to be faced with ASAF res and wanted be in position ask ASAFs to delay because LAs had res of their own. Rodriguez considered debate so explosive that he could not imagine it being conducted completely without res. He said LAs needed firm ground on which to stand in event Cuba or socialists presented res which because of reasonableness and conformance with Charter LAs would be unable to oppose.

/2/See Document 10.

Freitas Valle said he had visited Roa (Cuba) who was almost voiceless, running fever, very nervous and planning to speak Thurs. Roa told Freitas Valle he did not intend propose res but Cuba prepared negotiate with US. Roa told Padilla Nervo Brazilian Pres had sent message to Cuban Pres to effect Brazil would not allow anything to be done against Cuba (it was not clear in what context this was meant whether in UN or outside UN). Freitas Valle said he had proposed to Roa he might wish to return to SC and find out if new US admin had changed position re Cuba but Roa had demurred. Freitas Valle said Roa said Cuba did not want problem in OAS as this organization dominated by US. Freitas Valle's impression was Roa was nervous and discouraged and desirous negotiate with US.

Padilla Nervo said LAs did not want reasonable res conforming to Charter presented by socialists as either to vote for or against it would align LAs on Cuba or US side which would produce unfavorable reaction with local public opinion. He said LAs did not want to pass judgment on situation but wanted res in order to block item being passed to SC. Furthermore, lack of res in debate would be attributed to US with unfavorable reactions LA public opinion. Schweitzer pointed out that res would give focus to debate and give speakers something to lean on.

Amadeo told group he had given text of proposed LA res to Yost./3/

/3/The text of the Argentine draft resolution was transmitted to the Department in telegram 2808, April 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1061)

Yost reiterated US did not desire res because it served to dignify Cuban complaint and said he had sent text given him by Amadeo to Dept for comment. He said in view LAs feeling res unavoidable US desirous consult closely with LAs. He said we expected specific comments on Amadeo draft tomorrow morning. In general, we were concerned about paras referring to Cuba and US./4/ We anxious to find language which in no way limited controversy to US and Cuba because we considered situation encompassed entire hemisphere. Sosa Rodriguez agreed problem belonged in OAS but each nation must have access to UN. Yost agreed to meet with group 10:30 tomorrow morning with specific comments Amadeo text.

/4/Numbered paragraphs 3 and 7, which concerned USUN in the resolution transmitted in telegram 2808, read as follows:

(3) "Deeply concerned by the present situation existing between Cuba and the United States of America;" and

(7) "Urges all other members to refrain from whatever action that could aggravate the existing tension between Cuba and the United States of America." (Ibid.)

Comment: Dept suggested res/5/ had not arrived in time for Yost to take up with LAs at mtg.

/5/See Document 90.

Stevenson

90. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, April 11, 1961, 9:26 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1161. Confidential; Verbatim Text. Drafted in ARA/RPA by Jamison and in IO/UNP by Sisco. Cleared by Coerr and Cleveland. Pouched to all posts in the American Republics.

1981. Re Cuba. On basis Pedersen-Sisco telecon, we understand that 12 LAs which have diplomatic relations with Cuba have caucused and have agreed that a resolution on Cuban situation should be submitted. It our further understanding that if LAs submit resolution Padillo Nervo would not join with Afro-Asian effort directed towards resolution contained urtel 2804./1/ Department, of course, regrets that it has not been possible convince LAs to refrain from submission resolution on this matter, despite your efforts and those which have been made in capitals. In light foregoing therefore, you requested see Amadeo and other key selected LAs with view to (a) assuring that no resolution submitted by LAs before full consultation with us; and (b) obtaining their agreement any resolution should be along lines described Deptel 1913./2/ As indicated Deptel 1913, we believe any resolution on this matter should be addressed to fact that Communist tyranny imposed on people has driven thousands of Cubans, many of them original supporters of Castro's revolutionary regime, from their homeland. Cuban people have been and continue to be subjected to destruction and violation of their human rights and liberty which repressive dictatorship in Communist mold cannot tolerate. In short, if there is to be a resolution, it should put this whole matter in proper perspective by focusing on root cause of difficulties.

/1/See footnote 3, Document 88.

/2/Dated April 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/4-461)

Following is suggested redraft Argentine draft resolution. As you will note from changes contained therein, we have sought wherever possible to retain Amadeo's language. Changes are designed to expose falsity assumption dispute is basically bilateral and to emphasize above described approach. While we recognize that proposed changes may go further than some of LAs may be willing to go, we believe revised resolution should be put to Amadeo in first instance.

"The General Assembly,

Having heard the statements by the Minister of State of Cuba, by the Permanent Representative of the United States of America, and by others;

Taking into account the communication addressed by the Secretary General of the OAS to the Secretary General of the United Nations, dated 7 November 1960;/3/

/3/U.N. doc. S/4559.

Deeply concerned by the present tensions in the Western Hemisphere which are largely the product of extracontinental intervention;

Noting that the OAS has condemned emphatically the intervention or threat of intervention by extracontinental powers in the affairs of the American Republics;

Noting the conditions of tyranny in Cuba in which freedom and justice have been denied to Cubans and human rights violated;

Noting that many thousands of Cuban citizens have sought and gained refuge from tyranny imposed by their

government in close alignment with extracontinental totalitarian powers, and that these Cuban citizens understandably seek the establishment of conditions of freedom and justice within Cuba;

Considering that the Member States of the United Nations have the obligation to find solutions to their controversies through negotiation and other peaceful means prescribed in the Charter of the United Nations, and that this should be done in accordance with principles of freedom and justice for all concerned;

Taking also into account that the Organization of American States aims, amongst other objectives, to promote the solution of conflicts between their members through peaceful means and to achieve a system of individual liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential rights of man;

1. Expresses the hope that the Member States of the Organization of American States will provide all the necessary assistance to reach a solution of the problems conforming with the principles and purposes of the Organization of American States and the Charter of the United Nations;

2. Urges all other members to refrain from whatever action that could aggravate the existing tensions in the Western Hemisphere."

Rusk



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963
Volume X
Cuba, 1961-1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

Cuba, 1961-1962

91. Memorandum From C. Tracy Barnes, Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) for Covert Action, Central Intelligence Agency, to the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger)

Washington, April 11, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Material, 1961. Secret. Schlesinger passed the memorandum from Barnes on to McGeorge Bundy on April 12, under cover of a note suggesting that Bundy would be interested in the memorandum. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT

Cuba

I have mentioned our conversation to Mr. Dulles and Dick Bissell, both of whom are thinking about the two main points, i.e., how to answer the direct question regarding support or involvement; and, secondly, should anything further be done with respect to particular individuals "on the Hill." The latter question might appropriately be raised at the meeting Wednesday afternoon./1/

/1/April 12. The President's appointment book indicates that the President met with a number of the leaders of both Houses of Congress on April 12, along with the senior officials of the Departments of State and Defense, but no record has been found that indicates that the issue of Cuba or the impending invasion was discussed at that meeting. (Kennedy Library)

With regard to the other question, if we have any brilliant thoughts we will pass along. In the meantime, I would like to list a few ideas, some of which repeat part of our conversation:

1. The support or involvement question unavoidably requires the answer to a specific issue, namely, do you want directly to deny or to avoid denial by using some less direct and therefore inevitably ambiguous form of words. The working press is too smart and, at the moment, too well informed to assume anything but an affirmative from an answer failing directly to deny. Assuming a denial is not feasible, I would suggest consideration of the following:

a. A statement that there have been many allegations regarding U.S. support, all of which have been denied and none of which have been proved. In addition, it might be said that any specific evidence indicating impropriety will, of course, be considered. (I believe that we can live with this one. You will remember that it is the same position all agreed should be used in New York.)

b. If possible, it would be fine to include in an answer a few of the good ringing phrases that were to be used by

Stevenson in New York in case his speech does not occur. The ones I have in mind deal with the placing of blame on the Castro regime and the fact that the anti-Castro efforts, such as they are, are Cuban not American.

c. Roa's appearance is now definitely off until Thursday./2/ Moreover, there have been reports (Tuesday and Tuesday night) that he is very shaky, upset and possibly (repeat possibly) going to collapse. Also note the attached cable/3/ which, I think, is probably pretty accurate. A point can at least be made that having come to New York like a lion with all sorts of bluster and fire, he has now failed to show twice when given an opportunity to state his case. If anything further develops, I'll let you know immediately.

/2/April 13.

/3/Not found attached.

d. I have been thinking about the opening phrase in Mac Bundy's suggested paragraph/4/ which has to do with not speaking of the doings of the Agency, and I hope that any such phraseology can be avoided. As you know, historically, intelligence activities have been denied but not with a preamble of this sort. I feel certain that such a preamble will not go down well with the press or the public. Moreover, it will always be construed, in the particular case where used, as evidence that the Agency is involved. The press is sophisticated enough to interpolate the preamble where a denial is given and would, in my opinion, prefer to do so than to have it explained.

/4/On April 11 Bundy sent a memorandum to Schlesinger in which he suggested the following answer for the President in response to a question regarding CIA involvement:

"This Administration does not propose to discuss in public at any time the work of CIA, but I can say this: the people and the government of the U.S. have inevitably had a sympathetic interest in the plight of Cuban patriots--anti-Communist and anti-Batista. But no effort has been made--and none will be made--to put U.S. interests in the place of Cuban interests. As far as we are concerned, any revolt against the Castro dictatorship inside Cuba, and any return to Cuba by exiled patriots, will be altogether Cuban in spirit, membership, and purpose.

"--And let me say one word more. There have been contingency plans, in another Administration, for U.S. armed forces to respond, if called on, in any Cuban civil war--on the side of freedom, of course. This Administration has shelved those plans. The armed forces of the United States will stand guard against any act of external aggression by the Castro dictatorship, and against any intervention in the hemisphere by foreign imperialists of left or right. They will not be used in the internal struggle for freedom of the people of Cuba." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/61-4/61)

2. The arrest of Rolando Masferrer may be brought up with an inference that he may have been discriminated against since he is persona non grata to the Revolutionary Council. The answer to this is pretty easy, namely, Mr. Masferrer was, indeed, one of Batista's most notorious aides but a violation of the Neutrality Act/5/ was the reason that his asylum was rescinded by the State Department and that he was arrested by the I&NS and indicted by a Federal Grand Jury. There would be no harm in this connection in indicating that similar action would be taken against any other individuals where the evidence was sufficient to justify a comparable charge.

/5/The Neutrality Act of 1939; 54 Stat. 4, et seq.

C. Tracy Barnes/6/

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

92. Editorial Note

According to summary notes on the meeting prepared by General Gray, a meeting was held at the White House at 5:45 p.m. on April 12, 1961, to consider final preparations for the Zapata operation against Cuba. According to the President's appointment book the meeting lasted an hour and a quarter and was attended by Rusk, McNamara, Robert Kennedy, Lemnitzer, Bissell, Barnes, and McGeorge Bundy. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book) Although Gray is not listed in the appointment book, his notes indicate that he attended and it is probable that some of the other responsible officials from the Department of State attended as well. Gray's notes summarized the meeting as follows:

"At this meeting CIA presented a paper which outlined the latest changes for the Zapata operation including the defections and air strikes on D-2. Many questions were discussed concerning training of additional forces, statements, if any, on D-2 operations, how to prevent headlines, and acceleration of internal troubles. The President stressed the necessity for non-association with the US and directed that all training activities being conducted within the US should stop. He was informed that no-go time for preliminary operations would be 1200, Friday, 14 April, and for the main landing 1200, Sunday, 16 April." (Summary notes prepared on May 9, 1961; *ibid.*, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. For the text of the CIA paper, see Document 93.)

The President did not give final approval to the CIA plan at this meeting. (Memorandum No. 1 from the Cuba Study Group to the President; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

93. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, April 12, 1961.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 1, Source Documents, DCI-8, Vol. I, Part III. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the source text, in an unknown hand, indicates that the paper was the final revised version. Another handwritten note reads: "Bissell Briefing on Zapata Update."

CUBAN OPERATION

1. Orientation and Concept: The present concept of the operation being mounted to overthrow Castro is that it should have the appearance of a growing and increasingly effective internal resistance, helped by the activities of defected Cuban aircraft and by the infiltration (over a period of time and at several places) of weapons and small groups of men. External support should appear to be organized and controlled by the Revolutionary Council under Miro Cardona as the successor to a number of separate groups. To support this picture and to minimize emphasis on invasion, the following steps have been taken:

- a. The public statements of Cardona have emphasized that the overthrow of Castro was the responsibility of the Cubans, that it must be performed mainly by the Cubans in Cuba rather than from outside, and that he and his colleagues are organizing this external support free of control by or official help from the U.S. Government.
- b. The plans for air operations have been modified to provide for operations on a limited scale on D-2 and again on D-Day itself instead of placing reliance on a larger strike coordinated with the landings on D-Day.
- c. Shortly after the first air strikes on D-2 a B-26 with Cuban pilot will land at Miami airport seeking asylum. He will state that he defected with two other B-26 pilots and aircraft and that they strafed aircraft on the ground before departing.
- d. A preliminary diversionary landing of true guerrilla type will be made in Oriente Province on D-2. The main D-Day landings will be made by three groups at locations spaced some distance apart on the coast. These will be

followed about one week later by a further guerrilla type landing in Pinar del Rio (at the western end of the island).

e. Ships carrying the main forces leave the staging base at staggered times. (The first one sailed on Tuesday morning.) They will follow independent courses to a rendezvous for the final run-in. Until nearly dusk on D-1 they would appear to air observation to be pursuing unrelated courses so there will be no appearance of a convoy.

f. All the landings will be at night. At least in the first 24 hours, supply activity over the beaches will be at night. There will be no obtrusive "beachhead" to be seen by aircraft. Most troops will be deployed promptly to positions inland.

2. The Time Table of the plan is as follows:

D-7: Commence staging main force--staging completed night of D-5.

D-6: First vessel sails from staging area--last vessel departs early morning D-4.

D-2: B-26 defection operation--limited air strikes.

D-2: Diversionary landing in Oriente (night D-3 to D-2).

D-Day: Main landings (night D-1 to D)--limited air strikes. Two B-26s and liaison plane land on seized air strip.

D to D+1: Vessels return night of D to D+1 to complete discharge of supplies.

D+7: Diversionary landing in Pinar del Rio.

3. Diversion or Cancellation: It would now be infeasible to halt the staging and embarkation of the troops. In the event of a decision to modify the operational plan or to cancel the operation, ships will be diverted at sea, either to Vieques Island or to ports in the U.S. If cancellation is directed, the troops and ships' officers will be told that the reason for the diversion is that all details of the operation, including time and place of intended landings, had been blown to the Castro regime and that under these circumstances the landings would be suicidal. This explanation would be adhered to after the demobilization of the force in the U.S. The U.S. Government could take the position that this enterprise had been undertaken by the Cubans without U.S. Governmental support, that it had failed because of their poor security, and that the U.S. could not refuse to grant asylum to the Cuban volunteers. If by reason of either new intelligence or policy considerations it is necessary to effect a major change in the operational plan, it will be necessary to divert to Vieques Island so that officers of the brigade and ships' captains can be assembled and briefed on the new plan. (The advantages of this location are its security together with the opportunity for the troops to be ashore briefly after some days on board ship.)

4. Naval Protection: The ships carrying the main force will receive unobtrusive Naval protection up to the time they enter Cuban territorial waters. If they are attacked they will be protected by U.S. Naval vessels but following such an intervention they would be escorted to a U.S. port and the force would be demobilized.

5. Defections: Every effort is being made to induce the defection of individuals of military and political significance. At the present time contact has been established by and through Cuban agents and anti-Castro Cuban groups with some thirty-one specific military and police officers, including [4 lines of source text not declassified]. There are, of course, in addition many others rumored to be disaffected but to whom no channel of approach is available. The objective of these efforts is not to induce immediate defections but to prepare the individuals for appropriate action in place after D-day.

6. Internal Resistance Movements: On the latest estimate there are nearly 7,000 insurgents responsive to some degree of control through agents with whom communications are currently active. About 3,000 of these are in Havana itself, over 2,000 in Oriente, about 700 in Las Villas in central Cuba. For the most part, the individual groups are small and very inadequately armed. Air drops are currently suspended because available aircraft are tied up in the movement of troops from their training area to the staging base. After D-Day when it is hoped that the effectiveness of the Castro air force will be greatly reduced, it is planned to supply these groups by daytime air drops. Every effort will be made to coordinate their operations with those of the landing parties. Efforts will be made also to sabotage or destroy by air attack the microwave links on which Castro's communication system depends. The objective is of course to create a revolutionary situation, initially perhaps in Oriente and Las Villas Provinces, and then spreading to all parts of the island.

7. Propaganda and Communications: Currently medium and short wave broadcasting in opposition to Castro is being carried on from seven stations in addition to Radio Swan. Antennae modifications of the latter have increased its effective power in Cuba and it is believed that there is now good medium wave reception of Swan everywhere except in Havana itself where it can still be effectively jammed. The number of hours of broadcasting per day will be increased beginning immediately from about 25 to almost 75 soon after D-Day. The combination of multiple long and short wave stations which will then be in use, supplemented by three boats which carry broadcasting equipment (two short wave and one medium wave) will assure heavy coverage of all parts of the island virtually at all times. Radio programs will avoid any reference to an invasion but will call for up-rising and will of course announce defections and carry news of all revolutionary action. Soon after D-Day a small radio transmitter will be put in operation on Cuban soil.

8. The Political Leadership: As of the present moment, the six members of Cardona's Revolutionary Council, notably including Ray, have reaffirmed their membership. Although no specific portfolios have been confirmed, the following possibilities are currently under discussion: Varona, Defense; Ray, Gobernacion (Interior); Carrillo, Finance; Hevia, State; Maceo, Public Health. The political leaders have not yet been briefed on the military plan but they will be informed at each phase of military operations. Advance consultation with the political leaders is considered unacceptably dangerous on security grounds and although last minute briefings will be resented, it is believed that the political leaders will want to take credit for and assume control as quickly as possible over these major operations against Castro. The present plan is that one of them (Artime) will go into Cuba with the main force, others will follow as soon as possible after D-Day and they will announce the establishment of a Provisional Government on Cuban soil.

9. Command: Military command will be exercised in the name of the Revolutionary Council and later of the Provisional Government. In fact, however, the CIA staff constitutes the general staff of the operation and the Agency controls both logistics support and communications. Accordingly, in the early stages at least, the functions of a general head-quarters will be exercised from the Agency with the Cuban brigade commander exercising field command over the units that land on D-Day.

94. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, April 12, 1961, 9 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1261. Confidential; Priority.

2833. Cuban item. Yost this morning gave Amadeo text US substitute res./1/ Amadeo's immediate reaction was while he personally could accept res, he was sure paras 5 and 6 referring specifically to Cuba would be unacceptable to some LAs and would be virtually impossible to get approved in comite. He promised to consult LA group on US text and give us their reaction.

/1/See Document 90.

During course of day USDel received various reports that reaction to US text had been sharply adverse. Amadeo at one point reported LAs had decided to drop attempt to work out satisfactory res. Padilla Nervo said one-sidedness US res reflected US not taking LA group seriously and, therefore, they were discontinuing effort.

Yost met with Amadeo and LA group (reps LAs, except Bolivia, still recognizing Cuba) late afternoon. They expressed strong objection to US draft. Principal points: (1) it would divide LAs, many of which for domestic reasons could not support US res; (2) it would draw fire from countries in other areas and provoke debate, instead of providing mechanism for rapid disposition of item.

Yost explained US position and succeeded in quieting LAs down. He made very clear US (1) could not accept any res which envisaged situation as bilateral dispute between Cuba and US and (2) wanted to have res include reference to extracontinental threat. LAs requested time to revise their draft (USUN 2808)/2/ taking into account US views. Promised to furnish new draft tomorrow.

/2/See footnote 4, Document 89.

This afternoon Diallo Telli (Guinea) called on Stevenson to get reaction res they had prepared. Res based on Ecuador-Chile res presented SC last Jan./3/ Text sent ourtel 2835./4/ Stevenson explained US favored no res, Cuban situation not bilateral problem, and Guinea draft unacceptable. Stevenson gave no indication US talking with LAs on res but said we would inform Guinea if it became necessary have res and one acceptable to US presented.

/3/See Document 10.

/4/Dated April 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1261)

Stevenson

95. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, April 13, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/61-4/61. Top Secret. Also sent to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.

The following decisions, of which you are already aware, are reported for appropriate action:

1. There will be no employment of U.S. armed forces against Cuba unless quite new circumstances develop.
2. The specific plan for paramilitary support, Nestor, has been rejected, and the President does not wish further planning of any such operations for an invasion of Cuba. There will be quiet disengagement from associations developed in connection with Nestor.

McGeorge Bundy/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

96. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)

Washington, April 13, 1961, 6:30 p.m.

//Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret. Sent as a JCS/OSD telegram. According to the memorandum for the record prepared by Mitchell, which outlined the evolution of the rules of engagement for Operation Bumpy Road, this telegram was drafted after General Cabell discussed with General Lemnitzer and General Bonesteel the rules of engagement set forth in CM-179-61, Document 85. Cabell was particularly concerned that U.S. naval forces might intervene before seriously needed, thus forcing abandonment of the operation. The message to Dennison printed here was cleared with Admiral Russell, USN, General Dean, J-3, and Admiral Wellings, Deputy Director of the Joint Staff, and was then approved by General Lemnitzer. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

JCS 468-61. Exclusive for Admiral Dennison, General Lemnitzer sends.

1. Original concept for U.S. naval support of Bumpy Road was to ensure that when once embarked this operation must not fail. This concept modified by the later plan which provides that cancellation possible until landing phase actually starts. Concept further modified by provision in rules of engagement that if intervention by U.S. military element is required and actually takes place while CEF en route to transport area then operation must abort.

2. In view above a change of emphasis is now required. That is, it now important that premature U.S. intervention not occur which would be the cause for cancellation of this highly important and desirable operation.

3. To this end it is important to success of operation that commanders of all sea and air units of your forces engaged in protection of expedition clearly understand and apply rules of engagement along following lines:

A. It is desired to minimize the need to abort the operation because of U.S. engagement of Castro ships or aircraft in conduct of protective mission assigned to you.

B. Actual engagement of Castro ships or aircraft should be withheld until last possible moment and action taken only after it becomes clear that otherwise total destruction of friendly ship or ships may be imminent. For example, non-engagement in event of initial strafing or bomb run by Castro aircraft on friendly ship is acceptable rather than too hasty U.S. intervention with resultant need to abort the whole operation. Same applies importantly to intervention by U.S. surface ships. Initial firing on friendly ship by Castro surface ship is acceptable and U.S. engagement of Castro ship should await evidence that Castro ship is boring in for a kill or capture.

C. Preliminary maneuvering of U.S. aircraft or ships should take into account the above. Effort should be made to minimize blowing the operation by overly active intervention.

4. In the event actual U.S. engagement of Castro craft takes place, immediate report should be passed to Washington together with salient facts involved. Particularly desired are any facts which would support argument that it could be plausibly denied that U.S. intervention was in direct support of CEF.

5. In summary, hope is that over-all operation will not need to be aborted because of U.S. military intervention and to this end CEF prepared to take substantial risks.

97. Telegram From the Director of the Joint Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)

Washington, April 13, 1961, 7:55 p.m.

//Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Limited Distribution.

JCS 469-61. Exclusive for Adm Dennison, Gen Wheeler sends. Operation Bumpy Road contingency planning.

1. If operation aborted

A. Main force will be diverted or moved to Camp Garcia Vieques Island for billeting. In order to prepare for this eventuality HQ MC is directing FMFLANT airlift camp equipment and rations for 1500 men to Camp Garcia commencing 14 April.

B. Request you reschedule MarCorps BLT training exercise scheduled for 15-18 April at Vieques to a date not earlier than 25 April.

C. Request you have contingency plan for use of armed MarCorps unit to seal compound of Camp Garcia to maintain order in CEF group if necessary.

2. If operation executed

A. If operation proceeds as planned, a force of about 175 CEF men with 25 US instructors will train in the Camp Garcia maneuver area for about three weeks commencing about 23 April.

B. It is anticipated that about 160 US Army personnel may be sent to Vieques to establish a 100 bed hospital if the need arises.

C. The foregoing units will be supported by camp equipment and rations prepositioned at Camp Garcia under paragraph 1 A above.

3. New item same subject. A report has been received from CIA that a Navy P2V7 flew over Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua at low altitude during the morning of 13 April. If possible, without arousing undue interest, desire US aircraft stay clear that area. CIA has also requested US military aircraft remain south of line between 2146 N 8431 W and 1951 N 7714 W from 14 April until operation completed. We do not desire undue attention directed to that area so this request is passed to you for such action as you consider appropriate and consistent with performance of assigned missions.

98. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency to General Maxwell D. Taylor

Washington, April 26, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Top Secret. General Taylor, former Chief of Staff of the Army, was brought back to Washington on April 22 by President Kennedy after the failure of Bay of Pigs operation, to try to help piece together what went wrong. He chaired a committee composed of himself, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke, and Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, which was charged by the President with responsibility to investigate the causes of the Bay of Pigs failure and to make recommendations to the President.

1. Following is the text of a precedence Emergency cable sent to Col. Jack Hawkins (USMC) at Puerto Cabezas on 13 April 1961 by the Project Chief:/1/

/1/Copies of the two telegrams quoted in this memorandum are in Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Papers Furnished the Green Committee.

(a) Please advise Emergency precedence if your experiences during the last few days have in any way changed your evaluation of the Brigade.

(b) For your information: The President has stated that under no conditions will U.S. intervene with any U.S. forces.

2. Following is the text of Col. Hawkins' reply of the same day:

(a) My observations the last few days have increased my confidence in the ability of this force to accomplish not only initial combat missions but also the ultimate objective of Castro's overthrow.

(b) Reference (paragraph 1 above) arrived during the final briefing of the Brigade and Battalion commanders. They now know all details of the plan and are enthusiastic. These officers are young, vigorous, intelligent and motivated with a fanatical urge to begin battle for which most of them have been preparing in the rugged conditions of training camps for almost a year. I have talked to many of them in their language. Without exception, they have utmost confidence in their ability to win. They say they know their own people and believe after they have inflicted one serious defeat upon opposing forces, the latter will melt away from Castro, who they have no wish to support. They say it is Cuban tradition to join a winner and they have supreme confidence they will win all engagements against the best Castro has to offer. I share their confidence.

(c) The Brigade is well organized and is more heavily armed and better equipped in some respects than U.S. infantry units. The men have received intensive training in the use of their weapons, including more firing experience than U.S. troops would normally receive. I was impressed with the serious attitude of the men as they arrived here and moved to their ships. Movements were quiet, disciplined and efficient, and the embarkation was accomplished with remarkable smoothness.

(d) The Brigade now numbers 1,400; a truly formidable force.

(e) I have also carefully observed the Cuban Air Force. The aircraft are kept with pride and some of the B-26 crews are so eager to commence contemplated operations that they have already armed their aircraft. Lt. Col. George Gaines (USAF) informed me today that he considers the B-26 squadron equal to the best U.S. Air Force squadron.

(f) The Brigade officers do not expect help from U.S. Armed Forces. They ask only for continued delivery of supplies. This can be done covertly.

(g) This Cuban Air Force is motivated, strong, well trained, armed to the teeth, and ready. I believe profoundly that it would be a serious mistake for the United States to deter it from its intended purpose.

Esterline/2/

/2/J.D. Esterline signed for Colonel J.C. King above King's typed signature.

99. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, April 13, 1961, 10 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1361. Confidential; Priority; Verbatim Text.

2848. Cuban item. Sosa Rodriguez (Venezuela) informed Yost late today Amadeo LA group had held long session on US suggested revisions (USUN 2847) to LA group revised res (USUN 2845)./1/ He reported our desire retain original language of first operative para accepted by group. Our additional preambulatory para (third in text given below) provoked extensive discussion. Group reached tentative accord on dropping following words in para: "Causes of" and "acted on". Several dels indicated they wished consult their govts on draft and are doing so tonight. Amadeo (Argentina) later told us he was pessimistic about group's reactions.

/1/Both telegrams 2845 and 2847 are dated April 13. (Ibid.)

Res with modification listed above would read:

"The General Assembly

Having heard the statements made by the Minister of State of Cuba, by the Rep of the US of America and by other representatives;

Deeply concerned by the situation pointed out in the above-mentioned statements, which threatens the peace and security in the Western hemisphere;

Noting that the present tensions in the Western hemisphere were considered at the seventh meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics;

Taking into consideration the communication addressed by the SYG of the OAS to the SYG of the UN, dated Nov 7, 1960;

Considering that the member states of the UN are bound to find a solution to their controversies by negotiation and other peaceful means in order that international peace and security and justice would not be endangered;

1. Urges the member states who integrate the OAS to provide all the assistance necessary to reach a solution conforming with the principles and precepts of the Charter of the UN and the Charter of the OAS;

2. Urges all the states members to refrain from any action that could aggravate the existent tensions."

USUN considers foregoing draft covers basic points US position and is best res that can be obtained. Unless Dept feels otherwise, plan tell LAs tomorrow we agreeable to their introducing this text and to urge them do so promptly.

Sosa Rodriguez indicated he did not believe Cuba would speak before Mon, April 17.

Stevenson

100. Telegram From the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)

USS *Essex*, Caribbean, April 14, 1961, 12:26 p.m.

//Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Exclusive; Bumpy Road. Repeated to Lemnitzer, Burke, Smith, McElroy, and O'Donnell.

141726Z. Exclusive for Dennison, info Lemnitzer, Burke, Smith, McElroy, O'Donnell from Clark. Completed fueling 141630Z/1/ at lat 18-38N long 85-28W. Units proceeding independently to station. Have assigned 1 DD to escort each CEF ship with orders to remain outside visual range during daylight. Plan launch from lat 18-30N long 81-00W at 151030Z/2/ as follows; 3 VS for search ahead of CEF, 1 AD to assist in location CEF ships as required. Will begin routine Bumpy Road reporting at 151030Z.

/1/April 14, 11:30 a.m.

/2/April 15, 5:30 a.m.

Intelligence. No surface contacts. Will maneuver to avoid being sighted. 6 aircraft contacts within 60 miles. 4 engine transport passed overhead at 1710Z./3/ All aircraft probably commercial airlines. No apparent surveillance activity. Elokomin proceeding via South Mariposa Bank to station at 19-00N 80-00W ETA 171200Z./4/ SOA controlled to avoid contact with CEF.

/3/12:10 p.m.

/4/April 17, 7 a.m.

101. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy

Washington, April 14, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 731.00/4-1461. Secret.

SUBJECT

Conversation with Dr. Miro Cardona

On April 13 Mr. Berle and I had a conversation with Dr. Miro Cardona at the Century Club in New York.

Our purpose was to put over to him the two points mentioned in last Wednesday's meeting:/1/ (1) that no U.S. troops would be sent in support of the Cuban anti-Castro operations; and (2) that, if the Revolutionary Council goes to Cuba and proclaims itself a Provisional Government, recognition will not be automatic.

/1/April 12; see Document 92.

1. On the first point, Dr. Cardona displayed considerable resistance. He said that, if the Cuban movement against Castro failed, not only the Revolutionary Council but the United States would be held responsible. Everyone knows, Dr. Cardona said, that the United States is behind the Cuban operation.

Dr. Cardona declared that, if the Cuban patriots succeeded in establishing a provisional government on a Cuban beach-head, and if things then began to go wrong, he plans to call for help from all the countries of the hemisphere--including the United States. "This help must come," Dr. Cardona said. If the Cuban patriots win as a result of U.S. intervention, no one will care. If they lose, then the U.S. will have suffered a severe defeat on its own doorstep, Communism will be consolidated in Cuba, and the Castro movement will move on to tear down the Inter-American system. "You must understand what will happen to your interests if we lose. You must commit yourselves to full support of our efforts."

2. On the question of recognition, Dr. Cardona seemed to understand that this was dependent on circumstances and would not be automatic.

3. On the question of possible negotiation with the Castro regime, Dr. Cardona argued that any suggestions to this effect coming from pro-Castro quarters were serving Castro's purposes. "Negotiation is the maneuver of a man who is losing." If such suggestions were taken up, the only effect would be to prolong Castro's tenure of power. The proper response to such suggestions should be that this is a Cuban affair and that, so long as Castro remains in power, there is nothing to negotiate.

4. Dr. Cardona raised the question of the operational plans. "There must be some military plan I don't know about. I would like to know about it for purposes of coordination. I don't want to know these things--but I have to know to make our efforts effective." He suggested the establishment of some sort of liaison with the

operational side. We said that we would pass this request on but offered him no hope that it might be fulfilled. We see no reason why it should be.

Dr. Cardona predicted that, once landings take place, 10,000 Cubans would immediately align themselves with the "invading" forces.

5. Dr. Cardona struck me as a proud, intelligent and liberal minded man. He is a serious person and will not be easily moved from his present position. Nonetheless I think a very tough effort should be made to get him to accept the President's press conference statement concerning the non-commitment of U.S. troops as the basis for his future relations with the United States./2/

/2/In response to a question during a press conference at the White House on April 12, President Kennedy stated that "there will not be, under any conditions, an intervention in Cuba by the United States Armed Forces. This Government will do everything it possibly can . . . to make sure that there are no Americans involved in any actions inside Cuba. (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961*, p. 258)

Arthur Schlesinger, jr./3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

102. Editorial Note

On April 15, 1961, a "Bumpy Road" Operations Center was established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to monitor the operation. At 8:29 a.m. the Center received a message from Admiral Clark reporting that Task Group 81.8 had effected a rendezvous with all of the ships of the Cuban Expeditionary Force and was proceeding according to plan. (Telegram 151329Z from CTG 81.8 to CINCLANTFLT; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials) At 12:48 p.m. Admiral Dennison reported to the Joint Chiefs that everything was going according to plan. The Commander of the Air Defenses at Key West had reported that a B-26 bomber, bearing the markings of the Cuban Air Force, had made an emergency landing at Key West, after having bombed Havana. (CINC-LANT telegram 151748Z to the JCS; *ibid.*)

The chronology maintained in the Operations Center for April 15 concludes with the general observation that the purported defection of the Cuban pilot and the air strikes against the airfields at Havana, San Antonio de los Banos and Santiago de Cuba went off on schedule. But a diversionary landing, which was to have been made by a force of 163 men approximately 35 miles east of the Guantanamo Naval Base, was aborted due to "weak leadership" and difficulty in locating the designated landing beach. (Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

103. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, April 15, 1961.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 4, Vol. I. No classification marking.

SUBJECT

Air Branch/1/ [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Combat Mission Report/2/

/1/Air Branch was handwritten on the source text above the excised material.

/2/According to Bissell's memoirs, he was instructed by President Kennedy on April 14 to "play down the magnitude of the invasion," and to reduce the scale of the initial air strike and make it "minimal." Bissell's

impression was that the President issued this instruction without consulting the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Secretary of Defense. Acting on the President's instruction, Bissell cut the size of the air strike for April 15 from 16 aircraft to 8. (Richard M. Bissell, Jr., *Reflections of a Cold Warrior* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), page 183)

Santiago

Both aircraft returned to base safely. Pilots reported airfield completely destroyed and fires everywhere. One B-26 reported destroyed by rockets, one T-33 probably destroyed by .50 calibre fire, and one C-47 destroyed by .50 calibre fire. All aircraft on ramp reported afire. AAA reported as heavy and determined. Aircraft repeatedly exchanged fire with AAA positions until AAA ceased. One aircraft returned base with numerous holes, complete hydraulic failure and one hung rocket. However, landed without incident.

San Antonio

Two aircraft returned base safely and pilots reported attack destroyed 75 per cent of field. Operations building was destroyed and one T-33 on alert exploded. Two additional T-33's were possibly destroyed. Smoke from bombs partially obliterated target and precluded accurate damage assessment. Heavy AAA was reported. One aircraft landed at Grand Cayman Island because of low fuel.

Libertad

One aircraft returned to base safely and pilot reported target partially destroyed. All bombs fell within confines of the base. (Press reports stated one bomb scored direct hit on an Air Force ammunition dump and explosions were still occurring 30 minutes after the attack.) Heavy AAA was reported. One aircraft was damaged by AAA and forced to feather engine which was on fire. Companion aircraft accompanied toward Key West but observed damaged aircraft in uncontrolled crash into ocean. No parachutes or survivors were observed. Second aircraft, now low on fuel, continued to Florida and landed at Boca Chica. Extent of damage not yet determined.

Special Aircraft

The special aircraft landed at destination as planned./3/

/3/An apparent reference to the B-26 bomber bearing the markings of the Cuban Air Force, which landed at Key West on April 15; see Document 102.

Airborne Spare

One airborne spare aircraft aborted on take-off due to engine trouble.

Stanley W. Beerli/4/

Colonel, USAF

Acting Chief, DPD-DD/P

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

104. Editorial Note

In a communique issued in Havana on April 15, 1961, Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro charged that at 6 a.m. that morning B-26 bombers from the United States simultaneously bombed points in the cities of Havana, San

Antonio de los Baños, and Santiago. Castro accused the United States of "imperialist aggression" and added that the Cuban Delegation to the United Nations had been instructed to ask the United Nations to respond to a formal charge of aggression against Cuba by the United States. (*American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961*, page 289) In New York a statement issued on April 15 by Miro Cardona, as President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, contended that the bombing of Cuban airfields that morning was done by "certain members of the Cuban Air Force," who had been in contact with, and were encouraged by the Cuban Revolutionary Council. (Ibid., page 290)

On the afternoon of April 15, an urgent meeting of the Political (First) Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations was called to consider the conflict developing in Cuba. The committee had on its agenda a complaint by Cuba pending from October 18, 1960, that the United States was preparing "various plans of aggression and acts of intervention against Cuba." (U.N. doc. A/4543) The Political Committee took up the agenda item 2 days earlier than scheduled in response to reports of bombing in Cuba, and Cuban Foreign Minister Roa accused the United States of aggression against the territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Cuba. Roa's charge was supported by the Soviet Representative, Valerian A. Zorin, who warned that "Cuba has many friends in the world who were ready to come to its aid, including the Soviet Union."

Ambassador Stevenson answered for the United States and denied the Cuban charges of aggression. Stevenson cited President Kennedy's press conference statement of April 12 that United States armed forces would not "under any conditions" intervene in Cuba, and that the United States would do everything in its power to ensure that no United States citizens would participate in actions against Cuba. Stevenson added that President Kennedy was opposed to the use of United States territory to mount an offensive against a foreign government. According to his information, Stevenson told the committee, the air raids against the Cuban cities had been carried out by defectors from the Cuban Air Force who had subsequently landed in Florida and had asked for political asylum. (U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.1149)

105. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, April 16, 1961, 6 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/4-1661. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Another copy of this telegram indicates that it was drafted by Richard F. Pedersen. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-002, Outgoing Tels 1962 (TS, EXDIS, etc))

2892. For Secretary and Dulles from Stevenson.

1. Greatly disturbed by clear indications received during day in process developing rebuttal material that bombing incidents in Cuba on Saturday were launched in part at least from outside Cuba.

2. I had definite impression from Barnes/1/ when he was here that no action would be taken which could give us political difficulty during current UN debate. This raid, if such it was, if exposed will gravely alter whole atmosphere in GA. If Cuba now proves any of planes and pilots came from outside we will face increasingly hostile atmosphere. No one will believe the bombing attacks on Cuba from outside could have been organized without our complicity.

/1/Stevenson was unaware of the planning for an operation against Cuba until several days before the invasion occurred. At that point, he was briefed, in general terms, by Arthur Schlesinger, Tracy Barnes, Harlan Cleveland, and William Bowdler, in a special meeting called for that purpose at the Mission in New York. (Memorandum on Cuba, April 1961; Princeton University, Stevenson Papers, Emb-Box 2, Cuba)

3. I do not understand how we could let such attack take place two days before debate on Cuban issue in GA. Nor can I understand if we could not prevent such outside attack from taking place at this time why I could not

have been warned and provided pre-prepared material with which to defend us. Answers I made to Roa's statements about incident on Saturday were hastily concocted in Department, and revised by me at last minute on assumption this was clear case of attacks by defectors inside Cuba.

4. There is gravest risk of another U-2 disaster in such uncoordinated action.

Stevenson



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

Cuba, 1961-1962

106. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, April 16, 1961, 7 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1661. Secret; Priority.

2894. For the President and Secretary from Stevenson. Cuba.

1. Key issue in forthcoming GA debate has now been clearly defined in USSR speech Saturday/1/ as follows:

/1/April 15; see Document 104.

"Nothing was said by (President Kennedy) to the effect that activities which are hostile to Cuba would be stopped on the territory of the United States . . ."

"They have no grounds for undertaking any action on their territory which would prove to be of assistance to Cuban underground elements or elements in other Latin American countries which are preparing for aggression against Cuba . . . We expect the Government of the US to make its position clearer as this discussion continues . . ."

2. In addition Zorin stated that among the "sincere" friends of Cuba, "who are ready to provide any assistance, the USSR is to be found." He charged that "aggression" against Cuba was being carried out "from the territory of the United States and with the assistance of American arms."

3. My speech now contains no statement on the key issue as set forth in paragraph 1 above except: "I do not see that it is the obligation of the United States to protect Dr. Castro from the consequences of his treason, etc."

4. I feel certain we will have to meet this issue more directly before the debate ends. And I believe we would do best to meet it in advance. I therefore raise again desirability of doing so in this speech. I note President in April 12 press conference/2/ stated he "would be opposed to mounting an offensive" against Castro from this country.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 101.

5. We must have a clear policy position on this point that we can all stick to. I believe I should say tomorrow something to this effect at end of paragraph saying US has no aggressive purposes against Cuba: "We sympathize with the desire of the Cuban exiles, as well as the people of Cuba themselves, to seek Cuba's independence and freedom and to bring about democratic processes in Cuba. We have no intention whatever of repressing the Cuban refugees in the United States, who have such a burning desire to restore a betrayed revolution. I wish to

make clear, however, that we would be opposed to the use of our territory for mounting an offensive against any foreign government."

6. Request your authority to do so.

Stevenson

107. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, April 16, 1961.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 3, Vol. 4, Ch. 3. Secret; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT

General Gray's Briefing for DOD [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Operations

1. Per instructions of Chief, WH/4, I attended a briefing at 0900 hours this date held by General Gray in the JCS Briefing Room. In addition to those members of General Gray's immediate staff who are working on [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] support, the briefing was attended by Secretary of Defense McNamara, Mr. Bundy from Defense, and Generals Lemnitzer, Shoup, LeMay, Eddleman and Admiral Burke. (Some additional Generals whom I could not identify were also present.)
2. General Gray conducted a briefing primarily from the DOD support angle, however, his opening minutes were devoted to the air strike, the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Operation and the impending brigade assault. When the results of the air strike were discussed, it was pointed out that only a preliminary analysis of photographs had been accomplished and definitive results would not be available until later the morning of the 16th. Secretary McNamara asked how many B-26's are shown to be still on the airfields in Cuba. The answer to this question was being obtained by Lt. Colonel Tarwater from the PM Staff the morning of the 16th for return to Secretary McNamara. In discussing the losses incurred by [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], Secretary McNamara asked if DOD had any more B-26's to give to the operation. General LeMay said yes, and Secretary McNamara said he wanted all to be delivered as soon as possible. When queried I informed him that we had enough crews to ferry these to [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. (Colonel VanDine is talking to Colonel Beerli, DPD, on this matter.)
3. In discussing the convoy movement it was pointed out that the escort ships had taken off two injured from the *Atlantico*. General Gray requested that these men be taken off the Navy's hands as soon as possible. (I have passed this request to [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] and [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] of PM.)
4. On logistics matters they discussed a ship scheduled to sail tonight. I did not know to what they were referring. (Something from St. Mary's?)
5. Next subject was regarding the priorities and movement of the additional supplies for 5,000-10,000-15,000 increments. Secretary McNamara was insistent that everything should be moved to as close a position as possible in order to allow the necessary shipment when called for. I gather that all this material is being positioned at Anniston Depot in Alabama. Discussions continued regarding 48 two and one-half ton trucks and 24 jeeps, 8 M-51 tanks and mechanized graders. On these items Secretary McNamara also recommended that they be put in as near a position for utilization as possible.
6. The question was raised on the use of personnel carriers during which it was pointed out that these items are attributable to the United States and could not be very well explained away if supplied through a covert channel.

7. It became apparent that it was Secretary McNamara's understanding that a great amount of the equipment to be provided was predicated on the fact that a Provisional Government holding Cuban territory would be supported by the U.S. and supplies furnished overtly. In this case the problem of attributability for the personnel carriers does not exist. All agreed that there are plenty of personnel carriers in the Georgia, Alabama and Texas areas to supply these if needed. In addition, under these conditions, DOD would take over the delivery of the supplies all the way.

8. Someone raised the point that it would be best if other L.A. nations put in token forces in support of the Provisional Government; General Lemnitzer stated that this action was State's affair and of no concern to DOD.

9. On the hospital matter it was pointed out that the Services were going ahead with scheduling for the movement of a hospital unit to Vieques. The first priority would be a Marine Unit, 60 beds, which could be moved to meet our deadline of 22 April. A second hospital unit could be provided by our deadline of 6 May possibly through additional elements of a Marine hospital unit or a separate Army organization. No problem envisaged here.

10. Question then returned to the use of tanks, personnel carriers, and other heavy equipment and Secretary McNamara asked if more Cubans would be available to man this equipment. I told him that recruitment was continuing and that these trainees could be provided with perhaps some already capable of operating some of the equipment types involved. Secretary McNamara suggested that we try to recruit 25 or more trainees who can be trained here to operate tanks, etc. General Gray interrupted to note that the President had stated no training would be accomplished in the States; Secretary McNamara said he thought surely the President would agree to this training being accomplished. (Who takes action on this item regarding recruitment of trainees?) In discussing training, Secretary McNamara said, of course, they can't be trained in Guatemala because it has been agreed that everything would be closed out in Guatemala and no further activity take place in that area. *[1 line of source text not declassified]*

11. Discussions turned next to unfinished business. First problem brought up was the request for Avon Park with General Gray noting that the Air Force did not agree that the use of this site was feasible. General LeMay said he could not understand why Eglin, part of which is already being used in support of our activities, could not perform the tasks that we have requested. He noted that Avon Park could be covered if necessary by the Air Force stating they were using it for bombing again, but that he thought Eglin with its already existing facilities would make much more sense for this activity. (This matter will be discussed with DPD by Air Force officers.)

12. Other items of unfinished business called for no comment: i.e. hospital arrangements noted above, early warning coverage for Nicaragua by *Essex*, mechanized grader no longer needed.

13. At this point Colonel Tarwater indicated he had received word that the *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* operation had not been run as scheduled./1/ General Lemnitzer pointed out that if the area had been alerted this would have accomplished the same thing as if the landing had been made.

/1/Reference is to the aborted diversionary landing; see Document 108.

14. When questioned as to the failure of the preceding night on the *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* mission it was pointed out that the vessel involved had difficulty in finding the landing beach. Secretary McNamara suggested that perhaps they needed to provide sterilized Navy personnel for use on our vessels, if this was necessary to insure that the navigational needs of the operations be met. Admiral Burke was in agreement.

15. Secretary McNamara again returned to the problem of backup support for the force and future military operations on Cuba after the assault. He said he wanted to be sure that everything that would be needed would

be provided. Did we have enough stock piled for airdrops? He seemed to feel that arms for 4,000 to 5,000 men might not be enough. He suggested that every effort be made to package for air and small boat delivery everything that we estimated would be needed to support our efforts. Admiral Burke noted here that small boat operations were very effective in supplying bulk tonnage.

[name not declassified]

AC/WH/4/SA/Mil

108. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Cabell) to General Maxwell D. Taylor

Washington, May 9, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret.

SUBJECT

Cuban Operation

1. At about 9:30 p.m. on 16 April (D-1) I was called in the CIA headquarters for the Cuban operation by the Special Assistant to the President, Mr. McGeorge Bundy. He notified me that we would not be permitted to launch air strikes the next morning until they could be conducted from a strip within the beachhead. Any further consultation regarding this matter should be with the Secretary of State.
2. I called the Secretary and asked him if I could come immediately to his office and discuss this decision. Mr. Bissell joined me at the Secretary's office where we both arrived at about 10:15 p.m.
3. The Secretary informed us that there were political considerations preventing the planned air strikes before the beachhead airfield was in our hands and usable. The air strikes on D-2 had been allowed because of military considerations. Political requirements at the present time were overriding. The main consideration involved the situation at the United Nations. The Secretary described Ambassador Stevenson's attitude in some detail. Ambassador Stevenson had insisted essentially that the air strikes would make it absolutely impossible for the U.S. position to be sustained. The Secretary stated that such a result was unacceptable.
4. In the light of this he asked that we describe the implications of the decision. We told him that the time was such (now almost 11:00 p.m.) that it was now physically impossible to stop the over-all landing operation, as the convoy was at that time just about beginning to put the first boat ashore, and that failure to make air strikes in the immediate beachhead area the first thing in the morning (D-Day) would clearly be disastrous. I informed him that there would be four effects of the cancellation order as it applied to strikes against Cuban airfields.
 - a. There would be a great risk of loss of one or more of the ships as they withdrew from the beach. This would be serious but not catastrophic, provided that the unloading had proceeded as scheduled and all planned unloading had occurred by daylight. In view of the fact that this was a night landing and close timing was required, it was pointed out that the probability of smooth performance here was doubtful. (As it turned out, the unloading was not accomplished in the time planned.)
 - b. The disembarked forces in the beachhead would be subjected to a heavier scale of air attack than would otherwise have been the case. In view of the fact that the Cuban Air Force was inadequate for massive air attacks, the attacks to be expected under the new circumstances would be damaging to these forces but not decisive.

c. Failure essentially to neutralize the Cuban Air Force very early on D-Day would have its most serious effect on the use of the Expeditionary Air Force's B-26s to isolate the battlefield. The B-26s were being counted upon to attack approaching Cuban ground and Naval elements and close-in artillery and tanks. No fighter cover was being provided for the B-26s and they would thus face the prospect of serious attrition during these battlefield operations. The beachhead could then be overwhelmed by the superior surface attack which could be brought against it.

d. Loss of efficiency would result from this late change of orders.

5. After considering the foregoing, the Secretary of State agreed that strikes could be made in the immediate beachhead area but confirmed that the planned air strikes against Cuban airfields, a harbor, and a radio broadcasting station, could not be permitted and the decision to cancel would stand. He asked if I should like to speak to the President. Mr. Bissell and I were impressed with the extremely delicate situation with Ambassador Stevenson and the United Nations and the risk to the entire political position of the United States, and the firm position of the Secretary. We saw no point in my speaking personally to the President and so informed the Secretary./1/

/1/In a subsequent memorandum to President Kennedy on September 1, 1961, McGeorge Bundy recalled: "I made it very clear to Cabell and Bissell on Sunday evening that if they disagreed, you would be willing to hear arguments from them. Rusk was not 'in command'; he was simply in charge in Washington--who else could be?" Bundy concluded that if the air strike had been allowed and had succeeded, the invasion would still have failed. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 6/61-12/61)

6. Our immediate problem then was quickly to dispatch the necessary order to the Air Base in Puerto Cabezas carrying out the instructions to stop the planned air strike and to require re-planning and re-briefing of crews. (This was barely accomplished as the order to cancel caught the crews in their cockpits.)

7. Our next task was to try and compensate for the loss of effective air strikes./2/ In order to protect the shipping as it withdrew from the beachhead, I arranged with the Navy to stand by pending authority to give fighter cover. At 4:30 a.m., 17 April (D-Day), I called on the Secretary of State at his home and reiterated the need to protect the shipping. The Secretary telephoned the President and put me on the phone. After I made the request the President asked that the Secretary be put back on. After conversation with the President, the Secretary informed me that the request for air cover was disapproved./3/

/2/Another record of Cabell and Bissell's meeting with Rusk was prepared in the CIA on May 3. According to this account, when Cabell and Bissell informed Hawkins, Esterline, and Drain of the cancellation of the D-Day air strike, they responded that it would probably mean the failure of the mission. Cabell replied that the CIA had its "marching orders" and would comply. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Papers Furnished the Green Committee) For text, see the Supplement.

/3/At a press conference on January 24, 1963, President Kennedy was asked about allegations that the Cuban Expeditionary Force had been promised that it could expect U.S. air cover during the invasion. Kennedy replied that no U.S. air cover was planned because "if you are going to have U.S. air cover, you might as well have a complete U.S. commitment, which would have meant a full fledged invasion by the U.S. That was not the policy of the U.S. in April 1961." He noted that the decision to delay the air strike planned by the CEF's B-26 bombers for the morning of D-day contributed to the failure of the invasion, but he did not discuss the reasons for the delay. (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963*, p. 92)

C.P. Cabell/4/

General, USAF

The foregoing conforms to my recollection:

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

Deputy Director (Plans)

/4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.

109. Report by Grayston Lynch of the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, May 4, 1961.

//Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, Paramilitary Study. Secret; Eyes Only. Lynch prepared the report for the investigative committee chaired by General Taylor.

AFTER ACTION REPORT ON OPERATION [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

1. Preparation:

On 28 March 1961 the LCI's *Blagar* and *Barbara J.* departed Stock Island, Key West, Florida for Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, arriving on 2 April 1961. The two case officers of the ships, Mr. William Robertson of the *Barbara J.* and Mr. Grayston Lynch of the *Blagar* and the two ships' captains [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of the *Blagar* and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of the *Barbara J.*, had been told that they were to lead and direct the landing phase of the coming invasion of Cuba which would be staged from Puerto Cabezas and all the details of the operation would be given us in Puerto Cabezas. Enroute we received a cable directing us upon arrival at Puerto Cabezas to assemble and test 36 small boats that were to be used in the coming operation. After arrival in Puerto Cabezas, the crews of the two ships carried out this mission completing it on 10 April. The briefing team from Washington arrived about 11 April and briefings were conducted on 12, 13, and 14 April. These briefings and the operations and administrative plans given us were clear and thorough. The *Blagar* was given the position of command ship and the mission of landing troops on both Blue and Green Beaches. The *Barbara J.* was to land troops on Red Beach and then patrol to the east to cover the landing areas.

2. Plan For Blue Beach:

The plan for Blue Beach called for landing two battalions, the 4th aboard the *Caribe* and the 6th aboard the *Rio Escondido*, beginning at approximately 0100 hours 17 April in 4 LCVP's. Three LCU's preloaded with tanks, trucks and other vehicles were aboard a Navy LSD which would rendezvous with us five miles from Blue Beach and transfer the craft to us. They were to land on Blue Beach at first light. After the landing at Blue Beach was well underway, the *Blagar* was to come alongside the *Atlantico* and take aboard the 3rd battalion and with one LCVP following proceed 16 miles east to Green Beach, put the battalion ashore and return to Blue Beach to act as Command Ship and direct the off loading of the cargo ships. Aboard each LCI was a thousand man pack of arms and ammunition plus some resupply of ammunition. This was to be on call for the brigade ashore. The landing at Green Beach was to be conducted as soon as we felt we could leave Blue Beach, but was not expected to be done until after daylight of the 17th.

The reconnaissance of the beach itself and the marking of the landing sites was to be conducted by the UDT, teams that had been especially trained for this job for the last four months. There were three of these teams: one three-man team in the *Barbara J.* for Red Beach, one five-man team for Blue Beach, and one three-man team for Green Beach were aboard the *Blagar*. They were to land as soon as the LCI's arrived in the landing areas and while the LCVP's and small boats were loading the troops. It was felt that they would have about one hour to perform their missions.

3. Plan For Red Beach:

The LCI *Barbara J.* was escort for the cargo ship *Houston* which held the 2nd and 5th battalions into the Bay of Cochinos and land them at the head of the bay on Red Beach. This was to be done utilizing the small boats (12) of the *Houston*. It was planned to load each boat with ten men and their equipment. After this landing was completed the *Barbara J.* was to escort the *Houston* back to Blue Beach where its cargo was to be off loaded by the LCU's. The *Barbara J.* was then to patrol for ten miles to the east of Green Beach.

In all this planning we were told that early morning air strikes on the air bases in Cuba were planned and that these would take out all of Castro's air force.

4. Movement To The Beach Areas:

The *Rio Escondido* had damaged her props on logs coming out of New Orleans enroute to Puerto Cabezas and could only do five knots so this ship was loaded first and left Puerto Cabezas on 12 April. All the other ships left on the night of 14 April and proceeded independently to an assembly area at point AA. The brigade commander and staff were aboard the *Blagar*. All ships arrived on station at 1730 hours 16 April and formed a column for the run into the beaches. The column was led by the *Blagar* and followed at 800 yard intervals by the *Caribe*, *Atlantico*, *Barbara J.*, *Houston* and the *Rio Escondido*. At five miles from Blue Beach the LSD rendezvoused with the column and the transfer of the landing craft began. At this point the *Barbara J.* and the *Houston* left the column and proceeded toward Red Beach. The *Blagar* moved on up to within two miles of Blue Beach to launch the UDT teams. This five-man team and Mr. Lynch departed the *Blagar* at 2345 hours 16 April in a seven-man, Navy rubber UDT boat with a 16 HP silent motor. Two men were armed with BAR's and the other four with Thompson sub-machine guns. The team was equipped with a PRC-10 radio and lighting sets for beach and buoys for marking the channels. Escorting them part of the way was a 20 foot catamaran boat from the *Blagar*. This boat also had a PRC-10 radio and mounted one .50 and one .30 caliber machine gun. This boat was to lie off the beach and provide cover for the UDT teams.

5. Landing At Blue Beach:

The town of Playa Giron was well lighted and a cluster of very bright lights on the right of the town proved to be from the small group of buildings at the jetty which marked the right boundary of the landing area. At about 1000 yards out, six men were observed outside these buildings looking seaward. As there were no lights or noise from the ships it was assumed that they were merely coast watchers which later checking proved to be correct. The UDT team started into the beach about 300 yards west of these buildings and at when 500 yards out, all the lights in the buildings were switched off. The UDT team discovered a coral ridge about 100 yards from the beach running across the front of the landing area and one foot below the surface. They crossed this and started the boat into the beach. Fifty yards from shore a jeep came from the town down the beach road, and headed east and picked them up in its headlights. This jeep stopped directly in front of the team and turned toward the water throwing its headlights on the boat. It then caught the full fire of two BAR's and four Thompsons and was knocked out instantly. The team moved onto the beach and called the *Blagar* on the radio and told them what had happened. They also called for an immediate landing of troops on the beach before the enemy could rush in its troops. The team placed a red light by the jeep, moved toward the jetty 150 yards to the east and placed the other one; then moved out onto the jetty and placed the large white light to guide the landing craft in. While this was taking place someone pulled the master switch and blacked out Playa Giron completely. Three trucks were then observed moving toward the beach area without lights. These trucks discharged some troops who moved in on the UDT team who were in position in some old ruins on the jetty. The *Blagar* then moved in near the jetty to lend fire support to the landing. The *Blagar* was armed with eleven .50 caliber machine guns, five .30 caliber machine guns and two .75 MM RR. The militia was fired upon by the UDT team when they attempted to remove the red marker lights off the beach. This fire fight was in progress when the *Blagar* opened fire on the beach from a distance of 400 yards, clearing it completely in a few minutes. The only return fire was from one .50 caliber machine gun firing from the direction of the town. This fire wounded one man on the *Blagar* and then

ceased fire. After about ten minutes of firing on the beach area, the *Blagar* moved back and the first two LCVP's came in. They struck the coral about 75 yards from the beach and tried to ride over it but could not. They then dropped their ramps and the troops waded ashore. The first troops came ashore yelling but once on the beach moved out quickly and quietly. The UDT team called the second two LCVP's to land and warned them about the coral and had them come in slower and to discharge their troops as soon as they grounded on the coral. The brigade commander and his staff landed in a boat from *Blagar* at this time and took command of the beach. His radio was not working so his messages were relayed over the radio of the UDT team. There was no opposition to this landing as the fire from the *Blagar* had driven the militia away and no firing was heard until the troops started moving through the town. Mr. Lynch then returned to the *Blagar* to direct the rest of the landing, and to prepare to go to Green Beach. The five men of the UDT team were left on the beach to find a landing site for the LCU's. They had the PRC-10 radio and the boat and motor. The landing of troops continued and by first light all the troops of the 4th battalion were ashore and the 6th battalion was starting its troops ashore using the small boats from the *Rio Escondido*. Two of the LCVP's were holed by coral and after making several trips ashore one was forced to beach itself and the other sunk but the crew was picked up and sent to the beach. The UDT team continued to search for a landing site for the LCU's with no luck until a local fisherman was found who showed them a passage through the coral that could be used at high tide about 0630. This was a narrow channel and could only be used by one LCU at a time. The channel was marked by buoys and at 0600 hours the first LCU landed. After this LCU was off loaded, it backed out and another moved into the channel. The empty one was sent to the *Rio Escondido* to complete the off loading of the 6th battalion. As this was taking place Red Beach called and reported they were under air attack by a B-26. About ten minutes later or at 0630 the first enemy aircraft appeared at Blue Beach. It was a B-26 which came from the east and strafed the LCU's landing on the beach causing some damage to the motor of one LCVP which proceeded into the beach under its own power. There were no casualties from this attack and all anti-aircraft guns were firing on the plane. It left to the west in the direction of Red Beach. As this plane was leaving two more planes were sighted coming from the west and fire was put on them before it was discovered they were a friendly B-26 escorting a C-46 for the parachute drop. When they were recognized as friendly the fire ceased. No apparent damage was done to the planes but we were told later that one paratrooper was wounded but jumped anyway. The blue wing bands that were to identify our planes could not be seen until the planes were overhead and proved to be of little value in telling friend from foe. The enemy air attacks, although practically continuous, were never in groups of over two planes each. Each plane attacked independently and when he had fired his rockets left immediately. The only types observed were B-26's, which strafed and fired rockets, Sea Fury's which usually only fired rockets (four) and T-33 jets which fired rockets also. The B-26's and Sea Fury's were usually brought under AA fire with some effect but the T-33's always came from high out of the sun and we were never able to bring effective fire on them. After the first air attacks I called the brigade commander on the radio and advised him against moving the *Blagar* east to make the landing at Green Beach. The reasons given were that the departure of the *Blagar* would leave the ships in the beach area without their most effective anti-aircraft fire. Also by this time we had lost 3 of the 4 LCVP's and if the enemy planes hit us on our way down to Green Beach (a 2 hour trip), it might result in the loss of the battalion plus the command ship. I told him I could put the battalion ashore right away on Blue Beach by using the LCU's, and he could then start them toward Green Beach on the road. He agreed to this and two of the LCU's took this battalion ashore on Blue Beach.

At about 0700 our own B-26's were on station over the landing area and we thought the air attacks were finished but at 0800 a Sea Fury came in and dove on one of our C-46's that was returning from dropping the paratroopers. He came through our AA fire and made a firing pass on the C-46 which had dropped down next to the water and was staying within the harbor area. The Sea Fury was caught by our fire as he pulled up from his firing pass and started smoking and crashed into the water, exploded and sank. This cheered up the AA crews and other attacks later on were met with all guns that could fire. At about this time we received a message from the *Barbara J.* that the *Houston* was hit and sinking and that they would beach her. The *Barbara J.* was damaged by near misses by rockets that had split her seams and she was taking in water. She started out of the Bay of Cochinos to Blue Beach. At this time a Sea Fury came through our fire and fired four rockets at the *Rio Escondido* one of which exploded the drums of aviation gasoline on her decks. An LCU was at this time enroute to the *Rio* to take off this gasoline and her other cargo. The fire soon spread and it was apparent that the ship

was lost. The crew started jumping over the sides and swimming away from the ship. All the small boats in the beach area headed for the *Rio* and soon picked up all of her crew. These boats were about 1000 yards away from her taking the crew to other ships when she blew up and sank. The depth of the water at this point is 6 fathoms. The crew of the *Rio* was put aboard the *Blagar* and the gun and boat crews of the *Rio* were sent to the beach. A message was sent to Headquarters advising them of the loss of the two ships and an answer was received directing us to take all the rest of the ships to sea and return and unload under the cover of darkness. At this time we were attacked by a B-26 and the fire from the ships and from a friendly B-26 sent him away smoking. The *Barbara J.* and the two cargo ships the *Caribe* and the *Atlantico* were told to proceed ahead of us and wait 15 miles out. At this time I called the UDT team of 5 men ashore on Blue Beach and told them to return to the ship as we were going out to sea and return that night. They replied that they would stay on the beach and light it for us when we returned that night. All these men were captured when Blue Beach fell. The *Blagar* was to escort the three LCU's which could only do six knots. Two friendly B-26's flew cover for us on the way out although the wing tank of one was loose on the front end and was hanging down. These planes stayed with us until their reserve gas supply was gone and then one of them asked permission to drop his bombs on the Cienfuegos Airport on the way home. This permission was given and he departed. Results unknown. When we reached the 15 mile point we called the other ships and told them to assemble on us but only the *Barbara J.* showed up. The two cargo ships could not be found nor would they answer the radio calls. Soon after the *Barbara J.* rejoined us we were attacked by a B-26 and a Sea Fury coming from the beach area. The B-26 started an approach on the *Blagar* but was hit and as the plane fired its rockets it exploded in flames. The rockets struck 50 yards from the *Blagar* and the plane hit the water in the same place and bounced over the ship clearing the deck by only 20 feet. It struck the water about 100 yards over the ship and burned and sank. Parts of the plane were scattered over the deck of the *Blagar*. The Sea Fury did not press his attack but made one short strafing pass at the *Barbara J.* hitting her with two or three .20 MM shells. He then threw four rockets at the LCU's from a high altitude all of which missed and he departed. Two more attacks were made on us later in the day by lone B-26's none of which pressed the attack. The AA fire held them at a distance and they fired their rockets wide of the targets.

After dark of D-Day we continued south hoping to make some contact with the cargo ships but to no avail. Sometime during the night a message was received directing the *Barbara J.* to unload her ammunition and a 500-man pack into one of the LCU's for a run into the beach that night. It was felt that the *Blagar* should go because of the damage the *Barbara J.* had sustained; however, upon charting the course we found that due to the slow speed of the LCU, we could not arrive until after daylight of D plus 1. Headquarters was notified of this and we were told not to go. While the planning for the run into the beach was underway, some of the crew of the *Rio* that we had rescued went into the engine room and stopped the engines. They said they would not go back into the beach area without jet air cover. They were subdued and the engines were started again. Some of the Cuban crew of the *Blagar* were in sympathy with them and there were some rumors of mutiny. The day of D plus 1 was spent looking for the cargo ships which joined us late in the evening. We had orders to off load all their cargo plus the ammunition from the two LCI's into the LCU's and run it into the beach that night. We were told we must be in, unload and be off the beach by daylight. The LCU's were loaded and we started into the beach but again we notified Headquarters that we could not arrive until after first light. We were told not to go in but to stay where we were. All this time we were the only radio link with the brigade on the beach and they were sending out a steady stream of messages from the beach. Most of them were asking for air cover and air drops of ammunition. We relayed to brigade all the messages from Headquarters and from the air base. We were told that several air drops were to be made on the night of D plus 1 on the air field and the brigade was notified and marked the strip. The first air drop on the field was made but most of the chutes drifted off the strip into the woods. (These were recovered the next morning.) The brigade then requested that the drops be made on the town itself and the two later drops that night went there; one of them was right on target and the supplies landed in the streets and were quickly recovered but the last one was too close to the water and most of the chutes drifted into the sea. Some of these were recovered by small boats later on. We were also told that a C-46 escorted by two F-51's would arrive that night and land at the strip but they never appeared. One message also said that C-46's would land on the strip and discharge supplies and take off the wounded. The brigade was told to move its wounded (about 50 at this time) to the strip and they said they would. Later talks with survivors revealed that the brigade surgeon would not move the wounded to the strip for fear of losing them by air attacks.

One C-46 did land at the strip at first light, discharged its cargo and departed taking one wounded man that the brigade commander had sent out with the situation report on the beach. This plane load was the last supplies ever to reach the beach. During the morning of D plus 2 the brigade kept reporting very heavy air, tank and artillery attacks from both north and east and asked continually for jet cover. These messages were sent back and we were told jet cover would be provided by unmarked jets and the brigade reported seeing them arrive over the beach area. We were not told that this was for one hour only. Later the brigade reported they were under air attack again and asked where the jet cover had gone. I could not answer this because we thought it would be continuous. The brigade also asked for close air support and sent back locations of troop concentrations and tank and artillery positions on the roads to the north. At this time the brigade was still in contact with the paratroopers to the north and was reporting them as being under heavy artillery fire and fire by tanks. The brigade reported three MIGs were over Blue Beach but it is possible they saw the unmarked jets and mistook them for MIGs. At 0500 on D plus 2 the brigade commander said that unless he got ammunition right away that he could not hold. I told him help was on the way and we would evacuate him. His reply was that he would never evacuate and that he would fight as long as he had ammunition. At about noon on D plus 2 the *Blagar*, the *Barbara J.* and the three LCU's loaded with supplies started for the beach. Our ETA was about 1800 hours. At 1300 I was told by the Navy and relayed to the brigade that close jet air support was coming. It never appeared. At 1430 the brigade commander told me that he was out of contact with all units, out of ammunition, fighting in the water and under direct fire from tanks 500 yards away. He said he was destroying his equipment and heading for the woods. He then went off the air. At this time Headquarters was notified and the convoy reversed course as there was no need now for going in. One hour later a friendly PBY came from the direction of Blue Beach and passed us going S.W.

6. Rescue Operations:

On D plus 3 we received an order to take the UDT personnel left aboard the LCI's (3 on *Blagar* and 3 on *Barbara J.*) and transfer them to the destroyer Eaton which was escorting us. This transfer was made using rubber UDT boats in very rough seas. Mr. Lynch and Mr. Robertson also transferred with the teams to lead them on the operation. The information we had indicated that the survivors of the *Houston* were on the west side of the Bay of Cochinos and were still intact. The night of D plus 3 was spent cruising the inlets and small islands west of the Bay of Cochinos looking for the Castro patrol boat SV-3 which was reported captured by our people. No sign of this craft was found and at first light of D plus 4 we sailed into the Bay of Cochinos and up to the *Houston*. It was aground about 200 yards from shore and the decks were just above water. There was no sign of life and no trace of anyone ashore. We came out of the bay very close to the west shore and searched it with glasses but saw no one. We checked the lighthouse on the island of Cayo Piederass and found one of our 20 foot CEF boats drawn up on shore. We blew the ship's whistle repeatedly and went up and down both sides several times but found no sign of life. We then sailed to the west of the bay and started checking the keys that run off the swamps on the west side of the bay. On Cayo Blanco we spotted our first two survivors. The destroyer was about 800 yards from shore and the men ran out on the beach and started waving their shirts. We picked them up by sending the UDT team in to shore in the rubber boat using the 16 HP silent motor. We then spotted other survivors and spent all day picking up small groups in the same manner. The destroyer then put its whale boat in the water to assist. Although these boats were forbidden to actually land on the beach they could transfer the survivors from the rubber boat and take them back to the ship leaving the UDT to continue their search. One UDT team of three men were put ashore and combed the islands all day to find the ones who could not or would not come to the beach. Later in the day two Navy A.D.'s, propeller planes, were sent to us. They flew very low over the beaches and swamps and spotted several small groups. The UDT teams were then directed to these groups by radio and picked them up. The search was broken off at dark on D plus 4 and Mr. Lynch and three UDT men were transferred to the destroyer Murrarby which joined us that night. On D plus 5 the search was continued by both ships. The Murrarby was given the west side of the Bay of Cochinos down to the first islands and the Eaton and the Conway which also joined us that night had everything to the west. At first light on D plus 5, Mr. Lynch and three UDT men landed four miles south of the *Houston* and started to search for survivors. The coast was searched all the way to the islands but none found. We then started to comb the same keys as the day before and picked up several more small groups. Due to physical exhaustion during this

period, I cannot remember exact days. I believe we spent three or four days on this operation and were at one time or the other on four destroyers, one submarine and the aircraft carrier *Essex* twice. In all we picked up 26 survivors and found and buried one man on the beach. These survivors were in very bad condition and had been without food or water for five or six days. Most of them had only underwear or parts of uniforms left and some were naked. In all only two weapons were found among them, one pistol and one carbine. During this time three Castro helicopters were seen to the north of us flying very low over the swamps and were observed shooting the survivors by submachine guns from the air. They were seen to land on two occasions. One of these was a two place helicopter and the other two large Russian types painted green with no markings. On 24 and 25 April I conducted interviews with 19 of the survivors aboard the *Eaton*. The following picture of events on the beaches came from these men:

A. Action At Red Beach:

The UDT team from the *Barbara J.* led by Mr. Robertson landed at about 0130 and placed the marker light on the right side of the beach but was fired on from shore when attempting to place the left marker. This fire was from small automatic weapons and was silenced by the fire of the UDT team firing BAR's and submachine guns from the rubber boat. The first troops of the 2nd battalion started ashore in the small (19 1/2 foot) boats of the *Houston* and the UDT team marked the left of the beach with a flashlight from 100 yards out in the rubber boat. The second wave received fire from shore while on the way in. This fire was silenced by the *Barbara J.* firing over the heads of the landing force. The militia fled leaving some of their weapons behind. Once ashore the troops moved through the town and cleaned it out. The landings continued until all the 2nd battalion minus one squad was ashore and the weapons company of the 5th battalion landed also. (For more details on this period see report by Mr. Robertson on Red Beach.) One survivor, the Company Commander of the weapons company of the 2nd battalion stated that soon after daylight the beach was secured and they had captured over 40 prisoners. They discovered that 12 militia had been stationed in the town to guard a small militia radio station but that 30 or 40 had come in the day before on a picnic and were spending the night there. After the town was secured and the radio station was captured, the force which was under the command of the Brigade Deputy Commander sent a group out and captured a motor pool of trucks and gasoline at a motel and park construction project west of town. He also stated that 40 men from this small village offered to join them and fight against Castro. These men were put to work driving the captured trucks and other labor jobs on the beach. They were in complete control of the town and were not hurt by the air attacks which were directed against the town itself. These attacks and later ones caused many civilian casualties. The first attack by the militia came at 1000 on D-day and was from the north. This force was estimated at between 500 and 600 militia and had some tanks but friendly airplanes knocked out the tanks before they could go into action. This attack was beaten off with very heavy casualties suffered by the militia. As they were running short of ammunition a call for help was sent to Blue Beach and one tank and two 2 1/2 ton trucks of ammunition was sent to them along the beach road. This arrived at 1400 just as the next big attack was about to hit them and the tank went into action as soon as it arrived. This attack was launched down the road from the north. The troops, all militia, were in open, 2 1/2 ton trucks and open, semi-trailer trucks. The fire of the tank and the 57 MM R.R.'s, 3.5's and the 50 caliber machine guns of the landing force hit them before they could get out of the trucks. This force was estimated at 1500 and all the survivors of this action claimed they killed or wounded over half of them and destroyed most of the trucks. The next attack came late in the evening and continued all night. During the night action at least five enemy tanks were knocked out, two Russian ones and three American Sherman tanks. These were destroyed by 57 MM R.R. and 3.5's. How many were knocked out by the tank is unknown. The militia at one time sent an ambulance under a white flag to pick up wounded but tried to sneak two trucks loaded with militia in behind it. The tank destroyed all three vehicles with one round and the machine guns finished the job. At another time some militia that were trapped in some buildings came out to surrender but when the CEF troops moved toward them they dropped to the ground and opened fire. All this group was then wiped out by the CEF troops. The survivors stated that all the troops opposing them were militia and all prisoners had the Communist party card on their persons. When asked about these cards they stated that if they had no cards they could not get work. Most of the militia stated also that they were willing to fight against Castro. At about 0730 on D plus 1 the force at Red Beach was low on ammunition and was withdrawn to Blue Beach in the captured trucks, their own trucks and the tank. They took

their wounded with them but released all their prisoners upon departure. They destroyed the radio station and all the trucks that they could not use. Upon arrival at Blue Beach they held a muster to account for everyone. Blue Beach at this time on D plus 1 was quiet and the survivors stated that they had lunch and slept, cleaned up and were issued ammunition. That afternoon they went into action at Blue Beach, fought all night and at about 1100 the next morning 90 men of the 2nd battalion under the command of the Deputy Brigade Commander (Oliva) were sent back to Red Beach to stop a large column of militia, tanks and artillery that was mass-ing there. This force it is believed never reached Red Beach but it is known that they went into action because they called for mortar fire and the 2nd battalion mortars fired 120 rounds for them and then was out of ammunition. Two tanks went out with this group and were seen coming back to Blue Beach about 1300 damaged and out of ammunition. Nothing more was heard of this group and soon after the enemy force came down the road from Red Beach and attacked it from the west. This force was very large and had heavy artillery (larger than 4.2) and tanks. One survivor stated that at 1400 he went to Brigade Headquarters which was by the beach for ammunition and the Brigade Commander and staff were there but when he made a second trip at 1530 the Brigade Headquarters was gone and also a sailboat that was tied up near it. He states that starting at 1600 the front lines collapsed due to the lack of ammunition and at about 1700 all resistance ceased. He left Blue Beach with four companions in a row boat and saw many other small boats leaving at the same time. The enemy planes strafed these boats and caused many casualties. His boat drifted all night and at dawn they found themselves on the beach on the west side of the Bay of Cochinos. They then made their way down the keys to the point where they were rescued by the UDT teams. One survivor stated that his company was hit in Blue Beach on the night of D plus 1 by a shell fired from a tank that emitted some smoke and threw droplets on their clothing. The droplets did not burn, but the smoke did and caused choking and pain. They ran out of the area and when they returned later they found several dead from this shell, but he claims there were no wounds and the men died from what he thinks was a gas shell. He also stated that the next morning several men told him of the same thing occurring in their sectors, also by tank fire. Detailed action on Blue Beach is unknown due to lack of any survivors who landed there in the original force.

B. Sinking of *Houston*:

The *Houston* was hit sometime after first light by rockets while still at Red Beach. These rockets started fires in the number one and number three holds and the *Houston* pulled out from the beach. The fires were put out by the crew and the ship turned and started back in. At this time she was hit the second time by two rockets fired from a T-33 jet. These struck the stern somewhere around the screws knocking out the steering. The ship was crosswise in the bay and could only go forward or backward. She attempted to back up but started sinking by the stern so the Captain ran her up on the beach on the west side of the bay. This was about five miles south of Red Beach. The planes came back again so the order was given to abandon ship. Aboard at this time was one squad of the 2nd Battalion and most of the 5th Battalion plus a 20-man ship's crew, approximately 220 men. Six men were killed by the air attack and seven more drowned swimming to shore. Small boats were used plus lines to the shore to get the men off. After everyone was ashore the C.O. of the 5th Battalion took command and organized a perimeter. He then sent men back aboard to try to salvage what arms and equipment they could. Some was gotten off but as the holds were filled with water, this was not easy. He then sent scouts out in the direction of Red Beach, but they returned and told of running into militia between them and Red Beach. This beach perimeter was held until D plus 2. Some food and water was gotten off the *Houston* but not nearly enough. On D plus 2 a patrol craft about 35 feet long and mounting one machine gun came from the east and pulled up to the *Houston*. It is believed that this was the Castro craft SV-3. The boat checked the *Houston* and then came in to the beach to check the three small boats drawn up on shore. When it reached the beach, the troops ashore fired on it and killed four of its six-man crew. Two were captured. The Captain of the *Houston* then took this craft together with the C.O. of the 5th Battalion, the padre, two or three of the doctors and five other officers of the 5th Battalion out to the *Houston* and put aboard all the gasoline and supplies they could find. The Battalion C.O. then gave the order for the beachhead to break up in small groups and try to get out to the south. Some groups went to the north, some went inland but most started down the coast to the south. The Battalion C.O. then left to the south in the captured boat and said he was headed for Grand Cayman. Out of the groups who started south down the beach 21 were later rescued, including some of the crew of the *Houston*.

110. After Action Report

Washington, May 4, 1961.

//Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, Paramilitary Study. Secret; Eyes Only. Robertson prepared the report for the Taylor Committee.

MR. ROBERTSON'S REPORT OF ACTIVITIES ON *BARBARA J*

The writer was Operations Officer on the *Barbara J*. The *Barbara J*. is an LCI fitted with eight .50 cal machine guns, three .30 machine guns, a 75mm recoilless rifle, and a 57mm recoilless rifle, plus various automatic hand carried weapons. The job for the *Barbara J* during the operation was as follows:

1. The *Barbara J* was to escort the transport ship *Houston* into Bahia Cochinos to Red Beach. The *Houston* had aboard the 2nd and 5th Battalions Reinforced.
2. The *Barbara J* was to spot the *Houston* offshore, while the *Barbara J*'s beach reconnaissance team reconnoitered the beach and set light markers at each flank of a suitable landing site.
3. The *Barbara J* was to provide gunfire support when necessary and assist in the unloading of the *Houston*'s men and supplies at Red Beach.
4. When the beach was considered in good shape, the *Barbara J* was to escort the *Houston* out of Bahia Cochinos and proceed to patrol the beach from Green Beach eastward for five miles, engaging any enemy sea or road convoys heading toward Green Beach.
5. The *Barbara J* was to engage in any harassment operations which would confuse the enemy and help our own forces.

The objective of the 2nd Battalion on Red Beach was to secure the beachhead, proceed northward to Sopillar airstrip, link up with the paratroopers, and proceed to Objective A on the railroad at 82.0-72.0 on the 1:50,000 map. The objective of the 5th Battalion was to land behind the 2nd Battalion and take over and safeguard the beachhead.

At 2330 on D-1 the *Barbara J* and the *Houston* separated from the major convoy on schedule. At 0115 on D-Day the *Barbara J* and the *Houston* were on station opposite Red Beach. One *Barbara J* small boat with radio was dispatched to stand by with the *Houston*. The other small boat with the reconnaissance team and the writer proceeded ashore to the right of Red Beach and scouted and marked the right flank without being detected. Then the team proceeded by water to the point which was to be the left flank of Red Beach and discovered the point was occupied by enemy men. The 2nd Battalion commander was asked to notify us when he was within ten minutes of dispatching his first wave to the Beach. When the Battalion commander signified he was ready, the recon team approached the point. At about 30 yards off the point four or five machine guns and submachine guns opened fire on the recon boat. The recon boat returned fire and silenced these guns. The recon boat backed up to approximately 100 yards off the point and marked the left flank with a blinking flashlight towards sea. The first forty soldiers landed without opposition, though sporadic fire started as soon as they had landed ashore. This fire was their initial contact with the 50 militiamen in the village at the time of the landing.

Within twenty minutes of the reconnaissance team's initial contact with the enemy, six or seven trucks were seen entering the area from the left flank. The writer called for supporting fire from the *Barbara J*. The *Barbara J*'s first shots hit the lead truck and threw the convoy into darkness and confusion and apparently helped delay the convoy's arrival at Red Beach until later in the morning.

The reconnaissance group proceeded then to help in landing the troops. These troops were landed with approximately two units of fire and a minimum of equipment other than their personal weapons and the unit weapons. The unit weapons we succeeded in getting ashore were four .30 cal light machine guns, four 81mm mortars, and four 57mm recoilless rifles, plus 3.5 rocket launchers. On the second trip to Red Beach, our boat was hit by machine gun fire coming from about 200 yards left of the Red Beach left flank. One man in the boat was killed. On arrival at the beach this second trip, the writer sent for a representative of the 2nd Battalion command post, and between the two, an airstrike plan was set up in the event that communication might be out when the daylight airstrike arrived. In the plan, the aircraft would take on any targets moving along the beach towards Red Beach or along the road from the north towards Red Beach, and at first daylight the 2nd Battalion commander would send a well-briefed officer to the beach carrying a red flag for further conference with the writer. The commanding officer at this conference requested that future landing craft be landed nearer the right flank of the beach in as much as all enemy activity to date was being encountered from the left. There were explosions within the beachhead at this time which the writer took to be incoming mortar fire with some light calibre.

During this period, some .50 cal machinegun fire was directed at the *Barbara J*. The *Barbara J* was lying about 500 yards offshore and the *Barbara J* engaged this machine gun and silenced it.

The *Houston* reported that there were no small boats, so our recon team tied onto one of the *Barbara J*'s rubber boats to the lee side of the *Houston* where we found seven or eight small aluminum boats huddled with no troop movement going on. The writer climbed aboard and got a boat-load and a half of soldiers off-loaded before being stopped by a Cuban believed to be the 5th Battalion Commander. The writer believes that this man's intention was to wait until first daylight before continuing off-loading the 5th Battalion. At this point, 270 soldiers had been off-loaded. This was the 2nd Battalion Reinforced and the weapons company from the 5th Battalion and the Assistant Brigade Commander.

On the trip into shore, first daylight had arrived and at approximately 6 o'clock a B-26 appeared low and machine-gunned our small boat without success on this first run. When he came again we turned our small weapons and the weapons of all the soldiers in the small boat and fired back at him. On this pass the B-26 wounded one soldier with a freak shot that passed through another man's weapon before hitting the soldier. On the third pass of the B-26, he immediately, after passing overhead, started smoking and wobbling and soon went down over land with one survivor parachuting out.

A second B-26 appeared and started after the *Barbara J* and *Houston*. He strafed and dropped two large bombs, both misses. The *Barbara J*'s skipper was circling the *Houston* tightly and bringing all her firepower in support of the *Houston* during this action.

At this point, our cargo planes bearing paratroopers and accompanied by two friendly B-26's arrived in the area and the enemy aircraft departed. At the departure of our aircraft, we were attacked by a fighter plane which I believe was a Sea Fury. The skipper of the *Barbara J* decided to disperse until our air cover had better control and so moved the *Barbara J* and the *Houston* away from Red Beach about five miles.

The writer suggests that the following is a likely account of the short history of Red Beach. The account is compiled from observation and interrogation of survivors. Very little action occurred at Red Beach before daylight. Most of the shooting was our own. The air attack at daybreak, which included bombing and strafing the beachhead, damaged nothing important. At approximately 1000 a truck-mounted attack from the north involving 500 or 600 militia was broken up by Red Beach forces. This was accomplished with small losses to our forces and considerable loss to the militia. Fifty to seventy of the militia were captured, most of which were willing to join the Red Beach forces. The paratroopers were apparently engaged immediately upon landing, and link between the paratroopers and Red Beach forces was not accomplished. At 1400 on D-Day, another attack was made from the north involving 1,500 militia. An unknown amount were destroyed en route to this battle by a

friendly B-26. Two of our own tanks which had been sent up from Blue Beach assisted in stopping this attack. From all accounts, this force was well handled by our forces, and we claimed 1,000 casualties were inflicted. Seven tanks, which arrived after midnight were engaged by our 57mm recoilless rifles and 3.5 rockets, and five were destroyed. On D+1 an orderly withdrawal to Blue Beach was effected, since Red Beach was out of ammunition. Red Beach losses at this time were 25 dead, and an unknown amount wounded. The wounded were carried to Blue Beach.

On arrival at Blue Beach, the 2nd Battalion was put into the Blue Beach defense line which had been comparatively quiet till this point. In the afternoon, a battle started which put 1,500 militiamen against the 2nd Battalion. This battle lasted all night. The following morning an attempt was made to regain Red Beach, but the 2nd Battalion encountered tanks, trucks, troops, and artillery, and it is believed, did not reach Red Beach. The heavy mortars supported the 2nd Battalion until out of ammunition. Two tanks which were supporting the 2nd Battalion were returned to Blue Beach damaged by this action. It is believed that the 2nd Battalion was lost with Blue Beach.

At the time when the skipper of the *Barbara J* ordered the dispersal of the convoy, a B-26 arrived requesting targets for his bombs at Red Beach. He was instructed to go to Objective A on the north road and engage any mobile forces moving towards Red Beach. He located a convoy moving into Red Beach with blue marked trucks and was refrained from interfering with this convoy since it was known to be ours.

At this point the skipper of the *Barbara J* turned the convoy back towards Red Beach. The *Barbara J* and the *Houston* arrived off the point Carazones. When a T-33 jet arrived and strafed and fired rockets, with near misses for the *Barbara J* and hits on the *Houston*, a welded seam on the *Barbara J* was split, causing the *Barbara J* to take water at the rate of four feet each two and a half hours. The *Houston* announced the loss of their steering capability, and was at this time headed towards the beach. The skipper of the *Barbara J* ordered the *Houston* to reverse engines and back away from the beach. The *Houston* attempted to do this, but was observed to begin sinking rapidly by the stern. At the same time another Sea Fury started attacking the *Houston*. Gasoline was covering the water all around both ships, and the *Houston* reversed its engines again and made straight into the shore, grounding about 100 yards off-shore. As she struck shore, men were seen diving over the side in life jackets. The Sea Fury continued its strafing runs against the ship and the men in the water. From subsequent reports, we believe from seven to twenty men were killed in the strafing, and ten drowned from inability to swim. The *Barbara J* had no small boats; the *Houston* didn't attempt to use its three small boats. There was speculation as to whether we should attempt an evacuation, but this was tempered by the idea that the occupants of the *Houston* were scheduled to go ashore with the possibility that they could make a tie-up at Red Beach. The *Barbara J* was ordered to move to the Blue Beach to provide protection for the unloading operations there, the ships at Blue Beach being under air attack also.

From interrogation of survivors, it is learned that the *Houston* group proceeded towards Red Beach, but the scouts observed militiamen, and the entire group withdrew to the swamp. My last radio contact with this group was an announcement by the 5th Battalion Commander that he had successfully regrouped 1-1/2 miles west of the sunken ship. Information on his position was requested for an intended air supply drop. Within a half hour he was under attack. His request was for small boats so that he could strip the *Houston* of necessary supplies. Arrangements were made for RB-12 rubber boats and paddles to be dropped at first darkness. Within a half hour after this arrangement, the *Houston* was under attack and apparently the enemy was trying to split it up. I feel that our voice communication was being monitored. The following night an enemy patrol craft approached the *Houston* and landed five militiamen. These five were attacked by the survivors of the *Houston*. Two militiamen were killed and three taken prisoners. The three prisoners were executed because of the logistical problems they made for the survivors. On the 19th the skipper of the *Houston*, the 5th Battalion Commander, five 5th Battalion officers, the Chaplain, and three doctors left the beach in the captured patrol craft, bidding their men to scatter and make out for themselves. This might indicate a reason why the 5th Battalion seemed reluctant to go ashore at Red Beach. Of the remaining men, a few immediately made their way north through the swamps, and a few made their way south. Those that were rescued on the southern islands had swum most of the way in the

swamps. The *Houston* skipper and the small boat reportedly departed for Cayo Guano, but radio Cuba reported it landed at Cayo Largo and the men were captured.

As the *Barbara J* departed from Bahia Cochinos, a Sea Fury was circling, but apparently was bluffed by two of our B-26's which were flying protection for *Barbara J*. A jet T-33 was seen to attack one of the B-26's, and the B-26 was seen to fly lower and to either crash or make a crash landing on the airstrip at Blue Beach area. The remaining B-26 hovered over the *Barbara J*, reported he was out of ammunition, and asked for instructions. I requested that he stay as long as possible to bluff enemy aircraft, which he did, until he had only fifteen minutes reserve gasoline supply. This man's name was Ferrari and should be commended for courageous work.

At the entrance of Bahia Cochinos we had observed the *Rio Escondido* catch fire and blow up.

On arrival in the Blue Beach area, all ships were ordered south. We departed with the *Atlantico* and *Caribe* leading, and the *Barbara J* providing close support. The U-boats protected by the *Blagar* followed. The *Blagar* requested all ships to merge for mutual self-protection. The *Barbara J* joined the *Blagar* and U-boats, and the *Caribe* and *Atlantico* disappeared over the horizon. One strafing and bombing pass was made on the right flank LCU, with the *Blagar* and *Barbara J* giving her support. What appeared to be a salvo boat of shore-based artillery splashed five shells within the convoy on the way out. This was possibly 1 o'clock to 2 o'clock in the afternoon of D-Day.

At approximately 3:30, when the convoy was outside the continental limit, a Sea Fury and a B-26 attacked. The Sea Fury circled high and the B-26 came for a low strafing attack, lining up the *Barbara J* and the *Blagar*. As the B-26 passed over the *Blagar*, it exploded in a great ball of flame. It is believed that hits from *Blagar* guns had entered the gas tanks, and that the pilot fired his rockets, causing the explosion. The Sea Fury then circled for a few minutes and started a run on the *Barbara J*, but peeled off early, probably because of the *Barbara J*'s gunfire. He scored 20mm hits on the *Barbara J*. At this time we were ordered further out to sea.

Preparations were made for a night run into Blue Beach. When the order arrived, headquarters was notified that we were without the cargo ships, and that it was felt that it was impossible to arrive at Blue Beach before daylight. Air and/or sea support was requested, with the warning that we felt we were sure to be sunk without this protection and thus be no good to Blue Beach. During the night we were ordered to cancel this run. The following evening the cargo ships had been reassembled, and the *Caribe* was unloaded into LCUs. The *Barbara J* was unloaded into an LCU when the order came for the *Barbara J* to make a 500-man pack supply run to Blue Beach. The *Barbara J* was leaking and one bank of engines was out and emptied of supplies and had no small boats, so the responsibility was shifted to the *Blagar*. The writer transferred to the *Blagar* to assist in this run and to assist the *Blagar* Operations Officer with communications functions. At approximately midnight the run was started, with an additional warning to headquarters that we were going to arrive in daylight. An air or sea support was necessary. Sometime during the night this trip was cancelled.

The writer relieved the Operations Officer of the *Blagar* of communication duties at times during the night. The gist of the communication can be summed up as follows: The Brigade Commander continually reported he was out of anti-tank ammunition and surgical supplies and had wounded to evacuate. All messages were forwarded to strike base and U.S. Navy. From strike base and U.S. Navy we continually received assurances that re-supplies and evacuation of wounded were being carried on and that a close air support strike was arranged for first light. A tank column had been located coming into Blue Beach from the north. Its exact location was reported by the Brigade Commander. Arrangements were made for strike base to take on these tanks at first light, and U.S. Navy jets were "on the way." The jets had not appeared when first light arrived and their whereabouts was requested. We were told that they were still "on the way."

At 20 minutes daylight a request from headquarters came that either of the two operations officers go on beach to evaluate the situation. A Cuban CW operator was recruited to go with the writer. No boat operator was found who would go. Subsequent activity negated this operation.

At daylight the beach was under air, tank, and artillery attack. During the night, two re-supply drops had been made, part of which went into the ocean, part of which was received. A C-46 had landed on the airstrip, dumped its supplies, and departed evacuating one wounded. The Brigade Commander began talking in terms of his men standing in the water fighting, and "being massacred" and "murdered." At one point he could see four Navy jets high overhead, and was being attacked simultaneously by three enemy Sea Fury's. When he asked that the jets enter the fight and was told that we were doing everything to get permission, his comment was "God damn it, God damn you, God damn you. Do not wait for permission." He continually spotted tanks, artillery locations, and continually asked when would they be attacked by our airplanes. About midday the base announced that we were going in in full force, shooting, for evacuation purposes. The Brigade Commander was told that within three hours the Navy forces, air and sea, plus our cargo convoy would be there to pick them up. He announced that an enemy tank was within 400 yards of his command post firing at him and he had no ammunition with which to fight it. He said he would not be there in three hours. In his next message he said he was destroying his communications set and going into the woods. We were trying to get him to hold on when communication abruptly broke. We have two reports: (1) That the Brigade Commander was seen going to sea in a small sailboat, and (2) That he had gone inland to Excambrey. The convoy started out to sea.

On the morning of D+3 the operations officers of the *Blagar* and the *Barbara J* were transferred by rubber boat, along with six UDT men and personal weapons and radios, aboard the USS *Eaton*. Subsequently we boarded the aircraft carrier *Essex* along with the commander of the destroyer group, Captain Crutchfield, for the purpose of conferring with Admiral Clark and Marine Colonel Mallard about effecting rescue operations. It was generally thought among all concerned that the *Houston* survivors could be sought only if the information concerning them was recent, accurate, and reliable. The *Eaton* was dispatched towards Bahia Cochinos with our operations officers and UDT men aboard with the understanding that Mallard and Clark would seek information on the validity and accuracy of intelligence concerning survivors on the beach, and would send authorization or cancellation of that operation prior to the arrival of the *Eaton* on station. The operation was cancelled by Admiral Clark and we spent the night sailing close to the beach for light signals. At daylight movement was seen on Cayo Blanco del Sur. A rubber boat was dispatched and contact made with four survivors, who were pulled aboard. A whaleboat was dispatched from the *Eaton* with U-boat personnel aboard. The whaleboat would carry the writer and three UDT men to a position 200 to 300 yards off the beach, from where we would make the approach and contact with the survivors by rubber boat. Seventeen survivors were removed in five separate operations by this group over a period of two days. Predawn landings and reconnaissance were made each day to assure that Castro's militiamen hadn't occupied the island during the night. Similar activity was conducted by the *Blagar* operations officer and three UDT men on other beaches. The final day these two groups swept Cayao Miguel and Cayao Blanco del Sur and the island of Carrario. We carried loud speakers and searched in the mangrove swamps and tried to reassure hidden refugees that the arms we carried were not against them, but against Castro. They were afraid of our arms. For example, one man had been lying with only his face out of the water, and when he saw the writer, he tried to sink under water. We tried to assure him, but he thought that the writer was a Russian. He said that there were no friends any more, and we were Russians. We broadcast that if they would call to us, we would approach them without clothing and arms. During this operation Castro had helicopters calling as if they were saviors of the refugees and then submachine gun those who would show themselves. I believe that we missed many survivors because of the smallness of our patrol. We could not cover every square foot of these islands, and the refugees were afraid to expose themselves to us. All were in weakened condition and at times had to be carried to the boat.

On this night, the militiamen moved onto the islands and set fire to the brush and claimed to have driven out 166 survivors. I believe that this is an exaggeration. On the following morning, the writer and four UDT men and rubber boats and equipment boarded the submarine USS *Threadfin* and started towards Bahia Cochinos for an attempted rescue near the sunken *Houston*. This operation was cancelled at 7 o'clock in the evening and the *Threadfin* returned to sea because of an occurrence which is U.S. Navy Top Secret and not to be recorded in this report. The writer and men returned to the *Eaton*. The writer and the operations officer of the *Blagar* were air-lifted to the *Essex* and subsequently to Guantanamo and to headquarters.

111. Telegram From the Chief of the Subsidiary Activities Division (Gray) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)

Washington, April 17, 1961, 4:22 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. A chronology of the Bumpy Road Operation, maintained in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, indicates that this telegram grew out of a 1 a.m. meeting on April 17 at CIA headquarters. CIA Deputy Director Cabell invited General Gray to the meeting to discuss air support for the CEF. Cabell stated that the dawn strikes planned by CEF planes had been disapproved owing to objections from the State Department. An air CAP for the force by U.S. carrier based fighters was therefore urgently needed. Gray relayed the request to General Wheeler and General Lemnitzer and informed the CIA at 3 a.m. that an air CAP and early warning for the CEF ships would be made available if CIA obtained the necessary higher approval. (Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

JCS 994221. Bumpy Road. Exclusive for Adm Clark & Adm Dennison from General Gray.

1. On 17 April CEF aircraft will be limited to defense of beachhead from air and ground attack. Limited Cuban aircraft patrol activity in area expected.
 2. Be prepared to execute on order following missions as soon after first light as practicable throughout daylight hours 17 April:
 - a. Provide Air Cap for CEF shipping outside territorial waters. Rules of engagement as stated in your OP Plan/1/ apply as applicable.
- /1/Reference is to Operation Order 25-61, April 10, Document 87.
- b. Provide EW/2/ for CEF ships to include LCI's for purpose of warning ships of approaching aircraft. EW ships should remain maximum distance off shore consistent with capability to communicate with CEF ships.
- /2/Early Warning.
3. This is a warning order./3/

/3/According to the memorandum for the record prepared by Commander Mitchell, which outlined the evolution of the rules of engagement for Operation Bumpy Road, at 5:30 a.m. on April 17, Bissell called the Operations Center at the JCS and stated that the White House had only approved the employment of an Early Warning vessel. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba Paramilitary Study) Accordingly, General Gray sent a message to Admirals Dennison and Clark countermanding the authorization to provide an air CAP for CEF shipping. In JCS telegram 994222, sent at 5:50 a.m., Gray, on behalf of the JCS, instructed Dennison and Clark to execute only the mission set forth in paragraph 2b of JCS telegram 994221, subject to the limitation that EW vessels were not to approach any closer than 30 miles from the Cuban coastline. Gray stipulated that an air CAP was not authorized. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

112. Editorial Note

The landings of the Cuban Expeditionary Force on the southern coast of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs began as scheduled at 1 a.m. on April 17, 1961. At 1:44 the *San Marcos* completed the discharge of LCUs and withdrew to sea. (Chronology maintained in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations; Naval Historical Center, Area Files,

Bumpy Road Materials) Air support for the landings was limited to two CEF B-26 bombers, but Admiral Clark reported that the two destroyers he had assigned as Early Warning vessels would be on station some 30 miles offshore by 3:30 a.m. (CTG 81.8 telegram 171418Z, April 17; *ibid.*) Paratroopers of the First Battalion were dropped at 7:30 and seized the road center of San Blas, 10 miles northeast of Blue Beach. They were reinforced soon thereafter by the Third Battalion and a heavy weapons detachment. (Memorandum No. 1 from the Cuban Study Group to the President, June 13; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

At 9:40 a.m. units of Admiral Clark's Task Group reported that the CEF ships supporting the invasion were under heavy air attack and were putting out to sea. (CINCLANT telegram 171608Z to JCS, April 17; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials) By 10:17, the CIA reported to the JCS that the *Rio Escondido* and the *Houston* had been sunk, and the *Blagar* was under attack. (Chronology maintained in the Office of CNO; *ibid.*) Admiral Clark instructed the two destroyers providing early warning to withdraw if necessary, but not to become involved in action except for self defense. The Task Group would provide air CAP for the destroyers but not the CEF. (CINCLANT telegram 171608Z to JCS; *ibid.*) At 10:36 a.m. Admiral Dennison instructed Task Group 81.8, which had been retiring from the area according to plan, to reverse course and move north to a position which would allow closer support if authorized. (CINCLANTFLT telegram 171536Z to CTG 81.8, April 17; *ibid.*)

113. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Secretary of State Rusk

April 17, 1961, 9:11 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations, 3/31/61-5/31/61. No classification marking. Transcribed in Rusk's office by Phyllis D. Bernau. Bundy was at USUN; Rusk was in Washington.

TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR BUNDY IN NEW YORK

B said he administered the first shock--there is a morale problem there and glad he came for this reason. For various reasons he/1/ got himself in a state of mind this was not going to happen--partly because of a general conversation with our chief and partly because of a breakdown of communications. B conveyed general apologies for what happened over the week end. He will pick up the pieces to see where he can go. He/2/ patched up a picture of Uncle Sam and now is going to be in the middle of its destruction and not easy. B said maybe the Sec and the chief will want to talk this a.m. but meantime wait a bit. The Sec said not too much is coming in from there--can't tell too much about what is happening. B asked if there is anything he should do. The Sec said he is being called back at 9:30 and there may be something.

/1/An apparent reference to Stevenson.

/2/Another apparent reference to Stevenson.

The Sec said there should be a message up there re Adlai's speech/3/--something had come in here.

B asked to be called if anything came up./4/

/3/Cuban Foreign Minister Roa repeated and elaborated on charges of U.S. aggression against Cuba in debate in the First Committee on April 17. He charged that Cuba had been invaded by mercenary bands organized, armed, and financed by the Central Intelligence Agency. He stated that the mercenaries came from bases in Florida and Guatemala, and he listed addresses of recruiting centers in the United States. (U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.1150) Stevenson followed and categorically denied Roa's charges. The United States, he stated, "has committed no

aggression against Cuba, and no offensive has been launched from Florida or from any other part of the United States." (Ibid.)

/4/Bundy and Rusk talked again at 10:13 a.m. Bundy said that Stevenson had talked to the President, and "took a strong view." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations, 3/31/61-5/31/61) At 10:15 a.m. General Cabell called Rusk to report that two of the CEF ships had been sunk in heavy air attacks. (Ibid.)

114. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy

Washington, April 17, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, Papers of Arthur Schlesinger, Cuba 1961, Box 31. Secret.

SUBJECT

Cuba: Can We Recognize a Provisional Government?

I raised last week with the State Department the question of the conditions under which we could take formal diplomatic cognizance of an anti-Castro regime in Cuba. I have now received a memorandum from the Legal Adviser dealing with this question./1/

/1/This memorandum, entitled "Various Considerations If an Insurrectionary Movement Gains Control of a Specific Area in Cuba," is dated April 7, and was forwarded to Schlesinger on April 17 under a covering memorandum from Executive Secretary Lucius D. Battle. (Ibid.)

1. The memorandum makes clear that the United States can not, under international law, recognize an insurrectionary group which has control of only a relatively small area in Cuba. The tests for recognition include possession of the machinery of state, administering the government with the assent of the people and without substantial resistance, and capacity to discharge international obligations. Obviously the Revolutionary Council will not meet these tests until it is established in Habana and until fighting has substantially ceased. Recognition of the insurgents at an earlier stage would probably constitute a casus belli.

2. The memorandum also makes it clear that, if the insurgents gain control over a particular area and if they organize a framework of government within that area, a case can be made for US recognition of a state of belligerency in Cuba.

If the US recognized a state of belligerency, we would have the position, under international law, of a neutral. Both parties to the war would have the rights of belligerents. While the US Government would be required to practice impartiality in its relations with the two belligerents, private persons and companies in the US could make loans, sell arms, etc., to the insurgents. The Castro regime, on the other hand, would have the right under international law to blockade ports held by the insurgents and to stop and search American vessels on the high seas and seize vessels carrying contraband of war.

The State Department points out that the recognition of belligerency in Cuba by the US would create, in the words of the Rio treaty, a "fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America," and would thereby open the situation up to action by the OAS. Recognition of belligerency, in other words, could lay the basis for multilateral OAS action calling for an end to hostilities and supervised elections; or, failing this, for OAS quarantine of Cuba or general OAS recognition of belligerency in Cuba.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr./2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

115. Telegram From the Director of the Joint Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)

Washington, April 17, 1961, 3:35 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Top Secret; Immediate. The rules of engagement outlined in this telegram were drafted by Cabell and given to Gray at the CIA at 3:30 a.m. on April 17. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Green Study Group, Vol. II)

JCS 994247. Exclusive for Adm Dennison. Bumpy Road.

1. Effective on receipt and to continue until otherwise directed establish aircap in accordance with following restrictions:

- a. Carriers shall operate no closer than 50 miles from Cuban territory.
- b. Aircraft shall operate no closer than 15 miles to Cuban territory.
- c. No more than 4 aircraft on station at one time.

2. Paragraphs 3 B 2, 3 and 4, Appendix 2 to Annex A Operation Order CINCLANTFLT No 25-61/1/ are superseded by the following instructions:

/1/Document 87.

- a. US aircraft shall attack if unfriendly aircraft makes aggressive move by opening bomb bay doors when headed toward ship to be protected or starts a strafing run on it. Attacks will not be made by US aircraft under any other condition.
- b. No hot pursuit inside the 15 mile line from Cuban territory.
- c. US aircraft shall not come up close to unfriendly aircraft except when attacking it.
- d. If unfriendly aircraft is shot down every effort shall be made to hide the fact that such action has occurred.

3. The JCS interpret the foregoing to mean that you will establish a safe haven for friendly ships a minimum of fifteen miles off shore./2/

/2/Admiral Dennison relayed the new rules of engagement for air action to Admiral Clark at 4:56 p.m. (CINCLANTFLT telegram 172156Z to CTG 81.8, April 17; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials) The chronology of the operation maintained by CNO noted that 1 hour and 31 minutes elapsed between the time that JCS 994247 was sent to Admiral Dennison and the time that the new rules relayed by CINCLANT to Task Group 81.8 were received by Admiral Clark. (Bumpy Road Chronology; *ibid.*) During that time, the JCS passed to CINCLANT at 4:26 a CIA report that the *Barbara J.* and the *Atlantico* were under heavy air attack 25 miles off the coast and urgently requesting support. (JCS telegram 172126Z to CINCLANT, April 17; *ibid.*) At 4:48 p.m., CINCLANTFLT reported to JCS that one of the destroyer units of CTG 81.8 reported that CEF ships some 26.6 miles southwest of the Bay of Pigs were under attack by a Sea Fury plane. One of the ships, believed to be the *Barbara J.*, was on fire and requesting assistance. (CINCLANTFLT telegram 172148Z to JCS, April 17; *ibid.*)

116. Editorial Note

At 6 p.m. on April 17, 1961, Admiral Clark reported that the four remaining ships of the Cuban Expeditionary Force, *Blagar*, *Barbara J.*, *Atlantico*, and *Caribe*, were 55 miles off the Bay of Pigs with the two EW destroyers assigned to the area maintaining distant contact. The CEF ships were proceeding south at 5 knots. (CTG 81.8 telegram 172300Z to CINCLANTFLT, April 17; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials) During the early morning hours of April 18, Admiral Clark attempted to convince the CEF ships to return to Point Zulu, some 41.2 miles off the coast of Cuba. At 4:50 a.m. Clark reported that *Blagar* and *Barbara J.* had turned around and were expected to return to Point Zulu by 7 a.m. *Atlantico* and *Caribe* were still headed south, however, and the master of *Atlantico* stated that he would have trouble with his crew if he attempted to turn north, unless support from the Task Group was visible. Clark indicated that he planned to send CAP over the *Atlantico* at first light to boost morale. (CTG 81.8 telegram 180950Z to CINC-LANTFLT, April 18; *ibid.*) At 5:26 a.m. Clark reported that *Atlantico* had turned north but that he was still working on the reluctant *Caribe*. (CTG 81.8 telegram 181026Z to CINCLANTFLT, April 18; *ibid.*)

Blagar and *Barbara J.* reached Point Zulu by 11 a.m. and Clark reported that there was no hostile activity in the area. The CEF ships had been under an air CAP since first light. (CTG 81.8 telegram 181604Z to CINCLANTFLT, April 18; *ibid.*) At 12:26 p.m. Clark reported that the two planes that he had sent out to search for the *Caribe* had found the ship approximately 218 miles south of the Bay of Pigs and had persuaded the master to turn north toward Cuba. (CTG 81.8 telegram 181726Z to CINC-LANTFLT, April 18; *ibid.*)

117. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, April 18, 1961, 2 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Pen Pal Series, 1961-1964, Special US-USSR File, 1961. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 8:53 a.m. The Embassy also reported that a demonstration against U.S. involvement in Cuba began outside the Embassy at 2:35 p.m. local time. (Telegram 2552 from Moscow, April 18; *ibid.*, Central Files, 737.00/4-1861) The Soviet Government released the text of the letter to the press at the same time that it was presented to the Embassy in Moscow. The letter is also printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, May 8, 1961, p. 662. Ambassador Zorin read the text of Khrushchev's letter during debate in the First Committee on April 18. (U.N. doc. A/C.1/5R.1153)

2550. Following letter to President Kennedy from Khrushchev handed me by Acting Foreign Minister Semenov at 12:15 today. Begin text:

Mr. President, I send you this message in an hour of alarm, fraught with danger for the peace of the whole world. Armed aggression has begun against Cuba. It is a secret to no one that the armed bands invading this country were trained, equipped and armed in the United States of America. The planes which are bombing Cuban cities belong to the United States of America, the bombs they are dropping are being supplied by the American Government.

All of this evokes here in the Soviet Union an understandable feeling of indignation on the part of the Soviet Government and the Soviet people.

Only recently, in exchanging opinions through our respective representatives, we talked with you about the mutual desire of both sides to put forward joint efforts directed toward improving relations between our countries and eliminating the danger of war. Your statement a few days ago that the USA would not participate in military activities against Cuba/1/ created the impression that the top leaders of the United States were taking into account the consequences for general peace and for the USA itself which aggression against Cuba could have. How can what is being done by the United States in reality be understood, when an attack on Cuba has

now become a fact?

/1/See footnote 2, Document 101.

It is still not late to avoid the irreparable. The Government of the USA still has the possibility of not allowing the flame of war ignited by interventions in Cuba to grow into an incomparable conflagration. I approach you, Mr. President, with an urgent call to put an end to aggression against the Republic of Cuba. Military armament and the world political situation are such at this time that any so-called "little war" can touch off a chain reaction in all parts of the globe.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, there should be no mistake about our position: We will render the Cuban people and their government all necessary help to repel armed attack on Cuba. We are sincerely interested in a relaxation of international tension, but if others proceed toward sharpening, we will answer them in full measure. And in general it is hardly possible so to conduct matters that the situation is settled in one area and conflagration extinguished, while a new conflagration is ignited in another area.

I hope that the Government of the USA will consider our views dictated by the sole concern not to allow steps which could lead the world to military catastrophe. End text.

Freers

118. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger)

Washington, undated.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1861. Secret. Sent through Presidential Special Assistant Ralph A. Dungan. Drafted by J.P. Hoover in ARA on April 18.

SUBJECT

Cuba Contingency Plan

Pursuant to your conversation with Mr. Coerr of April 18, 1961, I am enclosing the original of the Cuba Contingency Plan.

Since it may have some additional interest, I am also enclosing a penultimate draft of the plan/1/ which touches on broader aspects of the possible post-Castro situation such as United States objectives, conditions for recognition, etc.

/1/Not printed.

You will observe that the Contingency Plan is being sent to you before it has been submitted to the Secretary.

L.D. Battle/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Attachment/3/

/3/Secret. Drafted by Hoover on March 24.

POSSIBLE US ASSISTANCE TO A FRIENDLY CUBAN GOVERNMENT AND SOME IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS AFFECTING US-CUBAN RELATIONS

1. A friendly government in Cuba might request from the US assistance in the following fields:

(a) Loans and/or grants for critical foreign exchange needs.

(b) PL-480/4/ foodstuffs.

/4/The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954; 68 Stat. 454, et seq.

(c) Critical medical and public health supplies, and technical assistance.

(d) Loans and/or grants providing local currency for immediate budgetary support.

(e) Joint planning, in cooperation with the Cuban government and multilateral agencies and within the context of the "Act of Bogota"/5/ and the "Kennedy Program",/6/ toward programs for the economic, social and political reconstruction and development of Cuba.

/5/Recommendation I of the Report of the Secretary General of the OAS to the Council of the OAS, October 11, 1960. For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 293-299.

/6/An apparent reference to the Alliance for Progress proposed by President Kennedy in his inaugural address and in his initial State of the Union Address. See *ibid.*, pp. 8 and 18-19.

(f) Cooperative arrangements, either on a bilateral or multilateral basis, for programs in such fields as the following: (i) Agrarian reform, agricultural improvement and diversification; (ii) Educational reconstruction; (iii) Public administration and Civil Service improvement; (iv) Technical and development assistance; (v) Accelerated industrial expansion and diversification; (vi) Increased employment.

2. Financial Assistance.

(a) General. The provision of immediate financial assistance for both critical foreign exchange needs and budgetary support will be required to permit the government to operate until lines of credit can be reopened and the economy can function again. Presumably, this period will not exceed 60-90 days, by which time, in addition to re-established commercial credits, action by other agencies in the nature of stand-by agreements, stabilization loans, etc., may have been taken.

(b) Foreign Exchange. It is estimated that there should be immediately available \$35 million to cover foreign exchange needs during the early critical period. This amount should be provided on a grant basis calling upon Cuba to deposit counterpart equivalent in local currency, which may in turn be granted or loaned by the US for budgetary support or other agreed-on purposes. (See Tab A)/7/

/7/None of the attachments cited in the contingency plan is printed.

(c) Budgetary Support. It is estimated that approximately \$15 million per month may be required for budgetary support to enable a new Cuban government to continue paying salaries and wages of the minimum number of government employees and workers needed to maintain essential administrative services. The total required under this heading would be \$45 million, which, if determined necessary, should be provided from counterpart funds generated from the grant \$35 million contingency funds under 2(b) above, and as necessary by additional grant or loan. (See Tab B)

(d) Need for New Currency. If the convertibility of the Cuban currency to a par with the US dollar is to be restored, it will probably be necessary for a new Cuban government to issue new currency, exchanging the new for old bills on the basis of a rate determined to represent a fair value in relation to the dollar at the time. A prospective new Cuban government ought to have prepared in advance a new currency issue of approximately \$500 million, (see Tab C) which would probably require a currency stabilization loan of approximately \$100 million.

3. Immediate Foodstuffs Requirements.

(a) General. It is probable that a successor Cuban government will encounter an immediate need in feeding parts of the population owing to the interference of civil disorder, etc., in the normal production of local foodstuffs and to the presumed failure of the Castro government to maintain imports of basic necessities in sufficient quantity. (See Tab D)

(b) Quantities and Value. The following commodities will probably be required in the indicated amounts, and advance arrangements should be made to supply them under Title I of PL-480, during an immediate period of 60 days.

Commodity: Lard

Metric Tons: 13,000

Approx. Value: \$3,000,000

Commodity: Evaporated milk

Metric Tons: 1,000

Approx. Value: \$300,000

Commodity: Corn

Metric Tons: 18,000

Approx. Value: \$1,000,000

Commodity: Rice

Metric Tons: 35,000

Approx. Value: \$7,350,000

Commodity: Wheat

Metric Tons: 23,000

Approx. Value: \$1,850,000

Commodity: Wheat flour

Metric Tons: 15,000

Approx. Value: \$1,500,000

Total Approx. Value: \$15,000,000

Note: Any of the above not available through PL-480 should be financed by contingency funds.

(c) Channels of Distribution. It is recommended that the distribution of the foregoing quantities of food within Cuba be handled by a joint committee composed of representatives of the successor Cuban government and of an American liaison group to serve temporarily as an adjunct of the Embassy. The joint committee should determine the proportions of the supplies to be made available for free distribution to the needy, for handling by voluntary relief agencies, and for sale to the public through existing registered food dealers. (See Tab E)

If internal transportation facilities are seriously disrupted, the successor Cuban government may find it necessary to undertake distribution directly to retail outlets.

Any sales proceeds would be granted for work relief, direct economic development, or economic development activities in the Cuban budget. Concurrently a Title I program for meeting the continuing commercial requirements should be developed.

(d) Procurement in the US. Procurement and shipment in the US should be handled in accordance with established procedures under Title II of PL-480. Outward freight charges have not been taken into account in the values indicated in (b) above, but should be assumed by the US.

(e) Stockpiling in the US. In the belief that stocks of the basic commodities listed under (b) above are normally available at storage points at or near Gulf and East Coast ports, no special advance preparations would appear to be necessary for the stockpiling of foodstuffs for Cuba.

4. Non-Food Requirements.

(a) General. In addition to financial assistance and supplies of foods, it is anticipated that immediate supplies of non-food items will be required for the rehabilitation of critical installations such as electric power, telephones and other communications, oil refineries, docks and transportation; and machinery spares, tires, automotive spares, steel bearings, fuels, lubricants, iron and steel semi-manufactures, copper products, fertilizers, dyes and chemicals, textile fibers and yarns, wood pulp, plastic molding materials, etc., for restoring important local industries to production. (See Tabs F & G) There will also be a need for medical and public health supplies.

(b) Medical and Public Health Needs. Medical problems may arise, whether from military action, lack of doctors and supplies, or from a period of public disorder or paralysis cutting off medical supplies and shutting down health services. These problems might be met by emergency shipment of medicines, medical supplies, and equipment parts and replacements. The return of Cuban doctors, nurses and other medical personnel to Cuba should be facilitated by urgent means, and possibly a team of US doctors and sanitary engineers should also be sent to evaluate the situation and establish the basis for larger scale assistance. Dispatch of a hospital ship from the Atlantic Fleet would be a dramatic means of providing medical assistance. It is estimated that approximately \$500,000 might be needed for medical and public health supplies, included in the \$35 million in 2 (b) above.

(c) Rehabilitation of Critical Installations. It is assumed that critical installations will have been subjected to sabotage and other damage although the extent of damage cannot be foreseen, and that it will be of the utmost urgency to restore these installations to at least minimum operation.

Preliminary discussions have been held with representatives of the Cuban Electric Company and the Cuban Telephone Company alerting them to the necessity of having competent technical personnel ready on short notice to appraise the needs for rehabilitation parts and supplies.

It is estimated that emergency funds in the amount of \$5 million be on hand (included in the \$35 million mentioned in 2 (b) above) for this purpose. The major probable demands of supplies and parts follow:

Cuban Electric Company--\$2.0 million

Cuban Telephone Company--1.5 million

Oil Refineries--.5 million

Railways--1.0 million

(d) To assist in processing the procurement of parts and supplies, the organization of a liaison group composed of Americans with experience in Cuba will be required to work with the Embassy. These men should have had technical experience in the following industries; sugar refining, electric power, telephones, petroleum refining, railroad, mining, rubber, textiles, metals, agricultural and automobile equipment. It is anticipated that these men would work with Cuban counterparts named by the new Cuban government. (See Tab E)

The liaison group should prepare detailed recommendations for the allocation of the contingency funds mentioned in 2 (b) above, would review and approve specific procurement orders, and assume responsibility for seeing that plans and orders are complied with.

5. Seized US Properties.

(a) Steps to be Taken by the US. The following steps should be taken by the US:

- i. Assemble documented data on the claims of US interests against Cuba resulting from the actions of the Castro government.
- ii. Seek assurances from the new Cuban government that the ownership of property as it existed on January 1, 1959, be recognized, and an undertaking to accept as the premise for further discussions the provisions of the Cuban Constitution of 1940 which apply to seized properties.
- iii. Seek a commitment from the prospective successor Cuban government to establish a joint claims commission to administer and dispose of seized properties and to treat with former owners.
- iv. Correlate policies relating to US claims with the overall plan for the solution of the varied and complex economic and social problems that will face Cuba and which have been responsible for the development of political difficulties within Cuba during past years; and taking into account that the economic and political system prevailing in Cuba prior to the Castro period may be fundamentally modified in response to political necessities.

(b) Principles Governing the Disposition of Seized Properties. The following principles should govern the disposition of seized properties:

- i. Prompt, adequate and effective compensation, including agreement for long-term compensation, in cases where the Cuban government decides to retain seized properties.
- ii. The negotiation of terms of acquisition in cases where the Cuban government desires to retain the properties.
- iii. The provision of legislation or regulations providing that uncompensated losses and damages sustained during the period of seizure may be taken as tax losses under U.S. laws by the United States owners upon restitution of their properties, allowing adequate carry-forward of losses to insure that the benefit of the losses actually accrues

to the owners.

6. Other Problems.

(a) Reconstituting US Embassy and Consular Staffs. The Department of State should be prepared to send an American staff of 29 persons, including Defense Attaches and Marine Guards, to reopen the US Embassy at Habana, and four Americans to reopen the US Consulate at Santiago de Cuba. These persons should be ready to proceed to Habana and Santiago on the day that a new Cuban government assumes power. (See Tab I)

One week later an additional 5 Americans should proceed to Habana and one additional American to Santiago.

(b) Control of Travel from the US to Cuba. With a friendly Cuban government in power, many persons will probably wish to travel to Cuba from the US. Most of these will be persons concerned with the promotion or protection of legitimate interests, Cubans and persons of other nationalities resident in Cuba and tourists, and the US will probably wish to encourage their travel. There will be other persons, however--irresponsible speculators, gamblers, gangsters, etc.--whose purposes will not be in the best interests of either Cuba or the US, and whose travel ought to be minimized. In view of the above, it is recommended that present travel controls be retained at least for the initial period.

(c) Voluntary Relief Agencies. It may be anticipated that voluntary relief agencies, notably Catholic Welfare and the Church World Service will be active in post-Castro Cuba. A register of approved voluntary agencies is maintained by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid of the International Cooperation Agency. Government support for the operations of agencies listed in this register can be approved and provided in a minimum of time, and can include providing surplus foods and other supplies, paying the costs of ocean freight, etc. (See Tab K)

7. Reconstruction of US-Cuban Relationships. A friendly Cuban government may provide an opportunity to rebuild the structure of US-Cuban relationships on a new basis, eliminating factors which have been the cause of strain in past years. Such factors would include the preferential commercial relationships (see Tab L), and the role and structure of sugar and mining companies, public utilities, and other US investments.

It is considered essential for the successor government to "capture" the vital forces of the Castro revolution, i.e., nationalism, obsession with economic and political independence, widespread pressures for land reform, industrialization, economic diversification and, above all, employment at all levels from manual labor to the utilization of skilled, technical, managerial and professional personnel. It is equally essential that the US be closely identified with this movement and with the solutions to these problems.

Whatever policy the US adopts toward Cuba is likely to be regarded as a model for US relationships with the rest of Latin America and as having implications with respect to US policies toward the rest of the underdeveloped world in Africa and Asia as well. Needless to say, the magnitude of a long-term aid, technical assistance and social development program in Cuba will be great. Preliminary estimates indicate it might be initiated at approximately \$125 million per year.

119. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, April 18, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, April 1961. Top Secret

I think you will find at noon that the situation in Cuba is not a bit good.

The Cuban armed forces are stronger, the popular response is weaker, and our tactical position is feebler than we had hoped. Tanks have done in one beachhead, and the position is precarious at the others.

The CIA will press hard for further air help--this time by Navy cover to B-26s attacking the tanks. But I think we can expect other pleas in rapid crescendo, because we are up against a formidable enemy, who is reacting with military know-how and vigor.

The immediate request I would grant (because it cannot easily be proven against us and because men are in need), but the real question is whether to reopen the possibility of further intervention and support or to accept the high probability that our people, at best, will go into the mountains in defeat.

In my own judgment the right course now is to eliminate the Castro air force, by neutrally-painted U.S. planes if necessary, and then let the battle go its way.

McG. B./1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

120. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Agency Personnel in Nicaragua

Washington, April 18, 1961, 11:26 a.m.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 4, Vol. I. Top Secret; Emergency.

4737. For [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]:

1. Following is for your guidance:

A. Present air situation dictates following:

(1) Maximum B-26 night attacks on strategic targets to eliminate Cuban air capability by Cuban crews.

(2) Maximum resupply effort during hours of darkness American to beachhead only and Cuban all areas.

(3) Use of F-51's in support of ground forces from Playa Giron.

(4) Support of ground forces by American crews (over beachhead and sea approaches only).

(5) Four additional B-26's being dispatched from Eglin to arrive evening 18 April.

2. American contract crews can be used B-26 strikes beachhead area and approaches only. Emphasize beachhead area only. Can not attach sufficient importance to fact American crews must not fall into hands enemy. In event this happens despite all precautions crews must state hired mercenaries, fighting communism, etc; US will deny any knowledge.

3. View above conserve all Cuban crews during daylight hours. Prepare for maximum effort strike tonight, Cuban crews frag bombs, three aircraft hit San Antonio de los Banos 19/0530Z and three additional aircraft strike same target 19/0700Z. Vary approaches effect maximum frag coverage all parking areas. Operational pattern future will be American air crews fly armed recce roads beachhead area approx each four hours. Cuban crews fly night airstrikes.

Note: Additional details on tonight's mission will follow.